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 Abstract in English 
The worst of the financial crisis is behind us. Nevertheless, the fall in global output in 2009 will 
be the largest of the post-war period. As a result, unemployment and government deficits are 
rising steeply this year, while inflation will be very low. Financial market support measures and 
expansionary macroeconomic policy have brought the steep output drop to an end and are 
leading to a tentative recovery of world output and world trade from the third quarter onwards. 
This upswing will continue next year, provided that the gradual return to normalcy now taking 
place in financial markets holds. The uncertainty that surrounds future international 
developments remains high. 
 
Key words: economic outlook, Europe 
 
JEL code:E66, F01.  
 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Wij zijn het dieptepunt van de financiële crisis al gepasseerd. Desalniettemin zal de afname van 
de wereldproductie in 2009 de grootste zijn na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Hierdoor zijn 
werkloosheid en overheidstekorten dit jaar sterk gestegen en is de inflatie laag. Overheidssteun 
aan de financiële markten en expansief macro-economisch beleid hebben de mondiale 
productiedaling tot staan gebracht en hebben geleid tot een herstel in wereldproductie en 
wereldhandel vanaf het derde kwartaal van 2009. De opwaartse conjunctuur zal in 2010 
aanhouden als de normalisering op de financiële markten aanhoudt. De onzekerheid over de 
mondiale economische ontwikkeling blijft echter groot.  
 
Steekwoorden: economische vooruitzichten, Europa. 
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Preface 
This CPB document contains the half-yearly General Report of the AIECE. The AIECE is the 
Association d’Instituts Européens de Conjoncture Économique (Association of European 
Conjuncture Institutes), having 42 members and observing institutes, representing 20 countries 
and 4 international organisations. The membership is open to independent European institutes 
involved in surveying economic developments and macroeconomic forecasting. Independent is 
interpreted as not being directly involved in conducting economic policies and not representing 
specific economic interests. The main objective of the association is to intensify the exchanges 
between its members with a view to improve their insight into international economic 
developments. The CPB is a long-standing member of this organisation. 
 
Twice a year, European economic issues are discussed in the general assembly of the AIECE. 
Main point on the agenda is the general report on the European outlook, prepared in turn by one 
of the institutes. The autumn 2009 report has been prepared by the CPB. Previously, the CPB 
prepared the reports of spring 1996 and autumn 1981. The current report was presented at the 
meeting by Wim Suyker, Jos Ebregt, Douwe Kingma and Gerard van Welzenis. They benefited 
from the substantial work of Mayke Kok in collecting and processing the replies to the 
questionnaire and in producing graphs and tables of the report.  
 
Coen Teulings 
Director   11 
1  The world economic environment 
The worst of the financial crisis is behind us. Nevertheless, the fall in global output in 2009 will 
be the largest of the post-war period. As a result, unemployment and government deficits are 
rising steeply this year, while inflation will be very low. Financial market support measures and 
expansionary macroeconomic policy have brought the steep output drop to an end and are 
leading to a tentative recovery of world output and world trade from the third quarter onwards. 
This upswing will continue next year, provided that the gradual return to normalcy now taking 
place in financial markets holds. The uncertainty that surrounds future international 
developments remains high. 












World industrial production, up to and incl. August 2009. Source: CPB world trade monitor database.  
 
1.1  The global economy 
The sudden intensification of financial stress in the autumn of 2008, which had been building 
for over a year, unavoidably played havoc with the real economy. In the course of last year, 
households incurred massive loss of wealth on residential property and financial assets. Both 
households and firms were facing tightening credit conditions, as cautious lenders turned off the 
tap. In September, confidence, heavily eroded already by a ceaseless stream of bad news, finally   12 
caved in.
1 Consumers and producers started to cut spending. From last year’s third quarter on, 
aggregate expenditure in all major economies − the United States, the euro area, and Japan − 
declined substantially. Due to the decline in domestic demand and lack of sufficient trade credit, 
imports slumped. The increased interconnectedness of national economies caused the damage to 
spread fast and far. Towards last year’s end, exports from Asia, ‘the world’s factory’, were hit 
particularly hard. World industrial output fell by a dazzling 8% between October 2008 and 
January 2009 (see Figure 1.1). It continued to fall, at a more modest pace, up to March 2009. In 
the final quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, real GDP in the OECD area dropped 
sharply, by 1.9% and 2.1% quarter-on-quarter, respectively. The collapse in global trade that 
started in November 2008 and lasted into January 2009, totalling a stunning 17%
2 in real terms, 
is even bigger than the slump that occurred during the first year of the Great Depression.
3  



















World GDP; 2009 is IMF projection of October 2009. Source data shown: Maddison up to 1980, IMF from 1980 onwards.  
 
The combination of financial market support measures, fiscal stimulus of unprecedented 
proportions and extremely stimulative monetary policy has prevented the world economy from 
continuing its free fall after the first quarter of 2009. Financial conditions have been gradually 
improving over the last months (see 1.4). The colossal loss of output that occurred in the first 
 
1 Developments in September and October 2008 even had elements of a classic panic. See Ben Bernanke, Reflections on a 
Year of Crisis, speech of 15 September 2009. 
2 Jos Ebregt and Gerard van Welzenis, World trade monitor, October 2009. This monitor is updated each month and is 
available at the CPB’s website: http://www.cpb.nl/eng/research/sector2/data/trademonitor.html. 
3 Miguel Almunia, Agustín S. Bénétrix, Barry Eichengreen, Kevin H. O’Rourke and Gisela Rua, From Great Depression to 
Great Credit Crisis, Similarities, Differences and Lessons, paper presented at the CEPR Economic Policy meeting, Tilburg, 
23-24 October 2009.   13 
quarter of 2009 was not repeated in the second. In some countries second quarter GDP was 
even slightly higher quarter-on-quarter, while in almost all other countries the second quarter 
decline was much smaller. In the second quarter, global world industrial production increased 
by 1.9% from the previous period, after falling 5% in the final quarter of 2008 and 5.5% in the 
first quarter of 2009 (all numbers given are non-annualised). The recovery has continued in the 
third quarter, with a rise in industrial production of around 2½%.
4 Nonetheless, world GDP is 
projected to fall this year by around 1¼%, the first drop since 1946 (see Figure 1.2).  










2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
IFO World Climate Indicator long-term average  
We expect economic conditions to improve during the rest of this year and in 2010. More 
positive global business surveys (Figure 1.3 ) and leading indicators of major economies are 
supporting this view. The same holds for improving financial conditions and continuing 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. Both output and trade will recover slowly however, 
owing to the severity of last year’s economic shock. Behavioural adjustments, such as 
households’ and firms’ efforts to decrease indebtedness, will weaken the pick-up in aggregate 
demand. Consequently, unemployment and fiscal deficits will reach record levels in the US and 
Europe.  
World trade will grow again in 2010 year-on-year, albeit not strongly enough to make up for 
the collapse in trade that occurred in the beginning of this year. Global output will reach a new 
record high due to a strong rebound in emerging economies. Output in the advanced economies, 
however, will remain below previous record levels until the end of the projection period.  
 
4 Based on data up to August; September production assumed unchanged from the previous month.    14 
Risk and uncertainties 
Uncertainties remain high. Even though the low point of the financial crisis has passed, many 
financial institutions are still struggling. Another adverse financial shock would be a deathblow 
to many of them, with severe consequences for the global economy. Meanwhile, governments 
and central banks have to think hard about an exit strategy. Governments around the world have 
expanded outlays in order to make up for failing private sector demand. Faced with mounting 
debt, they must decide when to start reducing spending or raising taxes. If the policy reversal 
comes too soon, the tentative recovery that is only just materialising will fall apart again. If it 
comes too late, a public debt-overhang will stifle economic growth for years to come and bond 
markets will react. In addition, as a result of government’s efforts to save banks from failure, 
many of these are now in fact public property. At some point in time, sooner rather than later, 
governments must sell their stakes and hand back control to the private sector. The question is: 
when exactly? Central banks are facing a similar dilemma. Last September, policy interest rates 
were lowered to zero or close to zero nearly everywhere. Since then, enormous amounts of 
liquidity have been pumped into the economy. Several central banks have built up large 
portfolios of private and public sector debt as a result of unconventional measures − generally 
referred to as ‘quantitative easing’ − they have taken to keep credit flows from running dry 
completely and to stimulate private sector expenditure. They also have accepted a wide range of 
assets as collateral for bank loans. As a result of all this, their balance sheets have expanded 
enormously (see Figure 1.12). The question we are facing is: when do they start to unwind these 
positions and when is the appropriate time to raise interest rates? 
Projections and views of the AIECE institutes 
All AIECE institutes project a global recovery in 2010. For the G3 (US, euro area and Japan) 
GDP is projected to rise by 1.3%, after a drop of 3.7% in 2009. The projection for 2010 is a 
substantial upward revision from the 0.5% projected on average in last Spring (Figure 1.4 ). 
However, after this upward revision, the projected upswing can still be characterised as modest. 
In their replies, many institutes underline the relatively moderate recovery and relate it to 
deleveraging in response to the financial crisis. 
The projected global recovery also shows up in a rebound in world trade. On average, 
AIECE institutes project a world trade increase of 4.8% in 2010, after a drop of 13% in 2009 
(see 5.1.7 on page 63 ). In Spring, a rise of 2.5% was projected for 2010.  
There are substantial differences between institutes in the expected strength of the global 
recovery. This is probably partly due to different closing times of the projection. But there 
seems also to be differences in views on the lasting impact of the financial crisis.    15 







Jan Feb Mrch Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov
Poll of Forecasters (Economist) Consensus Forecast IMF EC AIECE
GDP G3 2010, %
 
a
 G3: United States, Euro area and Japan. 
 
Questions for Discussion on the global economic developments 
•  Is the global recession over? If so, what role has policy played in ending the recession? 
What do you consider as the most effective policy measures taken?  
•  Can a normal recovery be expected or will the financial crisis be followed by a weak 
recovery?  
•  What are the main risks to the outlook? A fragile financial sector? Policies becoming too 
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1.2  Exchange rates 
The euro is on an upward trend vis-à-vis the dollar since 2001 (Figure 1.5). The intensification 
of financial stress in the Autumn of 2008 interrupted the gradual appreciation of the euro. The 
US may be the epicentre of the current crisis, but many investors still see it as a safe haven in 
tough times. With financial conditions improving, those investors are leaving the safe haven. As 
a consequence, the dollar has been depreciating since March. At the end of October, the euro 
rose temporarily above 1.50 dollar per euro causing renewed disquiet in many European 
capitals. 
 
By October, the euro has risen 3% in nominal effective terms from 2008. Although the focus is 
on the US dollar, it had only a minor contribution to this effective appreciation of the euro 
(Table 1.1 ). As a matter of fact, this appreciation is mostly due to a steep fall of pound sterling. 
The fall of the Polish zloty is the second most important cause. 
Figure 1.5  Downward trend of US dollar vis-a-vis euro interrupted by the financial crisis 
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Almost half  of the AIECE institutes applies random walk for future exchange rates in their 
projection. They keep exchange rates unchanged from the recent past. Of the other institutes, 
most expect an appreciation of the US dollar for they expect the recovery  to be stronger in the 
US than in the euro area. There are also some institutes expecting a further depreciation of the 
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Table 1.1  Recent effective appreciation of euro is not due to falling US dollar but caused by a  falling 
pound sterling 
− − − − 
Weight in effective exchange 
rate euro  
 
Change in %, October 2009 




Contribution to the change in 




       
US dollar  24.0  0.5  0.1 
Japanese yen  10.5  − 12.9  − 1.4 
Bulgarian lev  0.4  0.0  0.0 
Czech koruna  3.0  3.1  0.1 
Danish krone  2.7  − 0.2  0.0 
Estonian kroon  0.2  0.0  0.0 
Pound sterling  21.0  15.5  3.3 
Hungarian forint  2.7  6.5  0.2 
Lithuanian litas  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Latvian lats  0.0  0.9  0.0 
Polish zloty  3.4  20.0  0.7 
New Romanian leu  1.0  16.3  0.2 
Swedish krona  4.9  7.3  0.4 
Swiss franc  6.9  − 4.6  − 0.3 
Norwegian krone  1.3  1.6  0.0 
Croatian kuna  0.0  0.4  0.0 
Russian rouble  0.0  20.1  0.0 
Turkish lira  0.0  13.7  0.0 
Australian dollar  0.9  − 6.0  − 0.1 
Brasilian real  0.0  − 3.6  0.0 
Canadian dollar  2.0  − 0.5  0.0 
Chinese yuan renminbi  7.3  − 1.3  − 0.1 
Hong Kong dollar  2.2  0.0  0.0 
Indonesian rupiah  0.0  − 1.4  0.0 
South Korean won  3.3  7.6  0.2 
Mexican peso  0.0  20.5  0.0 
Malaysian ringgit  0.0  2.9  0.0 
New Zealand dollar  0.0  − 3.4  0.0 
Philippine peso  0.0  5.8  0.0 
Singapore dollar  1.9  − 0.4  0.0 
Thai baht  0.0  1.8  0.0 
South African rand  0.0  − 9.0  0.0 
Total      3.3 
        a
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1.3  Oil price 
The price of oil has exhibited extremely large swings in the course of the ongoing crisis. In the 
first year of the crisis, the oil price rose steeply, to reach a peak of 144 dollar on July 3rd 2008. 
On the day before the Lehman collapse, it was already down to 67 dollar per barrel. It continued 
to tumble to 34 dollar at the end of December 2008. As many financial markets, the oil price 
recovered strongly from early March onwards. At the end of October, it has risen to 77 dollar 
per barrel.  
 
The price swings since July 2008 can to a great extent be explained by the global business cycle 
and by the policy of the OPEC.
5 The severe recession has led to a strong drop in global demand 
for oil (see Figure 1.7). Its effect on the oil price was mitigated by supply reductions by OPEC 
leading to a substantial rise in spare capacity. Depreciation of the dollar in the course of 2009 
may also have contributed to the rise of the oil price measured in US dollars. However, the 
price rise in the course of 2009 is difficult to reconcile with the continuing rise in oil stocks. 
 
Only a few AIECE member institutes apply random walk for the oil price in their forecasts 
(random walk is also applied by the OECD in their Economic Outlook). No institute applies 
mechanically oil futures (the IMF and the ECB make use of oil futures in their forecasts). Most 
AIECE member institutes use a supply demand analysis to project the oil price. Those institutes 
project a rise in the oil price in 2010 as the global economic recovers and OPEC does not 
increase its oil supply sufficiently.  
 
 
5 The steep rise of the oil price from the start of the credit crisis in July 2007 till its peak in July 2008 is much harder to 
explain as the global business cycle was already softening.    19 
Figure 1.7  The Great Recession is showing up in the oil market 
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1.4  Financial markets 
Fourteen months after the demise of Lehman Brothers, financial markets have improved 
markedly. Having reached their lows around March this year, various financial indicators have 
reached levels last seen before the outbreak of the crisis. This rebound of the financial markets 
is to a large extent the result of unprecedented policy actions by governments and central 
banks. Notwithstanding recent improvements, possible future adverse shocks could dash hopes 
of a further recovery. If the improvement in financial markets and the real economy takes hold, 
governments and financial authorities will have to withdraw their supportive measures. The 
timing of such an exit-strategy is crucial. A premature withdrawal might prolong the crisis, 
whereas a belated exit could endanger the credibility of future monetary policy and lead to an 
increase in inflation and long-term interest rates.. 











1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
China, Middle East, Asian tigers, and Japan United States
Current account surplus, 
% of global GDP
 
What went wrong 
In the years prior to the Lehman failure, global imbalances increased (Figure 1.8). Especially 
the US had a large appetite for foreign capital.
6 This capital was eagerly provided by countries 
with large current account surpluses like China, Germany, Japan and the oil exporting countries. 
This capital glut found its way into US mortgages. These mortgages were not only prime 
mortgages, but also alt-A and sub-prime. By way of securitisation the providers of these 
 
6 Rogoff, K., 2009, China’s Dollar Problem, Project Syndicate (internet: http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/rogoff61), Obstfeld, M and K. Rogoff, 2009, Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products 
of Common Causes, paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Economic Policy Conference, 
October 18-20, 2009, (internet:: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~obstfeld/santabarbara.pdf).   21 
mortgages were able to repackage these mortgages and to sell them as mortgage backed 
securities (MBS) to investors. In this way the providers of these mortgages were able to access 
additional sources of funding and reallocate risks to those parties most willing to take on those 
risks.
7 Unfortunately, the risks contained in these mortgage packages were underestimated. As 
long as house prices continued to increase, there were no problems, but when the house price 
bubble burst, investors in MBS saw the value of their assets erode. Because of lack of 
transparency in the issuing process it was difficult to determine who owned what.
8 The balance 
sheet of Lehman Brothers turned out to contain a significant amount of repackaged sub-prime 
mortgages. Together with a leverage ratio of more than 30 to 1 (and its large use of short-term 
debt), only a small drop in the value of the assets wiped out the entire equity value and made 
Lehman insolvent.  
The decision of the Treasury not to bail out Lehman (it had bailed out Bear Stearns in 
March) made the sector face the facts. The result was a sudden intensification of financial stress 
and a need for financial markets to reassess risks.  
Consequences 
With the collapse of Lehman Brothers the uncertainty in the financial markets skyrocketed. 
Banks realised they did not know which of their competitors would be the next one to become 
insolvent. As a result the overnight interbank market came to a virtual halt. The situation at the 
interbank market at the time of the Lehman bankruptcy is illustrated in the figure below.  
Figure 1.9  Trust between banks is back again 
































7 BIS, September 2009, Report on Special Purpose Entities, The Joint Forum, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
8 Zingales, L., 2008, Testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on ‘Causes and Effects of the 
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy’ (internet: http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081006103245.pdf).   22 
Figure 1.10  Down and up on the financial markets, 1 January 2007 - 28 October2009 
Interest rate differential, capital market 
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 Interest rate differential between 7-10 year BBB-rated corporate bonds and 10 year government bonds. 
b
 Interest rate differential between BBB-rated corporate bonds and AAA-rated government bonds, all maturities. 
c
 United States: S&P 500. Europe: MSCI Europe. 
d
 Implied volatility reflects the expected standard deviation of percentage changes in stock prices over a period of 
   up to three month, as implied in the prices of options on stock price indices. United States series relates to S&P 500; euro 
   area series relates to MSCI EURO STOXX 50. 
 
In the US, the fear of default and collapse pushed the spread between LIBOR and OIS from less 
than 10 basispoints before September 2007 to more than 360 basispoints in November 2008. In 
August of this year, the spread fell below 0.25%, a level considered normal. At the end of 
October 2009, the spread had fallen below 15 basispoints. 
Governments and central banks to the rescue 
In order to prevent a total collapse of the financial system, governments and central banks 
started to support financial institutions and financial markets. To limit the effects of the 
financial crisis on the real economy, central banks lowered policy rates to ever lower levels, 
eventually even to levels near zero.   23 














To steer the policy rates to the desired level central banks initially applied conventional policy 
measures.
9 Eventually, with policy rates at very low levels, fears of deflation mounting and 
credit markets still in disarray, central banks had to take recourse to unconventional measures. 
Enormous amounts of liquidity were pumped into the economy. Several central banks have 
built up large portfolios of private and public sector debt as a result of unconventional measures 
− generally referred to as ‘quantitative easing’ − they have taken to keep credit flows from 
running dry completely and to stimulate private sector expenditure. They also have accepted a 
wide range of assets as collateral for bank loans. As a result of all this, their balance sheets have 
expanded enormously (see Figure 1.12, left panel).  
Figure 1.12  Balance sheets of central banks explode 













Jan 07 Jul 07 Jan 08 Jul 08 Jan 09 Jul 09
ECB FED BoE









Jan 07 Jul 07 Jan 08 Jul 08 Jan 09 Jul 09
ECB FED BoE
Lehman
 % of 2008 GDP
 
 
9 Conventional measures include the expansion of standard operations, mere technical changes and liquidity easing. Credit 
easing and quantitative easing are both unconventional measures. See for instance: IMF, 2009, Gobal Financial Stability 
Report, April 2009, box 1.6.   24 
It is difficult to say whether the objective of central banks to keep credit flowing to households 
and companies has been achieved, as a large part of the liquidity provided to the banks has 
shown up in deposits with the central banks (see figure Figure 1.12, right panel). Credit is 
falling, but it is very hard to say whether this is because a credit crunch or a drop in credit 
demand due to the recession. 
Already before the Lehman bankruptcy, banks in the UK had significant deposits with the 
Bank of England. In the euro area and in the US, these deposits started to increase after the 
collapse of Lehman. With almost 10% in terms of GDP, UK banks still have the largest deposits 
compared with banks in the US and in the euro area. The development of deposits with the ECB 
shows a close correlation with the special longer-term refinancing operations with a maturity of 
one year.  





Purchase of assets and 
lending by Treasury 
Central bank supp. Prov. 
With treasury backing 
Guarantees 
 
         
Austria  5.3  0.0  0.0  30.0 
Belgium  4.7  0.0  0.0  26.2 
France   1.2  1.3  0.0  16.4 
Germany  3.7  0.4  0.0  17.6 
Greece  2.1  3.3  0.0  6.2 
Ireland  5.3  0.0  0.0  257.0 
Italy  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Netherlands  3.4  2.8  0.0  33.7 
Portugal  2.4  0.0  0.0  12.0 
Spain  0.0  4.6  0.0  18.3 
United Kingdom  3.5  13.8  12.9  17.4 
United States  4.0  6.0  1.1  31.3 
         
Source: OECD, 2009, The Financial Crisis: reform and exit strategies. 
 
To save banks from the Lehman fate, governments have provided banks with fresh capital, 
practically nationalising many of them in the event. Besides providing capital governments 
guaranteed loans to the financial sector and in some instances took over the risk of future 
decreases in the value of the asset portfolio. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the rescue 
efforts in euro area countries and in the UK and US. 
View of the AIECE institutes on policy rates of the central banks 
The AIECE institutes expect the federal funds rate to average at 0.3% in 2009. Such an average 
implies that during the rest of 2009 the rate will remain at or near its current level. For next year 
an increase to an average of 0.7% is expected with answers ranging from 0.3% to 1.3%. 
For the year 2010, the euro short term interest rate is expected to stay at the 2009 level of 
1.3%. The range of answers for 2009 is almost completely confined to the interval of 0.6% to 
1.6%, with one outlier of 2.5%. The same holds true for 2010. All answers except one lie in the   25 
interval 1.0% to 1.8%. The outlier is 2.6%.The institutes expect the long term interest rate to 
show a small increase to 4.0% in 2010 from 3.9% in 2009.  
The outlook 
The build-up in global imbalances in the years leading up to 2007 is widely believed to be one 
of the causes of the problems in world financial markets.
10 In future, these imbalances will have 
to be redressed to a sustainable level. During the meeting of the G20 in Pittsburg last 
September, heads of state agreed to work together to strive for smaller imbalances. This is, 
however, not the first time governments agree to redress global imbalances. Although part of 
the imbalances has already vanished because of the current recession (Figure 1.8), the longer 
term situation is uncertain.  
Figure 1.13  Loss of net worth makes US consumers more thrifty 
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The same holds for the lasting impact on assets and liabilities of US households. A fall in house 
prices ignited the problems in the financial markets, but when these intensified problems spread 
to the real economy. Falling house prices, together with a decline of the stock market, implied a 
severe loss of net worth for households.  
Between the high of the third quarter of 2007 and the low of the first quarter of 2009, US net 
worth declined with 14200 billion dollar. With house prices and asset prices bottoming out 
during March/April of 2009, net worth started to increase again in the second quarter. With a 
decrease in net worth of more than 20%, US households intensified deleveraging by decreasing 





10 The role of global imbalances is widely accepted but not by all. For instance German policy makers do not agree. In the 
Financial Times, one commentator (Martin Wolf) is stressing its importance frequently, while another one (Samuel Brittan) is 
downplaying it.    26 
Figure 1.14  US consumers start to save again 























Figure 1.15  Banks not yet out of the danger zone 
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Figure 1.16  Credit down: but is it because a credit crunch or lack of demand? 
United States 
a
                                                                  
 
       Euro Area 
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b
 Credit to business sector and households.   27 
Declining asset prices also had a negative effect on bank balance sheets (Figure 1.15 left panel). 
Banks were forced to start a process of deleveraging by decreasing lending. As a precautionary 
measure banks might even choose to aim at a leverage level lower than before Lehman. 
To date, banks only have partially addressed the impaired assets on their balance sheets. The 
changes in accounting rules have removed much of the incentive for banks to remove these 
assets. In the future,  credit deterioration will put further pressure on banks’ balance sheets. The 
IMF reckons US banks are more than half way through their loss cycle. On the other hand loss 
recognition by European banks is less advanced.
11  
 
Future capital needs depend on the regulatory capital requirements that banks will have to 
satisfy. In Figure 1.15 (right panel), the amount of regulatory capital is expressed as a 
percentage of risk weighted assets. Under current regulation, the Tier 1 capital ratio has to 
exceed 8%. The Tier 1 risk based capital ratio is the ratio of a bank's core (equity capital) to its 
total risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets are the total of all assets held by the bank which 
are weighted for credit risk according to a formula determined by the regulatory authority. An 
alternative to the Tier 1 capital ratio is the leverage of a bank, measured as tangible common 
equity (TCE) over tangible assets (TA).
12  
Even with a required Tier 1 capital ratio of 10 percent banks in the UK are rather well 
capitalised. Under the stricter requirement according to the TCE/TA-ratio, banks in all regions 
will have to increase their capital base. 
Recently, American banks have earned billions of dollars from their “toxic” portfolios as a 
rally in some of these distressed assets enabled them to book accounting gains or sell them.
13 
These  third quarter results bode well for other banks, after the sector suffered more than 1,000 
billion dollar in write-downs globally on troubled assets such as mortgage-backed securities, as 
a result of the crisis. 
The deleveraging process of households and banks is far from completed. Households’ debts 
are still high and banks want to bolster their capital ratios. This implies that in the near future, 
consumer spending will be relatively low. Because banks will be reluctant to lend money, the 
cost of capital will be higher than before the crunch and investment activities will be lower 
because of these higher costs. 
At some point in time, central banks will have to retreat from the market and commercial 
banks should be able to stand on their own feet again. The questions central banks are facing 
are: when do we start to unwind our positions and when is the appropriate time to raise interest 
rates? What happened in the US during the years shortly after the Great Depression is an 
 
11 IMF, 2009, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2009. 
12 TCE is calculated as total equity, less preferred shares and intangible assets, TA are total assets less intangible assets. 
13 Financial Times, 2009, US banks gain from rally in toxic assets, October 18, 2009.   28 
example of what may go wrong if monetary authorities make a wrong assessment of the 
economic and monetary situation. In the period 1933-1937, economic growth averaged 9%. 
This growth was halted by a switch to a contractionary fiscal and monetary policy. The Fed 
feared an increase in inflation because of the large quantities of excess reserves banks were 
holding. By doubling the reserve requirements the Fed locked up these excess reserves. Banks 
responded with reducing lending. The resulting monetary contraction was an important cause of 
the 1937-38 recession. 
In order to mitigate the chance of future financial crises, reform of financial markets is 
necesarry. First of all, responsability between national regulators should be clarified and each 
regulator should act according to sound regulatory rules. Furthermore, the integrity and 
transparacy of financial markets should be improved. And last but not least, the international 
dimension of large financial institutions should receive due attention in the future regulatory 
framework. 
Questions for discussion on financial markets 
•  Bad timing of the exit strategy could hurt economic recovery (see for example the 
experience of the US economy in 1937-38 and Japanese economy during the last decade). 
What is the right moment for governments and central banks to scale down their support 
for the banking sector? Should they have started already? What factors are crucial to this 
timing? Is international coordination necessary? Do you expect policy makers to take the 
right decisions?  
•  Is it possible for central banks to ‘lean against the wind’?  If so, how can we discern a(n 
asset) bubble? 
•  Do you expect broader policy goals for central banks (broader than the current inflation or 
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2  The international economic outlook 
2.1  United States 
The United States are starting to recover from the deepest post-World War II recession. Growth 
figures for 2009 as a whole will be extremely unfavourable, but in the course of this year, 
quarterly declines in GDP have become smaller. In the third quarter, GDP made a remarkably 
strong rebound. 
 
Table 2.1  The deepest post-World War II recession: GDP growth, United States, 2008 q3 - 2009 q2 
a
 
  2008 q3  2008 q4  2009 q1  2009 q2  2009 q3  2008  2009 h1 
chained 2005 dollars         quarter on quarter change, SA              change on year ago 
         % per quarter              % per year 
               
Gross domestic product  – 0.7  – 1.4  – 1.6  – 0.2   0.9  0.4  – 3.6 
               
Private consumption expenditure  – 0.9  – 0.8  0.2  – 0.2  0.8  – 0.2  – 1.6 
Private gross capital expenditure  – 1.8  – 6.7  – 16.1  – 6.5  2.8  – 7.3  – 26.6 
Government expenditure  1.2  0.3  – 0.7  1.6  0.6  3.1  2.1 
Exports  – 0.9  – 5.3  – 8.5  – 1.0  3.5  5.4  – 13.4 
Imports  – 0.6  – 4.5  – 10.7  – 3.9  3.9  – 3.2  – 17.4 
  a 
Source: National Income and Product Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Figure 2.1  The deepest post-World War II recession: quarterly real GDP growth, United States, 1930-2009 
Quarter on quarter                                                    
 



























 Annual growth rates are shown for the period 1930-1947. 
 
A dismal year 
In the second quarter, GDP in the United States declined for the fourth time in a row and for the 
sixth time in one and a half years. The decline was however much smaller than in the previous 
two, disastrous quarters. Of all expenditure categories, capital spending decreased the most. 
Residential investment, which has been decreasing incessantly since early 2006, again lost 6% 
compared to the first quarter (non-annualised). Spending on commercial and industrial real 
estate, which started falling in the course of 2008, lost 5% in the second quarter of 2009 (non-  30 
annualised). Both these declines are much smaller than the ones that occurred in the first 
quarter. The negative effect on GDP growth of firms liquidating their inventories has also 
decreased. In the first quarter of this year, this phenomenon − producers’ response to the 
unwanted build-up of inventories they were faced with towards the end of 2008 − accounted for 
a stunning third of the record fall in GDP. More recently, firms seem to have started to bring 
output more closely in line with expected sales. While private sector expenditure posted a 
moderate rise in the first quarter of the year, it went down again in the second, the third decline 
in four quarters. This contrasts with the 2001 recession (the bursting of the ‘internet bubble’), 
when private consumption expenditure hardly suffered.  
 
Figure 2.2  Slash production to get rid of unsold products: stock changes, United States, 2002-2009 
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Although the second quarter decline in GDP was limited when compared to the first, it only 
added to the hefty loss of output that has occurred over the last one and a half years. In the 
second quarter, GDP was 4% lower than it was one year before. This is the largest decrease 
since World War II. Private consumption expenditure has lost 2%; private capital expenditure 
has gone down by over 25%. Unemployment is now at its highest since the early eighties and 
many employees are working fewer hours than they would like to. Some workers have for the 
time being withdrawn completely from the labour market. 
The advance estimates of third quarter GDP growth show a remarkable rebound in activity. 
GDP went up by 0.9% (non-annualised), the highest quarter-on-quarter growth rate since the 
third quarter of 2007, with all broad expenditure categories contributing positively (private 
consumption and capital expenditure, government expenditure, and exports; imports obviously 
excepted). As expected by many, the stock-cycle has turned, for the time being at least, stock 
changes accounting for over a fifth of overall GDP growth in the third quarter. Less expectedly, 
residential investment posted a positive contribution (0.5%, non-annualised) for the first time 
since the last quarter of 2005. Of the other components of private capital expenditure, spending 
on equipment and software has stopped falling, while the ongoing decline in spending on 
structures (commercial and residential real estate) has decelerated markedly compared to the   31 
second and third quarter. The third quarter (quarter-on-quarter) growth rate of personal 
consumption expenditure is the biggest since the first quarter of 2007. 
Figure 2.3  Tentative recovery? Key economic variables, United states, 2005-2009 
Industrial production                                              
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Inflation has been low for a considerable time. In September, consumer prices were 1.3% lower 
than they were a year ago. Of the ten monthly on year ago changes in consumer prices up to 
September, all but one were negative. Such a string of negative figures has not been seen since 
the mid-fifties. The decline in July was close to 2% on year ago, a figure last recorded in   32 
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January 1950. Headline inflation is being driven down mainly by decreasing energy prices − the 
price of oil reached its record level just over one year ago, 144 dollar a barrel in early July 2008 
− but wages and profits margins are giving in as well. Core inflation has made a very gradual 
descent over the last few years. The most recent peak was in September 2006, at 2.9% on year 
ago. By September, the figure had decreased to 1.5%.   33 
 
The bottom has been reached; it’s deep 
Generally speaking, with prices on the decrease, unemployment high, capacity utilisation 
extremely low, and the number of vacant housing units high, there is now an enormous amount 
of slack in the United States economy. On a more positive note, the signs are that GDP has 
stopped contracting. The latest monthly figures and leading indicators suggest that it will 
increase slightly in the second half of 2009. For the year, the damage has obviously already 
been done. According to the latest projections of the IMF and the OECD, this years’ contraction 
of GDP will be in the range of 2½% to 3%. The fragile recovery now underway is mainly due 
to the lagged, combined effects of the enormous fiscal stimulus approved early this year 
(amounting to 787 billion dollar, 5½% of GDP) and the zero interest policy adopted by the Fed 
last Fall, supplemented with various unconventional measures aimed at keeping credit flowing 
and boosting aggregate expenditure. The turnaround is supported by reviving exports to Asia 
and the reversal of the stock cycle. At least as important, the housing market seems to be finally 
bottoming out. In the second quarter, the relentless declines in housing starts and home sales 
have come to a halt. House prices rose slightly since June. Still, arrears on mortgages and 
foreclosures show no sign of abating. 
The current account deficit is decreasing, owing to both the decrease in the volume of 
imports and the decline in the price of oil from last year’s July record level. In both the first and 
the second quarter of this year, the deficit amounted to 3% of GDP, just half the quite 
unsustainable 6% reached in 2006. On the other hand, and rather surprisingly, the external 
financial position has worsened. Net external debt has hit an all-time record, as US residents 
have suffered a much larger loss on investments abroad than non-residents have on investments 
in the United States. This is due to the fact that US residents have invested relatively much in 
shares and little in government debt compared to non-residents investing in the US. 
 
Reaching for the surface 
Provided that the gradual return to normalcy in financial markets continues, the recovery of the 
real economy will probably hold up next year. There are several factors however which threaten 
to retard or undermine even the upturn. Households will try to decrease indebtedness by 
reducing consumption. They hardly have had the opportunity yet to repair their balance sheets 
by paying off debt, an inevitable adjustment to the enormous loss of wealth incurred on 
residential property and financial assets. The large fiscal deficit and mounting government debt 
make continued fiscal stimulation at the present scale difficult, if not impossible. As long as 
there is much spare production capacity, the incentive for adding to it will be minimal. In 
addition, the cost of capital will be permanently higher than it was before the crisis. 
Consequently, capital expenditure will most likely remain subdued. All things considered, a 
return to full employment may well take much longer under the current conditions than it 
usually does after a recession.   34 
 
Figure 2.5  Looking forward with increasing confidence: leading indicators, United States, 1978-2009 
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Again according to the IMF and the OECD, GDP growth in 2010 will be less than 1%. That 
will not be sufficient to stabilise the labour market. Unemployment may reach 10% by the end 
of this year already. As a result, wages will remain suppressed and inflation will remain very   35 
low. Low GDP growth and sustained deficit spending may well cause the fiscal deficit to grow 
beyond 10% of GDP in 2010. Deficit spending and measures that have been taken to support 
the financial sector may cause the federal government’s debt to rise to over 60% of GDP in 
2010, which would be the highest debt ratio since the early fifties. 
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The institutes’ forecasts 
The forecasts of institutes participating in the AIECE network may be summarised as follows. 
The forecasts of this year’s contraction range from 2.5% to 3.3%, the average being minus 
2.8%. Not surprisingly, the range for next year is much larger. GDP forecasts for 2010 vary 
from 0.6% to 2.5%, with an average of 1.6%. Many institutes emphasise that so far, the 
recovery has been due to temporary factors such as the reversal of the stock cycle and the cash-
for-clunkers scheme. In addition, many question the sustainability of the recovery, citing the 
factors already mentioned before: household indebtedness, rising unemployment, the presence 
of spare capacity, and the public sector’s financial constraints. Most describe the recovery as 
moderate and fragile and do not see a sharp, V-shaped recovery in the making. On the other 
hand, one positive factor mentioned is the flexibility of the labour market, which may facilitate 
a surge in labour productivity. 
   36 
Questions for discussion on the US economy 
At the current junction, uncertainties abound. Even if in the United States the recession is 
formally declared to be over within a few months, countless questions remain. A short 
selection: 
 
•  When analysing actual GDP growth and thinking about the near-term prospect for it, we 
often think in terms of expenditure categories. Taking this approach now easily leads us to 
think that there is hardly a way out of the ongoing recession. Still, recessions always come 
to an end at some point in time. Does thinking in terms of GDP components entail undue 
pessimism under the current circumstances? 
•  The unheard-of turmoil that has raged financial markets for many months has eased 
considerably. Day-to-day volatility and risk premiums have decreased gradually and 
substantially. Is a renewed outbreak of financial turbulence conceivable? Are new financial 
disasters to be expected? What about the diverging performances of wholesale and retail 
banking? Is the wholesale market now dominated by a few super-big companies who are 
glad to have seen some of their biggest rivals going out of business? 
•  How is the Fed going to deal with the enormous amount of liquidity that is around? In spite 
of the vast amounts of money that have been brought into circulation since September last 
year, is there a real danger of deflation?  
•  The dollar recently depreciated below the magic 1.50 exchange rate to the euro. Will the 
crisis have structural consequences for such fundamental issues as global trade 
imbalances? Will US consumers finally adjust and go on saving more than they used to? 
•  The United States government has to deal with a large number of important policy issues. 
Health care, financial sector reform, fiscal policy, trade policy are all on the agenda (or 
should be). Will the Obama administration pull it all off? If he fails to carry through 
credible and effective reform in health care finance, will he be able to be effective in other 
fields? What do we know this far about his stance on free trade and protectionism? 
   37 
2.2  Japan 
Japan was hit extremely hard by the global crisis, mainly through its high export dependency of 
durable goods. Final demand for these products collapsed all over the world, followed by a 
sharp reduction in inventories. Japanese industrial production declined at an annualised rate of 
65% at the beginning of this year (figure 2.7). An early recovery in neighbouring countries, 
particularly China, helped to turn around this devastating development. Exports started to rise 
again in May and industrial production in June. Even though the recovery took on a ferocious 
pace, exports and production levels are still far below the highs in 2008. The second positive 
driving force for the Japanese economy from the second half of this year is the fiscal stimulus 
packages to the tune of 4.2% of GDP.  
Figure 2.7  Japan the most swinging state in the world  
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 Seasonal adjusted, three month moving average. 
 
AIECE member institutes estimate Japanese GDP to fall by 5.7% this year and to recover 
only partially in 2010 by 1.3%. Though the contribution of net exports to growth has recently 
turned positive, for 2009 as a whole net exports are dragging down GDP growth by   38 
approximately 2%-points, but it will contribute positively in 2010. Private investment was 
scaled back in 2009 due to a sharp fall in profitability in the first half of this year. No recovery 
is expected for 2010 due to weak demand and very low capacity utilisation rates. Household 
disposable income has been falling as the decline in wages accelerated and employment shrank. 
With hardly any change in the household savings ratio private consumption will decline this 
year and recover only slightly in 2010.  
Figure 2.8  After a lost decade, Japan has experienced the Great Recession 
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Deteriorating conditions on the labour market have intensified deflationary pressures. Actual 
and core inflation will probably remain negative over the forecast horizon in spite of record low 
interest rates and a lot of quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan. However, these measures 
helped to improve corporate financing conditions. Fiscal stimulus and automatic stabilizers 
pumped up the government deficit to almost 10% in 2009, with no improvement in sight for 
2010. Gross public debt will rise to approximately 200% of GDP, the highest ever recorded in 
any advanced economy. The new government has not yet announced any fiscal consolidation 
targets, but the Bank of Japan is planning to start withdrawing its emergency credit-easing 
programs in the near future. 
Figure 2.9  Spending and deflation in Japan 
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Figure 2.10  Japanese leading indicators on the rise 
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a Last three month over previous three month, annual rate. 
 
The main downward risks for Japan seem to be a (forced) early withdrawal from expansionary 
policies and a further rise in the exchange rate. On the other hand, a more positive outlook for 
the rest of Asia should help the Japanese economy to recover more quickly.   40 
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Questions for Discussion on the Japanese economy 
•  How to stop deflation?  
•  Is the strong yen killing exports?  
•  To what extent will private final domestic demand be able to take over from exports, stock 
building and government stimuli to sustain the recovery in 2010? 
   41 
2.3  Emerging Asia 
Export oriented countries in emerging Asia were hit particularly hard by the financial crisis in 
the second half of last year. Production growth decelerated fast, but started to pick up at the 
beginning of this year, preceding other parts of the world. Moreover, the pace of the recovery 
was incredibly strong, given the weak environment. In the third quarter, industrial production 
and GDP already surpassed the summits reached in the second quarter of 2008 (Figure 2.12 
upper right panel) The outlook for the fourth quarter is also bright according to the OECD 
leading indicator for industrial production (Figure 2.13). The turnaround was mainly fabricated 
by huge fiscal and monetary stimuli, notably in China and Korea. Neighbouring countries 
profited immediately, but the region as a whole also helped to pull the rest of the world out of 
the recession. So far, Asian exports recovered in line with the rest of the world during the 
second and third quarter, but Asian import growth clearly outpaced the world average. A 
rebound in financial markets and capital inflows, easing financing constrains for smaller firms, 
contributed as well to the recovery. In the course of this year, stock building become the third  
Figure 2.12  Powerhouse Asia leading the global recovery 
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 Seasonal adjusted, three month moving average.   42 
 
major driving force for the recovery. India and Indonesia showed a more stable growth path 
during the recession, being less export-dependent.  
 
China was leading the turnaround with massive fiscal stimulus. The government balance 
switched from a surplus of over 3% of GDP in the first quarter of 2008 to a similar deficit in the 
first quarter of 2009. The current upswing is already helping to control the deficit and there is 
room for further stimuli in case of an unexpected slowdown. Public spending is switching from 
infrastructure to social services like education, health and pensions. This should contribute to 
higher private consumption and better control of the investment boom and lessen the export 
dependency. Car subsidies helped to raise car sales by some 85% in the third quarter over a year 
ago. Money supply rose over 20% in the first half of this year, but was reined in significantly in 
the third quarter to avoid overheating and speculative bubbles in asset markets. However, 
expectations of a stronger yuan may boost inflows of capital. So far the recovery is entirely 
driven by domestic demand. AIECE members estimate a GDP growth in China of 8.0% in 2009 
and 8.8% in 2010. Current trends seem to point to even stronger growth in the current year, and 
possibly in 2010.  
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Other countries in Asia also pursued powerful fiscal and monetary policies to counteract the 
financial crisis. But the initial conditions were, in general, not as sound as in China. In some 
countries (India and Malaysia), fiscal sustainability is coming into question. Many of these 
countries also experienced a reversal in international capital flows, leading to severe credit   44 
tightening. The reversal in capital flows caused rapid exchange rate depreciation in most 
countries vis-à-vis the dollar, yen and yuan during 2008. This was particularly important for 
Korea, with the won falling by 35% in nominal effective terms. Authorities reacted with 
accommodating monetary and bank lending policies. Maintaining high credit growth carries the 
risk of creating incentives for overinvestment, unsustainable asset price inflation and a 
worsening of credit quality in the banking system. Regulators in South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore already told banks to tighten lending standards. Moreover, Hong Kong recently 
enacted measures to curtail property speculation. India’s central bank took the first step toward 
withdrawing its record monetary stimulus as inflation pressures started to build up, ordering 
lenders to keep more cash in government bonds.  
Most countries outside China will still show negative growth in 2009, but a more stable 
development in India and Indonesia props up the average for this group of countries to some 
1.5%. Growth in emerging Asia next year is forecast to equal approximately the long-term 
trend. 
Questions for Discussion on dynamic Asia 
•  Do the favourable 2009 developments show that dynamic Asia is permanently decoupled 
from the global business cycle? 
•  How to diminish export-dependency? 
•  Will private final domestic demand be able to take over from stock building and 
government stimuli to sustain the recovery in 2010? 
•  Have we entered the exit phase of fiscal and monetary support in Asia? 
 
2.4  Central and Eastern European countries 
Production in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole declined earlier and faster than in the rest 
of the world (figure 2.14). Particularly Russia and most of the other CIS states were hit hard. 
Central European countries generally moved in line with Western Europe, with two exceptions: 
Poland was doing much better and the Baltic much worse. The upturn in the whole area is now 
well established, but is trailing the world economy somewhat . Industrial production levels are 
still far below the latest top (-13%). The production decline is mirrored in imports declining at 
record pace during 2008, culminating in a negative momentum of -60% (annual rate) at the 
beginning of 2009. Imports are still 28% below the top in early 2008 and are just starting to 
recover. Exports fell more in line with world trade and net exports thus contributed positively to 
growth. Investments in the region were most affected by the financial crisis as capital flows 
suddenly turned outward. This also led to sharp depreciations, first in Central European 
countries, notably Poland, and later in Russia as well. The Baltic States kept their currencies 
pegged to the euro, but are under increasing pressure to abolish this policy. 
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Figure 2.15  Central and Eastern Europe in the world economy
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Russia has been dealing with the consequences of an oil-boom-related surge in capital inflows 
up to the middle of 2008, culminating in a rapid devaluation of the ruble at the beginning of this 
year. Substantial foreign-currency borrowing had led to unsustainable high rates of credit 
growth. The sudden reversal of the capital flows and the drop in commodity prices led to a free 
fall of investments, causing GDP to decline by more than 10% in the first half of this year.   46 
Recent data show that the economy may have turned the corner, helped by aggressive fiscal 
stimulus. GDP growth in the third relative to the preceding quarter is estimated at +0.6%. 
Rising commodity prices and a recovery in the rest of Europe will contribute to further growth 
in 2010. Fiscal policy will probably remain expansionary in spite of the enormous deterioration 
of the fiscal balance between 2008 (surplus 4% of GDP) to 2009 (deficit 7% of GDP). 
Monetary policies have been geared to safeguarding stability following the sharp depreciation. 
These policies could become more accommodating now. AIECE member institutes estimate 
Russian GDP will fall by 7.0% this year, but will return to growth by 2.3% next year. Other CIS 
countries are doing a bit better on average, but the Ukraine and Moldavia are worst off with 
GDP declines of approximately 15% this year and hardly any recovery in 2010. 
Table 2.2  Key variables of major countries in Central Europe 
  Poland      Czech Republic    Hungary       
    Slovak Republic 
  2009  2010    2009  2010    2009  2010    2009  2010 
                       
  Annual percentage changes %                 
                       
GDP volume  0.9  1.4    − 4.3  0.3    − 6.3  0.5    − 4.5  1.3 
Private consumption  1.9  1.0    1.1  0.7    − 5.9  0.3    − 1.5  1.5 
Investments  na  na    na  na    na  na    na  na 
Exports g&s  − 10.0  4.9    − 17.6  2.4    − 14.2  5.0    − 14.0  − 0.4 
Imports g&s  − 13.3  5.2    − 17.7  0.4    − 18.5  5.5    − 10.1  − 1.3 
                       
Private consumption deflator  3.5  2.1    0.6  1.2    4.6  4.4    1.9  2.3 
Unemployment, % labour force  9.8  11.6    6.8  8.5    9.9  10.0    12.4  11.7 
Government net lending, % GDP  − 5.8  − 7.2    − 4.3  − 4.9    − 3.9  − 3.8    − 6.3  − 5.5 
 
On average the development of GDP volume and demand components in the four major Central 
European countries is compatible to Western European averages (table 2.2). This is also true for 
government net borrowing. Inflation and unemployment rates are somewhat higher. Poland is 
one of the very few countries in the world that managed to keep GDP growth positive in 2009. 
The extreme depreciation of the zloty curbed export losses and the high level of self-financing 
of private investments as well as infrastructural investments linked to EU transfers sheltered 
Poland to some extent from the international financial crisis. Polish banks did not get into great 
difficulty. Fiscal and monetary policies are judged neutral rather than expansionary, but some 
taxes were cut. Hungary is on the other end of the spectrum. Tight macro-economic policies 
under the IMF program reined in expenditures. The prominent position of foreign banks 
curtailing credit did not help either. But restored credibility and bouncing investor confidence 
opened up the way to monetary easing in the second half of this year. Exports will remain the 
main driving force in 2010, but the shift in tax burden from labour to consumption will 
contribute positively to Hungary’s growth potential in the long run. Current developments in the 
Czech and Slovak Republic most closely resemble those in Western Europe. Fiscal and 
monetary stimulus played a major role in containing the fall out of the financial crisis. The   47 
Czech Republic already approved a fiscal consolidation plan for the medium-term. Availability 
of credit remained ample, although lending standards were slightly tightened. The outlook for 
both countries remains very dependent on the growth (prospects) for Germany. 
Questions for Discussion on Central and Eastern European economies 
•  Is the fall of local currencies damaging for confidence of international investors?  
•  Could fiscal tightening (for instance in the Czech Republic and Poland) hamper the 
recovery?  
•  Or is a lack of budget discipline a greater threat (for instance downgrading zloty)?  
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3  The euro area 
In the second quarter of 2009, quarterly GDP in the euro area decreased for the fifth time in a 
row. However, after the disastrous output losses that occurred in last years’ final quarter and 
this year’s first − respectively 1.8% and 2.5% quarter on quarter (non-annualised), the biggest 
such declines in fifty years − the second quarter decline in GDP was a relatively moderate 
0.2%, while growth returned in the two major euro area countries Germany and France. 
In the first months of the year, all categories of aggregate expenditure declined, resulting in 
a massive contraction of production. Consumption expenditure went down as the recession 
started to bite. Employment decreased and consumers, under the force of circumstances, started 
to pay down debt and increase savings. Exports suffered from failing demand worldwide. 
Capital expenditure decreased as capacity utilisation plunged, taking away firms’ very motive 
for investment in productive capacity, while the necessary means were lacking anyway, with 
profits declining and credit conditions ever tightening. Finally, GDP growth was pushed deeper 
into the red by a marked deceleration of stock building, a deliberate adjustment of production to 
the unintended rise in the stock-to-sales ratio that took place towards the end of last year. 
Figure 3.1  Euro area has its deepest post-war recession
a  
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The near-stabilisation of output in the second quarter was due to external demand ceasing to fall 
as fast as it did in previous quarters and to the waning of adverse stock adjustments. 
Nevertheless, unemployment, which generally lags production considerably, continued to rise. 
One out of five young labour market entrants is now unable to find employment. Since the end 
of 2007, the unemployment rate has risen by 2.2 percentage points, not even half the 4.5 
percentage points increase in the United States. But from the final quarter of 2007 to the second 
quarter of 2009, GDP in the euro area has contracted by 4.8%, while the figure for the United 
States is 3.8% (see Table 3.1). As a result, labour productivity in the United States continues to 
rise, whereas in the euro area it is falling. In many European countries, labour law makes 
shedding workers hard for employers. In addition, existing schemes for working time reduction   49 
as well as recent extensions to such schemes enable firms to employ workers part-time at low 
cost. Labour market conditions vary considerably across euro area countries. Conditions are 
harshest in Spain and Ireland. In June, unemployment in these countries had risen by 9¼ and 
7½ percentage points respectively from late 2007 levels. In the Netherlands by contrast, the 
increase during that period was ½ percentage point only (harmonised statistic). Not 
surprisingly, the Netherlands now have the lowest unemployment rate of all euro area countries. 
Just as in the United States, fresh statistics indicate that GDP in the euro area has stopped 
contracting. Producers’ and consumers’ confidence have recently been rising from historically 
low levels. The same applies to the OECD’s leading indicator. GDP is now projected to 
contract by 4½% in the whole of 2009. The end of the contraction is due to stimulative policy 
measures taken in the euro area and elsewhere. A total breakdown of the financial system has 
been prevented. Aggregate demand is being supported by governments engaging in deficit 
spending at an unheard-of scale and extremely loose monetary conditions. Additional 
government spending in the euro area amounts to over 1% of GDP this year. The ECB’s main 
policy interest rate, which stood at 2.5% at the beginning of this year, has been lowered to 1%, a 
record low in the bank’s history. Its most influential predecessor at the national level, the 
Bundesbank, never set its policy rate this low. The ECB continues to inject liquidity into the 
financial system, one of the new methods being cheap bank loans with a maturity of one year. 
Another, less conventional measure is the purchase of so-called covered bonds (asset-backed 
bonds held by commercial banks). 
Table 3.1  GDP is not telling the whole story about the recent relative economic performance of the euro 
area 
     
  Euro area  US 
   
 
Second quarter of 2009, percentage changes from the 
corresponding quarter in previous performance 
     
GDP   − 4.8  − 3.8 
Domestic demand  − 3.2  − 4.7 
Net exports (contribution to GDP growth)  − 1.6  0.9 
     
Domestic demand  − 3.2  − 4.7 
Private consumption  − 0.9  − 1.7 
Government consumption  2.5  2.5 
Gross fixed capital formation  − 11.4  − 16.9 
     
Net exports (contribution to GDP growth)  − 1.6  0.9 
Exports of goods and services  − 17.7  − 15.0 
Imports of goods and services  − 14.4  − 18.5 
     
Employment  − 1.6  − 3.9 
Productivity per person employed  − 3.2  0.1 
     
Unemployment rate (rise in % points)  0.5  3.9 
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Figure 3.2  Euro area: production and exports have bottomed out, but unemployment still rising 
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Table 3.2  Wide differences between EU countries in depth of the Great Recession 
       
Volume of  GDP  Domestic demand  Net exports 
a
 
       
Second quarter of 2009  % Changes from corresponding period in previous year 
       
European Union  − 4.9  − 4.3  − 0.6 
Euro area   − 4.8  − 3.2  − 1.6 
       
Belgium  − 3.7  − 2.2  − 1.5 
Bulgaria  − 4.9  -13.4  8.5 
Czech Republic  − 5.5  − 6.0  0.5 
Denmark  − 7.0  − 8.1  1.1 
Germany   − 5.9  − 1.6  − 4.3 
Estonia  − 15.8  − 31.8  16.0 
Ireland  − 7.3  − 11.8  4.5 
Greece  − 0.3  − 4.5  4.2 
Spain  − 4.2  − 6.7  2.5 
France  − 2.8  − 2.3  − 0.5 
Italy  − 6.0  − 4.3  − 1.7 
Cyprus  − 0.7  − 4.9  4.2 
Latvia  − 17.4     
Lithuania  − 21.1  − 30.7  9.6 
Luxembourg   − 5.3  − 0.9  − 4.4 
Hungary  − 7.3  − 14.0  6.7 
Malta  − 3.0  − 12.4  9.4 
Netherlands  − 5.2  − 4.6  − 0.6 
Austria  − 4.5  − 1.6  − 2.9 
Poland  1.4  − 0.9  2.3 
Portugal  − 3.7  − 4.6  0.9 
Romania  − 8.3  − 11.4  3.1 
Slovenia  − 9.0  − 12.5  3.5 
Slovakia  − 5.4  − 5.8  0.4 
Finland  − 8.9  − 6.3  − 2.6 
Sweden  − 7.0  -8.3  1.3 
United Kingdom  − 5.5  − 6.3  0.8 
        a
 Net exports in percentage points of GDP.       
 
We expect economic conditions to go on improving into next year. For the whole of next year, 
GDP is projected to be same as this year, when it contracts severely. In other words, annual 
GDP stays at this year’s suppressed level. This tentative recovery is driven by expansionary 
macro-economic policy. It seems unlikely that policy makers will scale back by next year 
already expansionary measures they have taken this year. Additional fiscal measures that have 
been publicly announced for 2010 now amount to ½% of projected GDP. The ECB’s policy 
stance will probably remain exceptionally stimulative far into 2010. 
Several forces at work retard a return to more robust economic growth. External demand is 
not expected to bounce back strongly. As is already happening in the United States, consumers 
will be under the necessity to pay down debt. They will do so partly of their own accord and 
partly because banks are reducing credit supply. Temporary measures that are boosting demand   52 
Figure 3.3  Business surveys and leading indicators are now promising for the near future of the euro area 
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Construction in Europe takes a heavy blow 
Like most everywhere, manufacturing is the industry suffering most from the recession in the euro area. Construction is 
a close second, however. In the second quarter of 2009, construction output was 7% lower than it was a year ago and 
13% lower than the peak reached in the last quarter of 2006. Construction activity is generally sensitive to cyclical 
fluctuations. But specific problems afflicting housing markets in Europe are adding to the adverse macro-economic 
conditions. Easy access to cheap mortgage loans has pushed up house prices in recent years. With the ECB targeting 
price stability for the euro area as a whole, monetary policy could not be used to prevent housing market bubbles in 
individual euro area economies such as Ireland or Spain.
a
 Households and real estate developers alike assumed too 
easily that prices would go on rising forever. Houses became clearly overvalued in several countries. The credit crisis 
has burst the bubbles. House prices now are declining in all euro area countries for which data are available, while 
housing  starts  are  at  a  minimum.  In  Ireland,  Spain,  and  the  United  Kingdom  many  homeowners  are  technically 
insolvent, as their mortgage debt exceeds the market value of their property. 
A change for the better is not to be expected any time soon. Contrary to what is happening among manufacturers, there 
are no clear signs that producers’ confidence is improving in the construction industry. In the first quarter of this year, 
housing permits, a forward indicator of construction activity, were lower by a third on a year ago. In addition, households 
and  banks  have  become  cautious  about  taking  out  and  providing  new  mortgage  loans.  The  tentative  recovery  of 
economic  growth  that  is  projected  to  continue  throughout  2010  will  not  be  supported  by  a  revival  of  residential 
investment. 
Indicators for construction activity and house prices, euro area   
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 T. Conefrey and J. Fitz Gerald, Managing Housing Bubbles in Regional Economies under EMU: Ireland and Spain, ESRI working paper 
315, October 2009. 
b
 Percentage change from corresponding quarter a year earlier. 
c
 Third quarter of 2009, unless specified differently.   54 
 now, such as schemes to exchange old cars for subsidised new ones, will have a negative 
impact once they end. Housing markets in many European countries remain very weak. 
GDP being flat next year causes the labour market to weaken further. Unemployment is 
expected to reach 11½% of the labour force, higher than ever since World War II. Just as in the 
Unites States, wage growth and inflation will be minimal. Inflation in 2010 is projected to be 
½% only, far lower than the ECB’s medium-term objective of slightly below 2% annually. The 
combination of zero growth, the increase in spending and fall in revenue caused by the 
recession itself, and significant amounts of discretionary spending, leads to a dramatic increase 
in deficit-to-GDP ratios. In 2010, fiscal deficits will rise by 1¼ percentage points to 6½% of 
GDP in the euro area as a whole, leaving further behind the limit of 3% of GDP agreed on (for 
normal times) in the Maastricht treaty. 
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Questions for discussion 
•  Can we ignore unemployment as a lagging variable or could it substantially weaken the 
rebound? Will Kurzarbeit be ended? If so, what will be the impact? Some fear a jobless 
recovery. Is this fear to be taken serious?  
•  Is the current divergence in the euro area (EU) worrying? 
•  Is the recent appreciation of the euro a threat to the European recovery?  
•  Will the recovery in the euro area be more moderate than in Asia and the US? If so, why? 
•  When can/will economic stimulus be withdrawn?    55 
4  Special topic: The current economic crisis and economic 
forecasting 
Table 4.1  The AIECE institutes on the impact of the crisis on their work and tools 
  Less   Same  More    Number of replies 
           
Time spent on forecasting in general  0  56  44    25 
Time spent on forecasting international outlook  0  44  56    25 
Time spent on analysing financial markets  4  16  80    25 
Time spent on monitoring recent economic 
developments  0  36  64    25 
Frequency of forecast  0  80  20    25 
Attention paid by media and policy makers to your 
forecasts and analysis  0  32  68    25 
           
  Yes  No       
           
Has the crisis led (or will it lead) to major changes in 
your analytical and forecasting tools?  14  86      22 
Has the crisis led to major shifts in your policy 
assessments?  41  59      22 
Is 'Keynes' back?  65  35      17 
 
Questions for discussion 
•  Macro-economics is heavily debated at the moment. Does this debate have any importance 
for macro-economic forecasting? Or for economic modelling?  
•  Could we have forecasted the Great Recession earlier and better (with the benefit of 
hindsight)? 
•  Is more fiscal activism increasing the importance of short-term forecasts?    56 
5  Part II 
5.1  Part II.1 International forecasts   57 







































2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 20 20
    WIFO na na Average 0.3 0.7
Belgium Std.dev 0.2 0.3
    FPB 0.1 0.6 Max 0.8 1.3
    DULBEA na na Min 0.0 0.3
    IRES 0.0 1.0 Std.dev/avg 0.64 0.44
Czech Rep
    CCSF na na
Denmark
    DEC 0.3 0.5
Finland
    ETLA 0.3 1.3
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 0.3 0.4 of the answers
    COE 0.2 0.6
    INSEE na na 2009
    OFCE 0.3 0.3
Germany
    DIW 0.2 0.5
    HWWI na na
    IFO na na
    IFW (Kiel) 0.0 0.4
    RWI na na
Greece
    KEPE na na
Hungary
    GKI 0.5 0.8
    KOPINT 0.3 0.5
Ireland
    ESRI na na
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA 0.3 0.4
    ISAE na na 2010
    PROMETEIA
    REF 0.3 0.7
Netherlands
    CPB 0.3 0.5
Norway
    SN na na
Poland
    IBRKK 0.3 0.3
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP na na
Spain
    CEPREDE 0.8 1.0
    SGEI na na
Sweden
    CSE 0.3 0.8
    NIER 0.3 0.8
Switzerland
    KOF 0.7 0.7
United Kingdom
















0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3  58 






































2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 18 18
    WIFO 1.3 1.5 Average 1.3 1.3
Belgium Std.dev 0.4 0.4
    FPB 0.6 1.0 Max 2.6 2.5
    DULBEA na na Min 0.6 1.0
    IRES 0.6 1.0 Std.dev/avg 0.34 0.28
Czech Rep
    CCSF na na
Denmark
    DEC na na
Finland
    ETLA 1.3 1.6
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 1.3 1.3 of the answers
    COE 1.3 1.0
    INSEE na na 2009
    OFCE 1.2 1.0
Germany
    DIW 0.8 1.0
    HWWI na na
    IFO na na
    IFW (Kiel) 1.0 1.0
    RWI 1.5 1.5
Greece
    KEPE 2.6 2.5
Hungary
    GKI na na
    KOPINT na na
Ireland
    ESRI na na
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA 1.3 1.2
    ISAE na na 2010
    PROMETEIA 1.2 1.1
    REF 1.4 1.5
Netherlands
    CPB 1.4 1.5
Norway
    SN na na
Poland
    IBRKK na na
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP 1.2 1.3
Spain
    CEPREDE 1.3 1.6
    SGEI 1.5 1.2
Sweden
    CSE na na
    NIER na na
Switzerland
    KOF na na
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 15 15
    WIFO 3.8 3.8 Average 3.9 4.0
Belgium Std.dev 0.6 0.5
    FPB 4.0 4.1 Max 5.3 5.1
    DULBEA na na Min 2.9 3.3
    IRES 3.3 4.0 Std.dev/avg 0.15 0.12
Czech Rep
    CCSF na na
Denmark
    DEC na na
Finland
    ETLA na na
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 3.6 3.9 of the answers
    COE 3.6 3.7
    INSEE na na 2009
    OFCE 4.0 3.6
Germany
    DIW 3.2 3.4
    HWWI na na
    IFO na na
    IFW (Kiel) 2.9 3.3
    RWI 3.9 3.7
Greece
    KEPE 5.3 5.1
Hungary
    GKI na na
    KOPINT na na
Ireland
    ESRI na na
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA na na
    ISAE na na 2010
    PROMETEIA 4.3 4.4
    REF na na
Netherlands
    CPB 3.8 4.1
Norway
    SN na na
Poland
    IBRKK na na
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP 4.5 4.7
Spain
    CEPREDE 4.0 3.8
    SGEI 3.6 4.0
Sweden
    CSE na na
    NIER na na
Switzerland
    KOF na na
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 31 30
    WIFO -2.7 1.0 Average -2.8 1.6
Belgium Std.dev 0.2 0.5
    FPB -2.8 1.5 Max -2.5 2.5
    DULBEA na na Min -3.3 0.6
    IRES -2.8 1.7 Std.dev/avg -0.08 0.32
Czech Rep
    CCSF -2.5 2.3
Denmark
    DEC -2.9 2.0
Finland
    ETLA -2.5 1.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -2.9 1.7 of the answers
    COE -2.5 2.5
    INSEE -2.6 na 2009
    OFCE -2.5 1.9
Germany
    DIW -2.5 2.0
    HWWI na na
    IFO na na
    IFW (Kiel) -2.5 2.0
    RWI -3.0 1.2
Greece
    KEPE -2.8 1.6
Hungary
    GKI -2.6 0.8
    KOPINT -2.7 2.0
Ireland
    ESRI -2.7 1.5
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA -2.6 2.0
    ISAE -2.6 1.8 2010
    PROMETEIA -2.8 0.8
    REF -3.1 0.9
Netherlands
    CPB -3.3 1.3
Norway
    SN -2.9 1.0
Poland
    IBRKK -2.6 1.5
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP -3.0 1.2
Spain
    CEPREDE -2.9 2.2
    SGEI -2.5 2.5
Sweden
    CSE -2.8 1.8
    NIER -2.8 1.7
Switzerland
    KOF -2.8 1.4
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 29 28
    WIFO -5.5 0.5 Average -5.8 1.4
Belgium Std.dev 0.3 0.6
    FPB -5.6 0.7 Max -5.3 2.6
    DULBEA na na Min -7.0 0.5
    IRES -5.9 1.1 Std.dev/avg -0.06 0.42
Czech Rep
    CCSF -5.5 2.6
Denmark
    DEC -5.9 1.2
Finland
    ETLA -6.0 1.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -5.3 2.6 of the answers
    COE -5.6 2.4
    INSEE -5.9 na 2009
    OFCE -5.9 2.2
Germany
    DIW -6.1 1.0
    HWWI na na
    IFO na na
    IFW (Kiel) -5.4 1.2
    RWI -5.9 2.0
Greece
    KEPE -5.5 2.0
Hungary
    GKI -6.0 1.7
    KOPINT -5.9 1.1
Ireland
    ESRI -5.4 1.7
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA na na
    ISAE -5.8 1.0 2010
    PROMETEIA -5.9 1.1
    REF -5.5 1.3
Netherlands
    CPB -6.0 1.0
Norway
    SN na na
Poland
    IBRKK -5.4 1.7
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP -5.5 1.0
Spain
    CEPREDE -5.6 1.3
    SGEI -5.5 1.7
Sweden
    CSE -5.7 0.7
    NIER -6.3 1.3
Switzerland
    KOF -5.6 0.8
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 31 30
    WIFO -4.0 0.8 Average -4.0 0.8
Belgium Std.dev 0.3 0.5
    FPB -3.9 0.8 Max -3.5 2.1
    DULBEA na na Min -4.8 -0.3
    IRES -4.3 0.7 Std.dev/avg -0.08 0.64
Czech Rep
    CCSF -3.6 2.1
Denmark
    DEC -4.1 1.1
Finland
    ETLA -4.5 0.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -4.1 1.1 of the answers
    COE -3.6 2.1
    INSEE -3.9 na 2009
    OFCE -3.8 0.8
Germany
    DIW -3.9 0.8
    HWWI na na
    IFO na na
    IFW (Kiel) -3.7 0.8
    RWI -3.7 1.0
Greece
    KEPE -4.2 1.0
Hungary
    GKI -4.8 -0.3
    KOPINT -3.9 0.9
Ireland
    ESRI -4.2 0.3
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA -3.9 1.3
    ISAE -3.9 0.7 2010
    PROMETEIA -4.0 0.7
    REF -4.0 1.0
Netherlands
    CPB -4.5 0.0
Norway
    SN -4.1 0.3
Poland
    IBRKK -4.1 0.5
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP -4.1 0.5
Spain
    CEPREDE -3.5 0.6
    SGEI -4.0 1.0
Sweden
    CSE -3.9 0.9
    NIER -4.2 0.5
Switzerland
    KOF -3.6 0.5
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 24 24
    WIFO -12.0 2.0 Average -13.0 4.8
Belgium Std.dev 1.9 2.2
    FPB -10.6 2.3 Max -10.0 9.6
    DULBEA na na Min -18.0 1.6
    IRES -12.8 4.6 Std.dev/avg -0.15 0.45
Czech Rep
    CCSF -13.0 6.6
Denmark
    DEC na na
Finland
    ETLA na na
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE na na of the answers
    COE -13.0 6.4
    INSEE -15.4 na 2009
    OFCE -14.3 7.0
Germany
    DIW -11.0 4.6
    HWWI na na
    IFO na na
    IFW (Kiel) -12.0 5.0
    RWI -13.5 6.0
Greece
    KEPE -18.0 3.1
Hungary
    GKI na na
    KOPINT -11.0 3.0
Ireland
    ESRI –11.9  2.5
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA -14.4 9.1
    ISAE -14.5 4.9 2010
    PROMETEIA -12.5 5.4
    REF -11.8 5.6
Netherlands
    CPB -15.8 3.5
Norway
    SN -10.0 1.6
Poland
    IBRKK -13.5 7.3
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP -15.0 5.0
Spain
    CEPREDE -13.0 2.5
    SGEI -12.0 2.5
Sweden
    CSE na na
    NIER na na
Switzerland
    KOF -11.9 4.8
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 32 31
    WIFO 60.0 75.0 Average 60.5 74.0
Belgium Std.dev 1.4 5.6
    FPB 61.2 76.5 Max 62.9 86.9
    DULBEA na na Min 56.0 64.5
    IRES 62.3 80.0 Std.dev/avg 0.02 0.08
Czech Rep
    CCSF 62.0 82.0
Denmark
    DEC 61.0 74.0
Finland
    ETLA 60.8 73.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 62.9 81.1 of the answers
    COE 62.7 84.0
    INSEE 60.5 na 2009
    OFCE 61.6 80.0
Germany
    DIW 60.0 68.0
    HWWI na na
    IFO 61.5 75.0
    IFW (Kiel) 61.9 75.0
    RWI 60.0 70.0
Greece
    KEPE 60.8 73.0
Hungary
    GKI 60.0 75.0
    KOPINT 60.0 72.0
Ireland
    ESRI 61.5 76.5
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA 60.5 70.0
    ISAE 60.6 75.0 2010
    PROMETEIA 60.5 67.6
    REF 61.4 74.6
Netherlands
    CPB 58.0 65.0
Norway
    SN 59.9 64.5
Poland
    IBRKK 60.5 75.0
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP 60.0 72.0
Spain
    CEPREDE 57.9 86.9
    SGEI 56.0 67.2
Sweden
    CSE 60.0 80.0
    NIER 60.0 71.0
Switzerland
    KOF 59.8 67.5
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 31 30
    WIFO 1.40 1.50 Average 1.38 1.42
Belgium Std.dev 0.02 0.05
    FPB 1.38 1.42 Max 1.46 1.50
    DULBEA na na Min 1.34 1.29
    IRES 1.46 1.46 Std.dev/avg 0.01 0.03
Czech Rep
    CCSF na na
Denmark
    DEC 1.39 1.46
Finland
    ETLA 1.38 1.43
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 1.38 1.45 of the answers
    COE 1.37 1.37
    INSEE 1.39 na 2009
    OFCE 1.37 1.32
Germany
    DIW 1.38 1.45
    HWWI na na
    IFO 1.39 1.45
    IFW (Kiel) 1.40 1.42
    RWI 1.38 1.45
Greece
    KEPE 1.38 1.43
Hungary
    GKI 1.38 1.45
    KOPINT 1.38 1.40
Ireland
    ESRI 1.37 1.40
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA 1.38 1.42
    ISAE 1.40 1.49 2010
    PROMETEIA 1.39 1.42
    REF 1.39 1.49
Netherlands
    CPB 1.37 1.40
Norway
    SN 1.37 1.37
Poland
    IBRKK 1.39 1.47
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP 1.39 1.42
Spain
    CEPREDE 1.36 1.29
    SGEI 1.34 1.37
Sweden
    CSE 1.38 1.38
    NIER 1.37 1.41
Switzerland
    KOF 1.38 1.41
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 17 16
    WIFO na na Average 131.7 133.0
Belgium Std.dev 4.3 5.0
    FPB 130.8 133.6 Max 147.4 143.6
    DULBEA na na Min 127.0 121.8
    IRES na na Std.dev/avg 0.03 0.04
Czech Rep
    CCSF na na
Denmark
    DEC na na
Finland
    ETLA 133.0 133.0
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 129.4 121.8 of the answers
    COE 131.0 135.0
    INSEE 131.0 na 2009
    OFCE 130.0 132.0
Germany
    DIW na na
    HWWI na na
    IFO na na
    IFW (Kiel) 134.4 134.9
    RWI na na
Greece
    KEPE na na
Hungary
    GKI 127.0 125.0
    KOPINT na na
Ireland
    ESRI na na
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA na na
    ISAE na na 2010
    PROMETEIA 130.4 131.9
    REF 131.1 138.3
Netherlands
    CPB 130.7 134.4
Norway
    SN 130.5 130.4
Poland
    IBRKK na na
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP 130.0 130.0
Spain
    CEPREDE 147.4 143.6
    SGEI na na
Sweden
    CSE na na
    NIER 131.1 137.0
Switzerland
    KOF 130.0 132.6
United Kingdom
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5.2  Part II.2 Cross country forecast 
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 34 33
    WIFO -3.4 1.0 Average -4.1 0.9
Belgium Std.dev 1.8 0.9
    FPB -3.1 0.4 Max 0.9 3.6
    DULBEA na na Min -7.2 -1.1
    IRES -3.0 0.7 Std.dev/avg -0.43 0.99
Czech Rep
    CCSF -4.3 0.3
Denmark
    DEC -4.8 1.1
Finland
    ETLA -7.0 1.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -2.4 1.2 of the answers
    COE -2.0 2.2
    INSEE -2.2 na 2009
    OFCE -2.1 0.8
Germany
    DIW -5.1 1.3
    HWWI na na
    IFO -5.0 1.3
    IFW (Kiel) -4.9 1.0
    RWI -5.0 1.2
Greece
    KEPE -1.4 0.0
Hungary
    GKI -6.5 0.0
    KOPINT -6.0 1.0
Ireland
    ESRI -7.2 -1.1
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA -4.8 0.8
    ISAE -4.8 0.4 2010
    PROMETEIA -4.9 0.5
    REF -4.9 0.6
Netherlands
    CPB -4.7 0.1
Norway
    SN -1.2 2.1
Poland
    IBRKK 0.9 1.4
Serbia
    FTRI -3.2 3.6
Slovak Republic
    SAS -4.5 1.3
Slovenia
    SKEP -7.0 0.7
Spain
    CEPREDE -3.6 -0.3
    SGEI -3.6 -0.3
Sweden
    CSE -5.0 1.0
    NIER -5.0 1.5
Switzerland
    KOF -3.4 0.1
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 34 33
    WIFO 0.2 0.5 Average -1.4 0.6
Belgium Std.dev 2.4 1.2
    FPB -0.9 0.6 Max 1.9 5.4
    DULBEA na na Min -7.0 -2.0
    IRES -1.1 0.5 Std.dev/avg -1.73 2.19
Czech Rep
    CCSF 1.1 0.7
Denmark
    DEC -5.0 1.8
Finland
    ETLA -3.5 1.0
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 0.6 0.6 of the answers
    COE 0.6 0.8
    INSEE 0.7 na 2009
    OFCE 0.5 0.6
Germany
    DIW 0.8 1.0
    HWWI na na
    IFO 0.9 0.4
    IFW (Kiel) 0.5 0.8
    RWI 0.5 -0.5
Greece
    KEPE -1.2 0.2
Hungary
    GKI -6.7 0.0
    KOPINT -5.0 0.5
Ireland
    ESRI -7.0 -2.0
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA -1.7 0.7
    ISAE -1.8 0.4 2010
    PROMETEIA -1.8 0.3
    REF -1.8 0.3
Netherlands
    CPB -2.7 -0.8
Norway
    SN 0.4 5.4
Poland
    IBRKK 1.9 1.0
Serbia
    FTRI 1.7 1.1
Slovak Republic
    SAS -1.5 1.5
Slovenia
    SKEP -0.5 0.0
Spain
    CEPREDE -5.3 -1.4
    SGEI -4.1 -0.4
Sweden
    CSE -1.8 1.7
    NIER -1.5 2.2
Switzerland
    KOF 0.7 0.3
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 23 22
    WIFO -11.0 0.5 Average -13.4 -2.5
Belgium Std.dev 5.5 4.9
    FPB -4.9 -1.2 Max -4.9 2.4
    DULBEA na na Min -26.0 -18.4
    IRES -5.0 -2.5 Std.dev/avg -0.41 -1.92
Czech Rep
    CCSF na na
Denmark
    DEC -11.1 -0.9
Finland
    ETLA -17.0 -8.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -8.2 -3.1 of the answers
    COE -7.9 -0.8
    INSEE -7.7 na 2009
    OFCE -7.6 -4.5
Germany
    DIW -18.8 1.7
    HWWI na na
    IFO -16.5 1.9
    IFW (Kiel) -14.3 1.6
    RWI na na
Greece
    KEPE -16.2 -1.4
Hungary
    GKI na na
    KOPINT na na
Ireland
    ESRI -26.0 -18.4
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA na na
    ISAE -17.3 0.9 2010
    PROMETEIA -18.5 1.8
    REF -19.2 2.4
Netherlands
    CPB -13.3 -8.9
Norway
    SN na na
Poland
    IBRKK na na
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP -20.0 1.0
Spain
    CEPREDE -8.9 -2.2
    SGEI na na
Sweden
    CSE -16.0 -6.1
    NIER na na
Switzerland
    KOF -10.1 -6.8
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 26 25
    WIFO -2.0 -1.0 Average -10.4 -3.0
Belgium Std.dev 10.8 5.1
    FPB -3.2 -4.6 Max 2.7 4.3
    DULBEA na na Min -45.7 -18.8
    IRES -2.2 -3.8 Std.dev/avg -1.04 -1.70
Czech Rep
    CCSF na na
Denmark
    DEC -17.6 -0.3
Finland
    ETLA -9.0 0.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -7.6 -2.2 of the answers
    COE -7.1 -0.7
    INSEE -5.3 na 2009
    OFCE -7.9 -4.5
Germany
    DIW 0.1 4.3
    HWWI na na
    IFO -1.8 1.1
    IFW (Kiel) -1.1 4.0
    RWI -1.5 -1.1
Greece
    KEPE -14.5 -1.5
Hungary
    GKI na na
    KOPINT na na
Ireland
    ESRI -45.7 -18.8
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA na na
    ISAE -6.7 0.7 2010
    PROMETEIA -7.0 -1.1
    REF -7.1 -2.6
Netherlands
    CPB -12.2 -8.1
Norway
    SN -13.6 2.3
Poland
    IBRKK na na
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS na na
Slovenia
    SKEP -8.0 -8.0
Spain
    CEPREDE -23.3 -3.5
    SGEI -12.5 -7.5
Sweden
    CSE -27.4 -10.6
    NIER na na
Switzerland
    KOF 2.7 0.6
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 34 33
    WIFO -12.0 2.2 Average -13.1 3.3
Belgium Std.dev 5.2 2.2
    FPB -15.1 1.5 Max 3.5 7.9
    DULBEA na na Min -25.0 -0.4
    IRES -15.7 6.3 Std.dev/avg -0.39 0.65
Czech Rep
    CCSF -17.6 2.4
Denmark
    DEC -10.4 0.3
Finland
    ETLA -25.0 5.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -11.8 1.9 of the answers
    COE -10.4 5.6
    INSEE -11.0 na 2009
    OFCE -10.3 5.3
Germany
    DIW -15.1 4.1
    HWWI na na
    IFO -13.0 7.9
    IFW (Kiel) -14.5 7.2
    RWI -7.5 2.8
Greece
    KEPE -13.2 0.8
Hungary
    GKI -15.0 4.0
    KOPINT -13.5 6.0
Ireland
    ESRI -1.7 1.1
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA -17.3 4.1
    ISAE -20.2 1.7 2010
    PROMETEIA -19.8 3.5
    REF -18.6 1.9
Netherlands
    CPB -10.9 2.5
Norway
    SN -10.6 2.7
Poland
    IBRKK -10.0 4.9
Serbia
    FTRI 3.5 4.8
Slovak Republic
    SAS -14.0 -0.4
Slovenia
    SKEP -19.0 2.6
Spain
    CEPREDE -12.1 1.6
    SGEI -16.2 2.1
Sweden
    CSE -12.8 3.0
    NIER -14.7 3.1
Switzerland
    KOF -11.6 0.1
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 34 33
    WIFO -10.1 1.6 Average -12.5 2.5
Belgium Std.dev 5.4 2.8
    FPB -13.7 1.4 Max 4.5 9.4
    DULBEA na na Min -23.0 -4.0
    IRES -14.3 6.1 Std.dev/avg -0.44 1.09
Czech Rep
    CCSF -17.7 0.4
Denmark
    DEC -12.4 1.7
Finland
    ETLA -23.0 2.0
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -10.4 0.7 of the answers
    COE -9.1 -4.0
    INSEE -9.6 na 2009
    OFCE -8.5 4.9
Germany
    DIW -8.5 4.7
    HWWI na na
    IFO -7.7 5.6
    IFW (Kiel) -8.4 9.4
    RWI -4.2 1.4
Greece
    KEPE -19.1 1.0
Hungary
    GKI -20.0 5.0
    KOPINT -17.0 6.0
Ireland
    ESRI -7.7 -1.2
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA -14.5 3.6
    ISAE -15.3 1.6 2010
    PROMETEIA -15.4 2.8
    REF -15.5 1.3
Netherlands
    CPB -10.3 0.5
Norway
    SN -8.8 6.6
Poland
    IBRKK -13.3 5.2
Serbia
    FTRI 4.5 5.4
Slovak Republic
    SAS -10.1 -1.3
Slovenia
    SKEP -18.0 2.4
Spain
    CEPREDE -18.8 -0.3
    SGEI -20.5 -0.6
Sweden
    CSE -12.7 2.5
    NIER -15.7 2.7
Switzerland
    KOF -7.8 0.9
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 33 32
    WIFO 0.5 1.3 Average 1.2 1.7
Belgium Std.dev 2.6 1.7
    FPB -0.1 1.5 Max 12.9 8.9
    DULBEA na na Min -2.0 -0.5
    IRES 0.0 1.5 Std.dev/avg 2.19 0.98
Czech Rep
    CCSF 0.6 1.2
Denmark
    DEC 1.5 2.0
Finland
    ETLA 3.0 2.5
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 0.0 1.9 of the answers
    COE -0.2 1.3
    INSEE -0.2 na 2009
    OFCE 0.0 1.6
Germany
    DIW 0.1 0.9
    HWWI na na
    IFO -0.3 0.4
    IFW (Kiel) -0.1 0.6
    RWI -0.3 1.1
Greece
    KEPE 0.3 1.2
Hungary
    GKI 4.7 4.3
    KOPINT 4.5 4.5
Ireland
    ESRI -2.0 -0.5
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA 0.7 1.5
    ISAE 0.8 1.7 2010
    PROMETEIA 0.4 1.3
    REF 0.0 1.8
Netherlands
    CPB 0.5 1.2
Norway
    SN 2.3 0.5
Poland
    IBRKK 3.5 2.1
Serbia
    FTRI 12.9 8.9
Slovak Republic
    SAS 1.9 2.3
Slovenia
    SKEP 0.8 1.3
Spain
    CEPREDE 0.0 2.1
    SGEI na na
Sweden
    CSE 2.1 0.5
    NIER 1.9 0.8
Switzerland
    KOF -0.8 0.3
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 33 32
    WIFO 5.3 5.8 Average 9.0 10.4
Belgium Std.dev 4.1 4.5
    FPB 8.2 9.4 Max 23.4 26.8
    DULBEA na na Min 3.3 3.9
    IRES 8.0 9.1 Std.dev/avg 0.46 0.43
Czech Rep
    CCSF 6.8 8.5
Denmark
    DEC 3.5 5.4
Finland
    ETLA 8.9 11.0
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE 9.4 10.5 of the answers
    COE 9.2 9.9
    INSEE 9.6 na 2009
    OFCE 9.1 10.1
Germany
    DIW 7.7 9.2
    HWWI na na
    IFO 8.0 9.1
    IFW (Kiel) 7.6 9.1
    RWI 7.7 9.5
Greece
    KEPE 9.5 10.2
Hungary
    GKI 9.8 9.8
    KOPINT 10.0 10.3
Ireland
    ESRI 12.2 14.8
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA 8.3 9.5
    ISAE na na 2010
    PROMETEIA 7.5 8.7
    REF 7.9 8.6
Netherlands
    CPB 5.2 7.9
Norway
    SN 3.3 3.9
Poland
    IBRKK 9.8 11.6
Serbia
    FTRI 23.4 26.8
Slovak Republic
    SAS 12.4 11.7
Slovenia
    SKEP 5.8 7.0
Spain
    CEPREDE 18.2 20.3
    SGEI 17.9 18.9
Sweden
    CSE 8.1 9.7
    NIER 8.8 11.4
Switzerland
    KOF 3.8 5.1
United Kingdom
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2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria Number 29 29
    WIFO -4.5 -5.7 Average -5.0 -5.7
Belgium Std.dev 3.5 3.1
    FPB na na Max 5.3 5.1
    DULBEA na na Min -12.9 -12.8
    IRES -5.6 -6.1 Std.dev/avg -0.70 -0.54
Czech Rep
    CCSF -4.3 -4.9
Denmark
    DEC -2.4 -5.4
Finland
    ETLA -2.0 -3.7
France Frequency distribution
    BIPE -7.3 -8.6 of the answers
    COE -7.5 -7.0
    INSEE na na 2009
    OFCE -8.3 -8.7
Germany
    DIW -3.1 -4.9
    HWWI na na
    IFO -2.7 -4.9
    IFW (Kiel) -3.0 -5.1
    RWI -3.0 -5.0
Greece
    KEPE -9.5 -4.9
Hungary
    GKI -3.8 -3.8
    KOPINT -3.9 -3.8
Ireland
    ESRI -12.9 -12.8
Italy
    CONFINDUSTRIA -5.2 -5.0
    ISAE 5.3 5.1 2010
    PROMETEIA -5.3 -5.7
    REF -5.6 -5.5
Netherlands
    CPB -4.6 -6.2
Norway
    SN na na
Poland
    IBRKK -5.8 -7.2
Serbia
    FTRI na na
Slovak Republic
    SAS -6.3 -5.5
Slovenia
    SKEP -5.5 -6.5
Spain
    CEPREDE -6.4 -8.0
    SGEI -9.5 -8.1
Sweden
    CSE na na
    NIER -2.3 -3.5
Switzerland
    KOF 0.2 -2.1
United Kingdom
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5.3  Part II.3 Country forecasts   79 
5.3.1  Austria WIFO 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  281.9  − 3.4  1.0 
Private consumption  148.8  0.2  0.5 
Public consumption  52.6  0.8  1.5 
Gross fixed capital formation  61.5  − 6.1  − 0.4 
   Private excl. dwellings  27.8  − 11.0  0.5 
   Dwellings  33.7  − 2.0  − 1.0 
Change in stocks 
a
  2.5       
Total domestic demand  265.6  − 1.8  0.6 
Exports of goods and services  167.3  − 12.0  2.2 
Imports of goods and services  151.1  − 10.1  1.6 
Net exports  
a
  16.2  − 1.8  0.4 
GDP deflator     1.9  0.9 
Consumer prices     0.5  1.3 
Private consumption deflator     0.5  1.3 
Output gap 
b
            
Unit labour costs 
c
      5.1  − 0.3 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate          
Employment (thousands)     4209.0  4187.1 
Unemployment rate 
d
      5.3  5.8 
Real household disposable income     1.0  0.2 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      12.7  12.5 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 4.5  − 5.7 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       70.7  75.7 
Current account balance  
f
       1.9  1.9 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)           
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      1.3  1.5 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      3.8  3.8 
United States Federal funds rate           
GDP          
    USA     − 2.7  1.0 
    Japan     − 5.5  0.5 
    Euro Area     − 4.0  0.8 
World trade volume (goods)     − 12.0  2.0 
Oil price 
i
      60.0  75.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.400  1.500 
    Yen/Euro           
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   80 
Austria   WIFO 
The current situation 
By the 2nd quarter 2009, the extent of the year-on-year decline in Austrian GDP is close to the 
one of the euro area (-4,6%). Generally, there are hardly any important features of the current 
situation that would markedly differ from the euro as a whole. The external shock was perhaps 
somewhat larger compared to other euro area countries given Austria’s exposure to the CEEC 
and as a supplier to German car manufacturers. However, private consumption has held up well, 
showing slightly positive growth. Private consumption has been supported by an income tax 
reform and strong real wage growth in 2009. 
 
Employment losses remained contained so far due to policy measures such as subsidising 
temporary part-time employment schemes. Inflation is slightly above euro area average. 
 
With -0.5%, the growth rate in 2009 Q2 was surprisngly low compared to Germany and the 
euro area. We attribute this to some delayed response of Austria to the external stimulus, 
mirroring the delayed response, when the crisis emerged in Autumn 2008.  
 
As elsewhere, surveys and other leading indicators point to a recovery in the remainder of 2009. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
At the moment no significant further fiscal measures are foreseen to support the economy. 
However, the fiscal package that has been set up in early 2009 should support growth into 2010. 
The income tax reform, which became effective in April is likely to have some delayed effects 
in the second half of the year, while public investment schemes should become effective in 
2010. 
 
The risks to Austrian banks stemming from business in the CEEC so far have not materialised. 
Overall, banks appear to be in a fairly safe position. With one exception, banks have accepted 
recapitalization loans from the government.  
 
We expect active labour market policy measures to be somewhat widened in 2010. 
The outlook 
Our forecast reflects the expected recovery of our main trading partners in the euro area and in 
the CEEC. The path of recovery is similar to those of forecast for the euro area as a whole.  
 
We expect clearly positive growth in the second half of 2009, but some setback in early 2010 as 
the inventory cycle will no longer contribute and certain fiscal stimuli will disappear, notably   81 
the cash for clunker programmes. Only later in 2010 a return to sustained growth may emerge. 
On average for 2010, the institute predicts GDP growth of 1.0%. Consumption growth is 
predicted to remain slightly positive, while investment will stagnate. 
 
The situation on the labour market will continue to worsen in 2010. Employment is predicted to 
decline further as firms aim at restoring productivity. Inflation is predicted to increase slightly 
with a moderate decline in vore inflation being more than offset by the rebound of energy 
prices.   82 
5.3.2  Belgium   FPB 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  344.2  − 3.1  0.4 
Private consumption  184.2  − 0.9  0.6 
Public consumption  79.6  1.9  1.4 
Gross fixed capital formation  78.3  − 3.9  − 1.5 
   Private excl. dwellings  52.3  − 4.9  − 1.2 
   Dwellings  20.1  − 3.2  − 4.6 
Change in stocks 
a
     − 0.9  0.0 
Total domestic demand  345.9  − 1.8  0.3 
Exports of goods and services  316.9  − 15.1  1.5 
Imports of goods and services  318.6  − 13.7  1.4 
Net exports  
a
     − 1.2  0.1 
GDP deflator     0.9  1.4 
Consumer prices      0.0  1.5 
Private consumption deflator     − 0.1  1.5 
Output gap 
b
       − 2.5  − 3.4 
Unit labour costs 
c
      2.6  − 1.1 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     2.4  0.9 
Employment (thousands)     − 34.6  − 58.9 
Unemployment rate 
d
      8.2  9.4 
Real household disposable income     1.5  0.4 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      15.1  14.8 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       na  na 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       na  na 
Current account balance  
f
       − 2.5  − 2.7 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      0.6  1.0 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      4.0  4.1 
United States Federal funds rate      0.1  0.6 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.8  1.5 
    Japan     − 5.6  0.7 
    Euro Area  9151.5  − 3.9  0.8 
World trade volume (goods)     − 10.6  2.3 
Oil price 
i
      61.2  76.5 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.380  1.420 
    Yen/Euro      130.8  133.6 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries        
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   83 
Belgium   FPB 
The current situation 
Belgian economic activity was severely hit during 2008Q4 and 2009Q1 (-1.7% per quarter). 
This was mainly due to plummeting exports, although domestic demand also declined. 
Households cut back their spending due to the gloomy economic climate leading to a worsening 
of consumer confidence and negative wealth effects. Business investment also decreased, but 
less than could be expected taking the low capacity utilisation rates and the economic downturn 
into account. Housing investment has declined since 2008Q4 after several years of rather strong 
growth, significantly increasing their share in GDP. 
The decline in the number of employed persons during the past few quarters was relatively 
limited due to the important decrease of average hours worked per employed person (using the 
temporary unemployment scheme, for example). In view of the registered drop in employment, 
unemployment increased at a rather slow pace, leading to a quasi-stabilisation of the labour 
force during the first half of 2009 (compared to a historical average increase of around 10 000 
persons per quarter). 
Inflation continued its slowdown that started in 2008Q4  in line with the decline of yoy growth 
rates of oil and food prices  and has been negative since May 2009. Underlying inflation 
remained clearly positive and initiated only recently a decline. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
The international hypotheses behind our forecasts are based on the latest OECD forecasts and 
future market quotations for oil prices, interest rates and exchange rates. 
Our forecasts are made under the hypotheses of no budgetary policy changes (i.e. no measures 
to reduce the projected deficit, for example). This also implies that measures taken in the 
framework of the Belgian recovery plan are expected to fade out by the end of 2009. 
The labour force is expected to return gradually to an increase that is consistent with Belgian 
population forecasts. 
The outlook 
In the second half of 2009, economic growth, driven by exports, should become slightly 
positive. Economic growth is expected to remain subdued until mid-2010 as it is currently 
almost exclusively supported by the recovery plans. In the course of 2010, economic growth 
should also be supported by domestic demand. 
Despite the slight recovery in 2009H2, exports should register an unprecedented decrease in 
2009 as a whole. In 2010, their yearly average growth rate should gradually recover and reach 
1.5%. Despite a robust increase in disposable income in 2009 (mainly linked to the lagged 
reaction of wage indexation to inflation), private consumption growth should be negative, 
leading to an important increase in the saving rate. In 2010, the saving rate is expected to   84 
remain around its level of 2009 as the rise in the unemployment rate should weigh on consumer 
confidence. Investment should recover somewhat during 2010H2 as economic growth gains 
strength. 
As economic growth remains rather weak throughout 2010 and due to an increase in hours 
worked per person, a net increase in employment is not expected before the end of 2010. 
Consequently, the (Eurostat) unemployment rate should increase to more than 9.5% by the end 
of 2010. 
Inflation should become positive by the end of 2009 as the yoy growth rate of oil prices 
becomes positive again. Despite the cooling down of underlying inflation, headline inflation 
should accelerate from 0% in 2009 to 1.5% in 2010.   85 
5.3.3  Belgium   IRES 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP     − 3.0  0.7 
Private consumption     − 1.1  0.5 
Public consumption     2.1  1.6 
Gross fixed capital formation     − 3.6  − 2.4 
   Private excl. dwellings     − 5.0  − 2.5 
   Dwellings     − 2.2  − 3.8 
Change in stocks 
a
     − 0.6  0.5 
Total domestic demand     − 1.6  0.6 
Exports of goods and services     − 15.7  6.3 
Imports of goods and services     − 14.3  6.1 
Net exports  
a
     − 1.6  0.6 
GDP deflator     1.4  1.2 
Consumer prices     0.0  1.5 
Private consumption deflator     0.0  1.5 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      4.8  − 2.2 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     na  na 
Employment (thousands)  4493.5  − 39.9  − 58.8 
Unemployment rate 
d
   0.1  8.0  9.1 
Real household disposable income     1.4  0.0 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   0.1  15.2  14.8 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 5.6  − 6.1 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       96.5  100.9 
Current account balance  
f
       0.3  0.3 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      0.6  1.0 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      3.3  4.0 
United States Federal funds rate      0.0  1.0 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.8  1.7 
    Japan     − 5.9  1.1 
    Euro Area     − 4.3  0.7 
World trade volume (goods)     − 12.8  4.6 
Oil price 
i
      62.3  80.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.460  1.460 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   86 
Belgium   IRES 
The current situation 
S’inscrivant dans ce contexte économique international moins défavorable, la contraction de 
l’activité s’est nettement tassée en Belgique au 2ème trimestre 2009, la croissance du PIB 
s’établissant à -0,3% qoq après avoir été de -1,7% qoq au 4ème trimestre 2008 et au 1er 
trimestre 2009. Hormis la consommation et l’investissement publics, tous les postes de la 
demande ont reculé au 2ème trimestre 2009 mais dans une ampleur nettement moindre que 
précédemment. En réalité, la majeure partie du recul du PIB est imputable au déstockage des 
entreprises. 
 
Outre le fait que le rythme de décroissance du PIB s’est atténué au 2ème trimestre, d’autres 
éléments tendent à indiquer qu’un mouvement de reprise s’est amorcé au cours des derniers 
mois.  La reprise étant surtout supportée par la demande mondiale,  la confiance des entreprises 
industrielles, qui sont fortement exportatrices, s’est ainsi relevée au cours des derniers mois.  Le 
redressement de la confiance concerne également les autres secteurs d’activité, de même que les 
consommateurs. 
The outlook 
La demande étrangère adressée aux entreprises belges devrait se raffermir dans les trimestres 
prochains. En effet, la production industrielle s’est déjà nettement redressée dans les pays 
émergents et la conjoncture industrielle s’est améliorée récemment dans la zone euro, principal 
marché d’exportation des produits industriels belges. L’amélioration de l’environnement 
commercial international se lit d’ailleurs à travers les enquêtes réalisées dans le secteur 
industriel, l’opinion des entreprises concernant le niveau de leurs carnets de commandes 
étrangères ayant commencé à se redresser depuis plusieurs mois. Nous prévoyons dès lors que 
les exportations recommenceront à progresser dès le 3ème trimestre de 2009, à un rythme 
modéré mais qui devrait s’intensifier par la suite. Face aux améliorations des perspectives de 
débouchés, la production industrielle devrait également être alimentée par un mouvement de 
reconstitution des stocks de produits finis, les entreprises ayant fortement réduit ceux-ci durant 
la crise.   
 
La demande intérieure continuerait de souffrir de la poursuite de l’ajustement des capacités de 
production des entreprises, modérant de ce fait le rythme de progression de l’activité 
économique.  
 
D’une part, les surcapacités de production conséquentes pèseraient sur l’évolution des dépenses 
d’investissement productif. La modération des dépenses d’investissement sera renforcée par la 
dégradation de la rentabilité des entreprises et les conditions du crédit toujours tendues.    87 
D’autre part, l’emploi continuera à se contracter sensiblement dans les trimestres à venir, en 
dépit de l’évolution plus positive de l’activité économique. Les destructions nettes d’emplois 
ont été importantes suite à la chute de l’activité rencontrée durant l’hiver 2008-2009, et les 
dernières statistiques du chômage indiquent clairement que la situation sur le marché du travail 
continue de se dégrader. Plusieurs éléments permettent d’anticiper des pertes nettes d’emplois 
encore conséquentes dans les tous prochains trimestres. En effet, il est établi que l’emploi en 
Belgique réagit à l’évolution de l’activité économique avec plusieurs trimestres de retard. Les 
coûts d’embauche et de licenciement élevés incitent fortement les entreprises à conserver leurs 
effectifs en cas de ralentissement passager de l’activité, au prix d’une diminution parfois 
notable du temps de travail ou de la productivité horaire. Ce n’est que lorsque le ralentissement 
de l’activité tend à se prolonger que les entreprises se décident finalement à licencier une partie 
de leur personnel. Ce mécanisme de rétention de l’emploi est renforcé par les mesures de type 
chômage temporaire mises en place en vue de décharger temporairement les entreprises d’une 
partie de leurs coûts salariaux en cas de ralentissement sévère mais temporaire de leur 
production. Ces processus à l’œuvre pour expliquer la rétention de l’emploi en période de crise 
vont également avoir toute leur importance dans l’épisode de reprise économique. Etant donné 
l’ampleur de la contraction économique passée et le recours intensif aux mesures transitoires 
qui a suivi, il est logique d’anticiper que dans un scénario de reprise lente de l’activité, il n’y 
aura qu’une partie de la force de travail qui pourra reprendre effectivement du service, amenant 
de nombreuses pertes d’emplois. L’effet sur l’emploi sera d’autant plus néfaste que les 
entreprises désireront certainement dans un premier temps redresser leur productivité horaire 
avant de recommencer à engager, celle-ci s’étant fortement dégradée pendant la récession.  
  Ces évolutions attendues sur le marché du travail seront préjudiciables pour la 
consommation des ménages. En effet, en plus de grever le revenu disponible des particuliers, 
les destructions d’emplois et le taux de chômage élevé minent le moral des ménages qui 
réagissent en gonflant leur épargne de précaution. Cette réaction explique qu’en 2009, en dépit 
d’une inflation nulle en moyenne et d’une croissance modérée du revenu disponible brut des 
particuliers, la consommation privée se contracterait de 1% sur l’ensemble de l’année, le taux 
d’épargne augmentant brusquement. En 2010, en raison de la stabilisation des prix de l’énergie, 
l’inflation générale remonterait mécaniquement, impliquant une croissance quasiment nulle du 
pouvoir d’achat. Pourtant, nous anticipons une croissance annuelle moyenne de 0,5% de la 
consommation privée, les ménages diminuant légèrement leur épargne de précaution étant 
donné l’amélioration progressive de la situation conjoncturelle et le ralentissement du rythme de 
destruction d’emploi prévus dans le courant de l’année 2010.   
L’investissement des ménages sera également mis à mal dans les prochains trimestres, en raison 
non seulement des évolutions négatives sur le marché du travail, mais également des conditions 
d’octroi de crédits qui paraissent toujours restrictives, en particulier au niveau des garanties 
exigées pour avoir accès à un financement. Le niveau faible des différents indicateurs dans le 
secteur est tel que nous n’entrevoyons pas de reprise de l’activité d’ici la fin de l’année 2010.   88 
5.3.4  Czech Republic   Kepe CCS&F, Prague 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  148.6  − 4.3  0.3 
Private consumption  72.7  1.1  0.7 
Public consumption  31.3  1.3  0.5 
Gross fixed capital formation  35.6  − 5.1  − 0.2 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings     na  na 
Change in stocks 
a
  1.1  − 0.8  − 0.8 
Total domestic demand  139.5  − 2.5  0.1 
Exports of goods and services  114.2  − 17.6  2.4 
Imports of goods and services  106.7  − 17.7  0.4 
Net exports  
a
  1.9  − 1.8  0.2 
GDP deflator  120.6  2.8  1.0 
Consumer prices  112.1  1.1  1.6 
Private consumption deflator  5.5  0.6  1.2 
Output gap 
b
    1.2  4.0  − 2.9 
Unit labour costs 
c
      4.7  0.6 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     2.1  1.8 
Employment (thousands)  5.206  − 1.8  − 2.1 
Unemployment rate 
d
   5.3  6.8  8.5 
Real household disposable income     3.5  2.4 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      5.5  5.9 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 1.5  − 4.3  − 4.9 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    29.9  33.7  37.9 
Current account balance  
f
    − 3.1  − 2.0  − 3.3 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)   2.3  2.3  2.5 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   4  4.6  4.8 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   4.6  4.5  4.4 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.5  2.3 
    Japan     − 5.5  2.6 
    Euro Area     − 3.6  2.1 
World trade volume (goods)     − 13.0  6.6 
Oil price 
i
   98.0  62.0  82.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      na  na 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   24.90  26.80  25.50 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   89 
Czech Republic   Kepe CCS&F, Prague 
The current situation 
In the course of 2009 the conjunctural situation in the Czech Republic was deteriorating rapidly. 
Most pronounced was the deceleration of its exports and the sharp decline of output of its 
manufacturing industry, which was mirroring the slackening of import demand in neighbouring 
countries to whose markets the bulk of Czechia´s exports is usually targeted. Already in mid-
2009 every fifth industrial company was recorded to have undertaken substantial lay-offs and 
numerous small and medium-sized enterprises, operating not only in  industry but also in 
services, have  closed down. Even big companies based in its  service sector - some of which 
are even at present highly profitable -  have been reducing their staff, contributing thus to the 
unprecedented increase of Czechia´s  unemployment rate. In the second half of 2009 these 
tendencies have become even more pronounced. Employee’s apprehensions of loosing their 
jobs have  caused residential construction and private consumption to shrink, though the income 
of households decreased as yet only marginally. But the main reason for the decrease of total 
domestic demand was the lack of incoming orders in industry and negative expectations among 
its management, which resulted in a sharp curtailing of  fixed investments.  
   As an important aspect of the current situation may be regarded the good health of the 
Czech banking sector (sufficient primary resources to provide loans, low share of loans in 
foreign currencies and of unpaid loans, liquidity surpluses, high capital adequacy and 
profitability) for this represents favourable preconditions for a rapid  recovery of the Czech 
economy as soon as external conditions will improve. 
 Economic policy and the  countries key features relevant to the outlook 
At the beginning of 2009 a „stimulation package“ had been approved in  parliament, but the  
insistence  of the newly elected  interim government on not permitting the  deficit  of the state 
budget to surmount  162  mld..  CSK  in 2010 (i.e. about 5,5% of its potential  GDP), will  lead  
to the cancelling of some of the intended measures. Public expenditures will be  curtailed  
substantially. Numerous infrastructural investments will have to be postponed and often it will 
not be possible fully to cover proposals of the funding of public services, presented by 
ministries and municipalities. This will cause hardships even in the social sphere, in spite of the 
fact, that the curtailing of  mandatory budgetary expenditures is not envisioned. Salaries of 
people working in the public sector will be reduced only slightly, even so this will not facilitate 
the fulfilment of promises given to teachers, health-care employees and other specialists to 
improve their incomes. And the envisioned increase of VAT on some everyday purchases will 
touch the family budget of most citizens. 
   The implementation of these and other austerity measures is regarded to be  necessary 
in order to stem  the increase  of Czechia´s  public debt  and to bring its budgetary deficit nearer   90 
to  Maastricht criteria, but they will certainly weaken the contribution of total domestic demand  
to the  forthcoming recovery. 
The outlook 
The extremely high share of foreign trade and foreign direct investment in Czechia´s GDP 
makes its economic  perspectives  strongly dependent on developments of the  conjunctural 
situation in its main partner countries and on corporate strategies adopted  by foreign-owned 
firms operating in its economy. Therefore first signals of the termination of the recession 
perceived in some EU-member states let us assume, that already in the first half of 2010 the 
export performance of Czechia will improve somewhat and in the course of this year a slight 
resumption of economic growth may be expected. (Other forecasters assume, that GDP might 
contract further,  in the range between -  -0,5% and -1,0 %,, but we donot identify with this 
assumption  because of  anecdotal evidence we perceived in the real economy).  But a full 
recovery of the Czech economy  we anticipate only in subsequent years - possible even in the 
medium-term, - first because the mitigation of damages it had incurred during the present 
recession will last some time,  second, because - similarly as in other EU member states - its full 
recovery is  conditional on its economy  becoming predominantly knowledge-based, which 
requires not only the strengthening of the R&D potential of the country and of the  high-tech. 
related part of its service sector, but also the restructuring of its manufacturing industry. 
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5.3.5  Denmark    DEC 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  231.5  − 4.8  1.1 
Private consumption  113.7  − 5.0  1.8 
Public consumption  61.8  2.0  0.7 
Gross fixed capital formation  48.9  − 12.9  − 0.8 
   Private excl. dwellings  30.4  − 11.1  − 0.9 
   Dwellings  14.4  − 17.6  − 0.3 
Change in stocks 
a
  1.7  1.0  − 0.7 
Total domestic demand  226.2  − 5.8  1.7 
Exports of goods and services  127  − 10.4  0.3 
Imports of goods and services  121.7  − 12.4  1.7 
Net exports  
a
  5.3  0.8  − 0.6 
GDP deflator     1.3  2.7 
Consumer prices     na  na 
Private consumption deflator     1.5  2.0 
Output gap 
b
       − 4.9  − 4.9 
Unit labour costs 
c
      5.6  − 0.8 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     3.2  2.7 
Employment (thousands)  2875.0  2800.0  2733.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
   1.8  3.5  5.4 
Real household disposable income     4.7  3.4 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      na  na 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    3.4  − 2.4  − 5.4 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    32.9  36.5  40.2 
Current account balance  
f
    2.2  1.8  1.6 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      1.9  1.3 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      2.3  1.6 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      3.6  3.6 
United States Federal funds rate      0.3  0.5 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.9  2.0 
    Japan     − 5.9  1.2 
    Euro Area     − 4.1  1.1 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
      61.0  74.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.390  1.460 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries      7.45  7.44 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   92 
Denmark    DEC 
The current situation 
Danish GDP fell by 7 per cent in the second quarter of 2009 compared to the same quarter last 
year. This is the greatest drop in the history of the quarterly national accounts (unofficial, but 
reliable data starts in 1971). There is no hard evidence on the recovery having started, but 
consumer and business confidence has been on its way up for some time. The drop in industrial 
production has stopped, and the fall in retail sales has slow down. The drop in house prices 
continued in the second quarter, but monthly indicators point to a possible levelling out. 
Employment has fallen and unemployment has risen from a historical low level last summer. 
However, unemployment has only reached the level believed to be “structural” (around 3½ per 
cent of the labour force).  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
Fiscal policy has been eased significantly. Income taxes have been reduced and public 
investments have been advance. Public employment has increased as well. The fiscal easing 
will increase economic activity (GDP) in 2009 by approximately 1 per cent compared to a 
neutral stance. Fiscal policy will be eased next year as well. The additional positive effect of the 
extra easing in 2010 on activity is around ½ per cent. Over the period 2008-10 fiscal policy is 
eased discretionally by around 45 billion D.kr. (2½ per cent of GDP). On top of these measures, 
temporarily is has become possible to redraw money from a special pensions savings fund 
(which is not formal part of the public sector). The redrawn amount of money is around 40 
billion D.kr.  
The outlook 
GDP is forecasted to fall by 4¾ per cent in 2009 compared to 2008, and the output gap is 
projected to be around -5 per cent. Employment has fallen, but not nearly as much as 
production. Thus, even though GDP is forecasted to start to increase slowly, employment will 
continue to fall and unemployment will increase for one to one and a half year to come. GDP is 
believed to grow just in line with growth of potential output, leaving the output gap more or less 
constant in 2010 (and 2011). Thus, growth significantly above trend is not predicted to take 
place until 2012. Unemployment will rise to 5½ per cent of the labour force in 2010 (and to 6 
per cent in 2011). Public finances have been hurt significantly by the crisis. In 2008 the surplus 
was around 3½ per cent, and in 2010 a deficit of more the 5 per cent is forecasted. This 
significant turn around is primarily due to the relative large Danish automatic stabilizers, but 
discretionary fiscal policy measures and temporary factors (such as a significant decline in tax 
revenue from the extraction of natural resources from the North Sea) is also playing a role. 
House prices, that were significantly overvalued in 2007-2008, have already fallen by some by 
20 per cent in real terms, and an additional drop of some 10 per cent is predicted. Wage   93 
increases have traditionally (at least for 10 years) been higher than abroad. This has not been 
justified by higher growth in productivity (actually pretty much to the contrary), so 
competitiveness has deteriorated significantly. Even though wage increases have come down (to 
around 3¼ per cent this year) they are predicted to be too high to improve competitiveness in 
the next couple of years. 
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5.3.6  Finland  ETLA 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  184.7  − 7.0  1.5 
Private consumption  95.6  − 3.5  1.0 
Public consumption  41.3  1.5  1.0 
Gross fixed capital formation  38.1  − 12.0  − 4.5 
   Private excl. dwellings  23.1  − 17.0  − 8.5 
   Dwellings  9.9  − 9.0  0.5 
Change in stocks 
a
  2.6  0.0  0.0 
Total domestic demand  177.5  − 4.0  0.0 
Exports of goods and services  86.8  − 25.0  5.5 
Imports of goods and services  79.6  − 23.0  2.0 
Net exports  
a
  1.3  − 4.5  2.0 
GDP deflator  1.8  3.0  0.5 
Consumer prices  4.1  0.3  1.8 
Private consumption deflator  5.3  3.0  2.5 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
   5.3  − 1.5  − 1.0 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate  4.3  1.8  2.5 
Employment (thousands)  2531.0  2445.0  2366.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
   6.3  8.9  11.0 
Real household disposable income  2.0  − 0.5  0.5 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   − 1.0  2.5  2.0 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    4.2  − 2.0  − 3.7 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    34.2  42.5  48.9 
Current account balance  
f
    2.6  1.4  2.0 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   4.6  1.3  1.6 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate      0.3  1.3 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.5  1.5 
    Japan     − 6.0  1.5 
    Euro Area     − 4.5  0.5 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
      60.8  73.5 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.380  1.430 
    Yen/Euro      133  133 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   95 
Finland   ETLA 
The current situation 
According to preliminary data by Statistics Finland, GDP was down 8.5 per cent year-on-year 
in the first half of 2009. GDP has now decreased for four consecutive quarters. On the other 
hand, the latest monthly statistics are rather encouraging. In some sectors of the economy, the 
low end has probably been passed and the situation is improving. For example according to 
Customs, the seasonally adjusted value of exports was up in June-July. Also new orders in 
industry have risen slightly, and the volume of output seems to have stabilised. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
The Finnish Consumer price inflation has been clearly faster than in the other Euro Area. Main 
reason is the price of food, which has not decreased in line with the other Euro Area 
development. Food prices start decreasing in Finland as well supported by the 5 percentage 
point decrease in value added on food to 12 per cent in September. 
 
Public sector finances are suffering from the global recession more than in most other countries. 
The largest surplus (4.4 per cent of GDP) in the EU will turn into almost as large a deficit in 
2010. Roughly half of the deteriorating is due to automatic stabilizers while the remaining 
deficit origins from economic stimulus and aging of the population. The central government 
deficit will be over 5 per cent of GDP, and the central-government-debt-to-GDP ratio will rise 
by 17 percentage points to 46 per cent. Without additional measures, indebtedness will continue 
to rise. 
The outlook 
In our September forecast, ETLA lowered our estimate for the 2009 GDP growth figure by half 
a percentage point to -7 per cent, because the beginning of the year was weaker than previously 
expected. The economy will continue to shrink in the third quarter but by less than before. The 
recovery will be slow, because investment will continue to shrink far into 2010 and rising 
unemployment will further weaken household purchasing power. 
 
The volume of exports will decline considerably this year in all sectors due to the collapse in 
export demand. In 2010, exports will increase the most in vehicles and the processing of metals 
whose products will be needed as intermediary goods in other sectors that will recover later. A 
recovery in export demand will help the economy grow slowly towards the end of the year. In 
2010, we expect GDP to rise by 1.5 per cent. 
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5.3.7  France   BIPE 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  1948.0  − 2.4  1.2 
Private consumption  1086.6  0.6  0.6 
Public consumption  478.6  0.8  − 0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation  426.9  − 7.1  − 2.5 
   Private excl. dwellings  224.3  − 8.2  − 3.1 
   Dwellings  120.9  − 7.6  − 2.2 
Change in stocks 
a
     − 1.3  1.1 
Total domestic demand  1997.4  − 2.2  0.8 
Exports of goods and services  514.1  − 11.8  1.9 
Imports of goods and services  563.5  − 10.4  0.7 
Net exports  
a
     − 0.1  0.3 
GDP deflator     0.9  1.0 
Consumer prices     0.2  1.7 
Private consumption deflator     0.0  1.9 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     2.4  1.5 
Employment (thousands)     25420.0  25204.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
      9.4  10.5 
Real household disposable income     0.7  − 0.1 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      15.4  14.8 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 7.3  − 8.6 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       78.0  86.0 
Current account balance  
f
       − 1.9  − 1.8 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      1.3  1.3 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      3.6  3.9 
United States Federal funds rate      0.3  0.4 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.9  1.7 
    Japan     − 5.3  2.6 
    Euro Area     − 4.1  1.1 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
      62.9  81.1 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.380  1.450 
    Yen/Euro      129.4  121.8 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   97 
France   BIPE 
The current situation 
In its business cycle note which appeared during the second fortnight of June, INSEE 
anticipated a new decline -0.6% in GDP in the second quarter of 2009. There was consequently 
a major surprise when the second quarter turned out to be positive with an advance in GDP of 
0.3% when the quarterly accounts were published in mid-August. Beyond the uncertainties 
which may relate to this first estimate by INSEE, one important element remains: independently 
of the profile of the exit from recession and its scale, the lowest point is very probably over. 
Admittedly, some information argues in favour of caution in expressing a date for the exit from 
recession. Thus, the survey at the end of August relating to industrial orders, excluding 
transport materials apart from cars, shows a new fall in these in June (-1.2%), following a rise in 
May (+1.5%). 
  Household demand is resisting thanks to the favourable trend in consumer prices. The 
consumer price index has reached a very low level on a sliding basis. In July, the price index 
was down by 0.7% compared with last year. Admittedly, the discount sales in clothing/shoes 
amplified the phenomenon. But the sharp contraction in oil products and fresh products since 
mid-2008 is the essential cause of the fall in consumer prices. Thanks to this, household 
demand remained positive during the first half of 2009, notably due to the added purchasing 
power that it induced. However, the substantial increase in unemployment limited the potential 
of demand to resist. 
  But a new rise in unemployment and the rally in prices will hinder an acceleration in 
household consumption in 2010. The expected consolidation of activity in the second quarter 
will be inadequate to prevent a new rise in unemployment during the next two to three quarters. 
In parallel, the positive impact of the fall in consumer prices will fade. The latter will begin to 
pick up gradually from July-August until they return to upward mode during the last quarter of 
2009. This trend originates from the rise in underlying inflation. In this context, household 
consumption should stabilise at best, with the rise in prices and unemployment offsetting the 
improvement in household morale. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
See the current situation. 
The outlook 
A probably moderate rally in activity. Without an acceleration in household consumption, only 
an improvement in the foreign balance or a rally in investment can support a substantial, lasting 
recovery in GDP. As regards the external contribution to French growth, our economy’s 
inadequate competitiveness limits the possibilities of seeing our growth improved strongly by 
global demand. As far as investment is concerned, there is a fear that the housing component   98 
will only rally slowly. As such, pressure on purchasing power will prevent some households 
from purchasing homes despite the return of property prices to more reasonable levels despite 
low current interest rates. In terms of productive investment, the moderate prospects for global 
demand and the continuing delicate financial situation of many companies encourage the 
adoption of a hypothesis of stabilisation at the current level until the second half of 2010, but 
not of a lively recovery. Finally, the more than difficult situation experienced by the State and 
local communities will lead to a new shrinkage in APU (public administration) investments. 
  The rebuilding of inventories will boost growth, but only for two or three quarters. The 
violent contraction in inventories was an important factor in the fall in activity at the end of 
2008 and during the first half of 2009. Their restoration to the former level should therefore 
have quite a strong but limited impact on GDP growth. An acceleration for two or three quarters 
can therefore be expected before returning to a more moderate level during the second half of 
2010, creating a ‘double dip’ effect. Moreover, the possibility cannot be excluded that stock-
rebuilding will be fast and we shall record strong growth during one quarter (0.7%, or even 
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5.3.8  France  COE-Rexecode 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  1950.0  − 2.0  2.2 
Private consumption  1087.0  0.6  0.8 
Public consumption  452.0  1.4  2.1 
Gross fixed capital formation  428.0  − 6.7  0.2 
   Private excl. dwellings (Productive)  241.0  − 7.9  − 0.8 
   Dwellings (Households)  121.0  − 7.1  − 0.7 
Change in stocks 
a
  4.2  0.0  0.8 
Total domestic demand  1998.0  − 1.8  1.8 
Exports of goods and services  516.0  − 10.4  5.6 
Imports of goods and services  564.0  − 9.1  − 4.0 
Net exports  
a
     − 0.3  0.3 
GDP deflator     1.0  0.3 
Consumer prices     0.2  1.5 
Private consumption deflator     − 0.2  1.3 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      2.3  − 0.5 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     2.3  1.9 
Employment (thousands)     − 1.2  − 0.4 
Unemployment rate 
d
      9.2  9.9 
Real household disposable income     1.7  0.3 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
 (Gross saving)     16.5  16.0 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 7.5  − 7.0 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       77.5  82.6 
Current account balance  
f
       − 2.1  − 2.6 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      1.3  1.0 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      3.6  3.7 
United States Federal funds rate      0.2  0.6 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.5  2.5 
    Japan     − 5.6  2.4 
    Euro Area     − 3.6  2.1 
World trade volume (goods)     − 13.0  6.4 
Oil price 
i
      62.7  84.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.370  1.370 
    Yen/Euro      131  135 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Gross saving, percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   100 
France  COE-Rexecode 
La récession qu’a subie l’économie française à partir du deuxième trimestre 2008 s’est 
interrompue au printemps 2009. Le volume du PIB a progressé au rythme de 1,4 % en rythme 
annualisé par rapport au trimestre précédent. Le redressement des exportations a soutenu 
l’activité. Il a été accompagné par une nouvelle chute des importations en volume et une 
progression des dépenses de consommation des ménages. L’activité a en revanche été à 
nouveau freinée par le recul des dépenses en capital fixe (investissement) et circulant 
(accentuation du déstockage) réalisées par les entreprises.  
Les immatriculations de véhicules particulières et commerciales sont un peu retombées en 
juillet et août après leur envolée du printemps permise notamment par la « prime à la casse » 
incluse dans le plan de relance. Elles se sont redressées en septembre. Du côté des indicateurs « 
qualitatifs », les enquêtes de conjoncture ont confirmé et même amplifié leur rebond amorcé en 
avril dernier. En particulier, l’indice synthétique de l’enquête auprès des directeurs d’achat du 
secteur industriel a franchi à la hausse en août la ligne de 50 qui trace une démarcation entre 
l’expansion et la contraction de l’activité. Il en est très proche dans les activités de services et 
pourrait rapidement dépasser cette ligne au regard de la franche amélioration des anticipations 
d’activité à un an que retiennent les chefs d’entreprise. Dans le cas du secteur de la 
construction, l’indice du climat des affaires a cessé de se dégrader depuis plusieurs mois sans 
parvenir à se redresser. Ce constat s’applique également aux intentions de commandes des chefs 
d’entreprise du secteur du commerce de détail.  
L’amélioration globale des enquêtes de conjoncture suggère ainsi que la première étape de la 
sortie de crise que constitue la fin de la récession a bel et bien été franchie. A court terme, des 
forces de rebond vont continuer à s’exercer.  
Ces forces de rebond tiennent dans un premier lieu à l’arrêt du déstockage. Celui-ci est 
désormais très avancé et probablement proche de son terme. Au cours du seul deuxième 
trimestre, il a porté sur un montant équivalent à 3 % de la valeur ajoutée des sociétés non 
financières, une proportion qui n’avait jamais été observée par le passé. Cette coupe dans le 
niveau des stocks a permis aux entreprises de ramener leurs besoins de financement à hauteur 
d’environ un point de leur valeur ajoutée. Ce ratio se situait à plus de huit points début 2008. Le 
niveau des stocks est désormais jugé plutôt plus bas que la normale par les industriels. A court 
terme, la demande sera ainsi de moins en moins satisfaite par un prélèvement sur le niveau des 
stocks, désormais très bas, mais plutôt par une nouvelle production ce qui viendra soutenir 
l’activité et aussi par une hausse des importations.  
La deuxième force de rebond tient à la montée en puissance du volet « dépenses » du plan de 
relance. A la fin du mois d’août, 18,2 milliards d’euros ont été dépensés par l’Etat dans le cadre 
des mesures incluses dans le plan de relance de décembre 2008 et du sommet social de février 
dernier. Le montant annoncé était au total d’un peu moins de 29 milliards d’euros. Sur ce 
montant de 18,2 milliards, environ la moitié s’explique par la mise en œuvre des mesures de   101 
soutien de la trésorerie des entreprises et 3,7 milliards par un versement aux collectivités locales 
dans le cadre du fonds de compensation de la TVA. Le montant restant s’explique par les 
versements de prestations aux personnes éligibles au RSA, par les exonérations de charge pour 
les TPE ou encore par la prime à la casse… Jusqu’à présent, les montants dépensés dans 
l’objectif de soutien de l’investissement public d’Etat ont été plutôt modestes : sur les 4,1 
milliards d’euros d’investissement de l’Etat prévus, seuls 610 millions d’euros ont été payés, de 
sorte qu’environ 2,2 milliards d’euros de crédits de paiement prévus pour 2009 n’ont pas encore 
été utilisés. 1,3 milliard d’euros pourraient encore être dépensés en 2010. Les entreprises 
publiques auraient dépensé pour leur part environ un quart du montant de l’enveloppe attendue 
(4 milliards d’euros). Aucune estimation précise de l’impact de la mesure FCTVA sur 
l’investissement des collectivités locales n’est disponible. Sous l’hypothèse où les montants 
annoncés et votés seraient effectivement utilisés pour une relance de l’investissement, environ 
cinq milliards d’euros de dépenses additionnelles pourrait intervenir durant le second semestre, 
soit 0,3 point de PIB. L’effet de soutien de l’activité exercé par la dépense publique viendrait à 
se modérer dans la seconde partie de l’année prochaine. 
Enfin, une troisième force de rebond à court terme tient à la réanimation du commerce mondial. 
Les exportations de marchandises se sont réorientées à la hausse à partir du printemps. L’indice 
des opinions des directeurs d’achat du secteur industriel sur les commandes à l’exportation est 
également repassé au-dessus de la ligne de 50. 
L’exercice concomitant de ces forces de soutien pourrait déboucher sur un rythme de croissance 
plutôt élevé au cours des deux à trois prochains trimestres. Au-delà, ce rebond peinerait à 
embrayer sur une phase de vraie reprise marquée par une nouvelle phase d’accumulation. 
Les dépenses d’investissement productif peineraient à redémarrer. Le faible niveau de 
l’utilisation des capacités de production limite l’incitation physique à investir. Surtout, le 
rétablissement de la situation financière des entreprises sera un préalable à un redémarrage de 
l’investissement. Or, le redressement des marges d’exploitation n’est qu’à peine amorcé et les 
besoins de trésorerie risquent de se tendre à mesure que le rebond de l’activité se propagera. Les 
conditions de financement auprès des banques restent tendues comme en témoigne le niveau 
record (supérieur à cent points de base) atteint par l’écart entre le taux des crédits aux sociétés 
non financières et celui de l’Euribor 3 mois.  
La principale inconnue réside dans l’évolution attendue de la consommation. Celle-ci a 
continué de progresser jusqu’à présent. Elle a avancé de 1,3 % en rythme annuel au deuxième 
trimestre. Cette progression s’est opérée en dépit d’un recul des effectifs salariés marchands 
supérieur à 410 000 postes depuis le point haut du premier trimestre 2008, d’une part, de la 
modération salariale, d’autre part. Elle n’a pas empêché une remontée du taux d’épargne des 
ménages. Celui-ci ressortirait à 16,6 % selon nos estimations au deuxième trimestre contre 15,1 
% un an plus tôt.  
La désinflation permise par le recul des cours du baril de pétrole a contribué  à soutenir les 
dépenses de consommation des ménages en début d’année. Leur revenu a également bénéficié   102 
d’une accélération des transferts sociaux au cours du premier semestre. Environ un milliard 
d’euros devrait encore être redistribué aux ménages au troisième trimestre sous forme de 
remises d’impôt sur le revenu. Ces éléments de soutien vont s’atténuer, voire s’inverser. 
L’inflation s’est à nouveau orientée à la hausse. Elle resterait toutefois modérée. L’introduction 
d’une taxe carbone viendrait exercer un prélèvement sur les revenus des ménages.  
En l’absence d’une véritable reprise soutenue, les effectifs peineront à s’orienter à la hausse. La 
poursuite de la montée du chômage pourrait exercer pour sa part un effet de discipline des 
salaires. Les revenus salariaux des ménages accéléreraient ainsi à peine en 2010 (à 1,6 % en 
termes nominaux après une progression de seulement 0,2 % en 2009). Les gains de pouvoir 
d’achat du revenu disponible brut des ménages ralentiraient ainsi à 0,3 % en 2010 après une 
progression de 1,7 % en 2009.  
En dépit de cette modération des revenus, nous ne privilégions pas une hypothèse de recul des 
dépenses de consommation. Celles-ci progresseraient en 2010 à un rythme proche de celui 
attendu pour 2009, inférieur à 1 % en volume. Tout d’abord, la prorogation de la « prime à la 
casse » empêcherait que se manifeste un contrecoup à la baisse sur les immatriculations de 
véhicules. Ensuite, nous retenons qu’en l’absence de remontée des taux d’intérêt et sous 
l’hypothèse que la baisse des prix de l’immobilier ne s’amplifie pas, l’incitation au gonflement 
de l’épargne financière s’atténuera progressivement. Le taux d’épargne financière a déjà 
brutalement remonté. En s’inscrivant à 7,1 % au deuxième trimestre 2009, selon nos 
estimations, il dépasse de près d’un point sa moyenne de longue période.  
Au total, malgré le vif rebond du PIB que nous retenons pour la fin 2009 et le début 2010, le 
niveau du PIB resterait encore inférieur à celui qui avait été inscrit avant l’entrée en récession. 
Le scénario que nous retenons décrit ainsi plus une phase de récupération après une chute 
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5.3.9  France  INSEE 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  1948.0  − 2.2  na 
Private consumption  1087.0  0.7  na 
Public consumption  479.0  1.4  na 
Gross fixed capital formation  427.0  − 6.2  na 
   Private excl. dwellings  199.0  − 7.7  na 
   Dwellings  213.0  − 5.3  na 
Change in stocks 
a
  − 0.3  − 1.4  na 
Total domestic demand  1997.0  − 2.0  na 
Exports of goods and services  514.0  − 11.0  na 
Imports of goods and services  563.0  − 9.6  na 
Net exports  
a
  − 0.3  − 0.1  na 
GDP deflator  118.6  1.1  na 
Consumer prices  119.2  0.1  na 
Private consumption deflator  116.2  − 0.2  na 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
   0.5  na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     na  na 
Employment (thousands)  26224.0  − 1.6  na 
Unemployment rate 
d
   7.8  9.6  na 
Real household disposable income  1283.0  2.1  na 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   15.3  16.5  na 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 3.4  na  na 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    67.4  na  na 
Current account balance  
f
    − 2.3  na  na 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      na  na 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.6  na 
    Japan     − 5.9  na 
    Euro Area     − 3.9  na 
World trade volume (goods)     − 15.4  na 
Oil price 
i
   97.2  60.5  na 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.471  1.39  na 
    Yen/Euro   151.6  131.0  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   104 
France  INSEE 
The current situation 
While French real GDP had strongly declined since the second quarter of 2008, GDP growth 
surprised on the upside in the second quarter (+0,3 %, q/q). Production in manufacturing 
industry has rebounded, particularly in the car industry. In third quarter of 2009, economic 
indicators such as industrial production index suggest that the improvement would continue. 
However, employment is still decreasing. The unemployment rate is 9,5 % in the second quarter 
of 2009, two points more than its lowest level in the first quarter of 2008 (7,5 %).  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
The stimulus package is partly composed of an important cash injection for modest households 
in the second and third quarters of 2009. These strong supporting measures could sustain the 
private consumption in the second part of the year. Moreover, as in many countries, scrapping 
subsidies increased the demand for cars. It represents 1000 € per scrapped vehicle, with 
conditions on car’s energy efficiency, and will carry on until the end of the year. In 2010, this 
subsidy should be reduced gradually. In addition, the French government launched a multi 
annual investment plan of 8 billions € encompassing central government and main public-
owned companies spending.   
The outlook 
After the recovery in the second quarter of 2009, GDP should still be growing at a moderate 
pace in the second half of the year. The French economy should benefit from the rebound of 
global trade. We expect a positive contribution of net foreign trade in the third quarter and 
exports should be dynamic until the end of 2009. Private consumption should continue to grow 
at a moderate pace. Private investment should continue to decline but at a slower pace. 
However, unemployment rate reached its highest level since 2000. 
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5.3.10  France  OFCE 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP    − 2.1  0.8 
Private consumption    0.5  0.6 
Public consumption    1.4  2.0 
Gross fixed capital formation    − 6.6  − 3.4 
   Private excl. dwellings    − 7.6  − 4.5 
   Dwellings    − 7.9  − 4.5 
Change in stocks 
a
    − 1.1  0.8 
Total domestic demand    − 1.9  0.8 
Exports of goods and services    − 10.3  5.3 
Imports of goods and services    − 8.5  4.9 
Net exports  
a
    − 0.2  0.0 
GDP deflator    0.1  1.6 
Consumer prices    0.2  1.5 
Private consumption deflator    0.0  1.6 
Output gap 
b
      − 5.0  − 5.7 
Unit labour costs 
c
     3.5  − 1.2 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate    2.4  0.7 
Employment (thousands)    350.0  260.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
     9.1  10.1 
Real household disposable income    2.0  0.9 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
     16.5  16.8 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
      − 8.3  − 8.7 
Gross public debt 
f,g
      78.2  84.4 
Current account balance  
f
      − 2.3  − 2.4 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)     na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
     1.2  1.0 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
     4.0  3.6 
United States Federal funds rate     0.3  0.3 
GDP         
    USA    − 2.5  1.9 
    Japan    − 5.9  2.2 
    Euro Area    − 3.8  0.8 
World trade volume (goods)    − 14.3  7.0 
Oil price 
i
     61.6  80.0 
Exchange rate         
    Dollar/Euro     1.370  1.320 
    Yen/Euro     130  132 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries          
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   106 
France  OFCE 
The current situation 
French GDP declined four quarters in a row from the second quarter of 2008 but rose by 0.3% 
in the second quarter of 2009. This is not the only positive signal for the French economy since 
last Spring. World trade has started to recover. Credit conditions have improved. Consumer and 
companies’ economic sentiment have improved too although they still remain at low levels. 
Last, stockbuilding seems about to resume. OFCE’s quarterly GDP indicator suggests a 0.6% 
output growth in the third quarter of this year. 
The French economy seems to have resisted the crisis better than its main euro area trading 
partners, with GDP expected to fall by 2.1% in 2009, as compared to close to 5% in Germany 
and Italy. Industrial production fell sharply although some sectors benefited from the support of 
fiscal measures. This was especially the case for the automobile industry which benefited from 
the car scrapping schemes introduced in France and neighbour countries.  
The output fall has led a deterioration of the labour market conditions and we expect the 
unemployment rate to come close to 9.5% at the end of this year, i.e. 2.4 percentage higher than 
in the first quarter of 2008.  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
Fiscal deficits have been rising under the combined effects of the recession and of the fiscal 
stimulus package. We expect the general government deficit to rise from 3.4% of GDP to 8.3% 
year and 8.7% of GDP in 2010. The fiscal stimulus package implemented in 2009 amounts to 
1.3% of GDP, embedding mainly measures on government investment and support to 
companies’ cashflow, while measures directly addressing the unemployment situation have so 
far been limited. Under current fiscal plans, fiscal policy will be contractionary in 2010, with a 
fiscal effort of around 0.4% of GDP.  
With the euro area expected to grow by 0.8% only next year and inflation expected to settle at 
around 1.2%, the ECB’s interest rates would remain unchanged at 1.0%. We have assumed that 
the euro real exchange rate would remain roughly stable in the coming months, but there is a 
risk of a further appreciation.  
 The outlook 
The rebound of the French economy could be short-lived. We expect French GDP will rise by 
0.8% only in 2010, which cannot be seen as a real recovery. A number of factors will lead GDP 
growth to remain moderate. French households’ consumption growth will be constrained by 
decelerating purchasing power resulting both from the stabilisation of inflation at around 1.5% 
in 2010 instead of 0.2% in 2009 and from rising unemployment. Companies will reduce their 
indebtedness levels and will not increase their investment before their balance sheets and profits   107 
are improved. Fiscal policy will become contractionary. The unemployment rate will continue 
to rise and reach 10.6% at the end of 2010. 
A major issue will be the exit strategy implemented in the G-20. If fiscal policies were to be 
tightened sooner and by a larger extent than we currently expect, the anticipated fragile 
recovery would be at risk. 
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5.3.11  Germany  DIW 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  2495.8  − 5.1  1.3 
Private consumption  1409.7  0.8  1.0 
Public consumption  451.8  2.7  1.5 
Gross fixed capital formation  474.7  − 9.1  3.2 
   Private excl. dwellings  229.7  − 18.8  1.7 
   Dwellings  245.0  0.1  4.3 
Change in stocks 
a
  3.9  0.0  − 0.1 
Total domestic demand  2340.1  − 1.5  1.4 
Exports of goods and services  1179.4  − 15.1  4.1 
Imports of goods and services  1023.7  − 8.5  4.7 
Net exports  
a
  155.7  − 3.7  − 0.1 
GDP deflator  109.8  1.1  0.6 
Consumer prices  115.0  0.3  1.0 
Private consumption deflator  112.8  0.1  0.9 
Output gap 
b
    1.3  − 4.5  − 4.3 
Unit labour costs 
c
   64.2  4.9  − 0.9 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate  20.5  2.8  0.6 
Employment (thousands)  40277.5  − 0.3  1.6 
Unemployment rate 
d
   7.2  7.7  9.2 
Real household disposable income  1381.4  0.9  0.9 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   11.2  11.4  11.4 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    0.0  − 3.1  − 4.9 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    65.8  71.7  75.2 
Current account balance  
f
    6.7  4.0  3.4 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   3.47  0.8  1.0 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   3.98  3.2  3.4 
United States Federal funds rate   1.8  0.2  0.5 
GDP          
    USA  9823.8  − 2.5  2.0 
    Japan  3338.7  − 6.1  1.0 
    Euro Area  9214.3  − 3.9  0.8 
World trade volume (goods)  13406.8  − 11.0  4.6 
Oil price 
i
   93.0  60.0  68.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.470  1.380  1.450 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   109 
5.3.12  Germany  IFO 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  2495.8  − 5.0  1.3 
Private consumption  1409.7  0.9  0.4 
Public consumption  451.8  2.4  1.7 
Gross fixed capital formation  474.7  − 8.9  1.4 
   Private excl. dwellings  229.7  − 16.5  1.9 
   Dwellings  245.0  − 1.8  1.1 
Change in stocks 
a
  3.9  − 1.2  − 0.8 
Total domestic demand  2340.1  − 2.1  0.1 
Exports of goods and services  1179.4  − 13.0  7.9 
Imports of goods and services  1023.7  − 7.7  5.6 
Net exports  
a
  155.7  − 3.0  1.2 
GDP deflator    1.1  0.5 
Consumer prices    0.3  0.6 
Private consumption deflator    − 0.3  0.4 
Output gap 
b
      na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
     4.4  − 2.0 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate    2.4  1.8 
Employment (thousands)    40174.9  39748.5 
Unemployment rate 
d
     8.0  9.1 
Real household disposable income    0.5  0.7 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
     11.0  11.4 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
      − 2.7  − 4.9 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       na  na 
Current account balance  
f
       na  na 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      na  na 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     na  na 
    Japan     na  na 
    Euro Area     na  na 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
     61.5  75.0 
Exchange rate         
    Dollar/Euro     1.390  1.450 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   110 
5.3.13  Germany  Ifw KIEL 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  2495.8  − 4.9  1.0 
Private consumption  1409.7  0.5  0.8 
Public consumption  451.8  2.3  1.6 
Gross fixed capital formation  474.7  − 9.6  3.1 
   Private excl. dwellings  307.0  − 14.3  1.6 
   Dwellings  137.3  − 1.1  4.0 
Change in stocks 
a
  0.5  − 0.4  0.2 
Total domestic demand  2192.6  − 1.6  1.6 
Exports of goods and services  1054.9  − 14.5  7.2 
Imports of goods and services  922.5  − 8.4  9.4 
Net exports  
a
  132.5  − 3.4  − 0.5 
GDP deflator     0.5  − 0.5 
Consumer prices     − 0.1  0.6 
Private consumption deflator     − 0.1  0.6 
Output gap 
b
       − 2.9  − 2.9 
Unit labour costs 
c
      4.4  − 0.8 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     3.0  1.3 
Employment (thousands)     − 0.3  − 1.8 
Unemployment rate 
d
      7.6  9.1 
Real household disposable income     − 0.2  1.6 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      11.0  11.5 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 3.0  − 5.1 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       73.1  77.5 
Current account balance  
f
       4.9  4.5 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      1.0  1.0 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      2.9  3.3 
United States Federal funds rate   2.5  0.0  0.4 
GDP          
    USA  0.4  − 2.5  2.0 
    Japan  − 0.7  − 5.4  1.2 
    Euro Area  0.6  − 3.7  0.8 
World trade volume (goods)  2.8  − 12.0  5.0 
Oil price 
i
   97.7  61.9  75.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.460  1.400  1.420 
    Yen/Euro   150.7  134.4  134.9 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   111 
Germany  Ifw KIEL 
The German economy is stabilizing. In the second quarter of 2009 production increased slightly 
and leading indicators point to somewhat stronger growth over the next two quarters. 
Nonetheless, we do not expect a cyclical recovery of the usual type over the next months with 
strong and sustained increases in capacity utilization. Empirical evidence shows that recessions 
that are associated with a banking crises tend to be deeper and more prolonged than “normal” 
recessions. 
 
While the situation has substantially improved in recent months,the international financial crisis 
is not yet over. Consolidation in the banking sector in many industrialized countries  and the 
process of reducing high indebtedness of private households, particularly in those countries that 
have to deal with the legacy of a house price bubble, will dampen growth of the world economy 
that will be lower than in the years before the crisis for some time to come. In addition, 
Germany is likely to lose international price competitiveness against those countries that are hit 
most severely by the crisis and which as a consequence are expected to have especially large 
output gaps, high unemployment and, as a result, stagnating or falling wage and price levels. On 
the domestic side, German banks have lost a lot of capital during the crisis and are likely to lose 
more going forward as insolvencies are likely to rise drastically over the next months. We 
expect that banks will tighten credit standards further and reduce bank lending in order to cope 
with the lower capital base  impairing business investment. While we do not expect an outright 
credit crunch at this point, there is a risk that the recovery will be substantially impaired by 
financial constraints. 
However, there are also some benign signals. The labour market has been surprisingly resilient 
so far, and while the situation on the labour market is likely to deteriorate over the coming 
months, it will do so less severely than could have been expected given the fall in production 
and less so than in a number of other countries. The fact that different sectors have been hit 
most severely in different countries can only account for a modest share of the differences in 
labour market behaviour as can institutional differences including differing rules on part-time 
unemployment (short-time working schemes). An important aspect seems to be that the wage 
moderation that had been induced by labor market reforms some years ago is still stimulating 
labor demand in Germany. Despite stronger wage increases last year and in the first half of this 
year, the relation between real labor costs and productivity is still more favourable than before 
the reforms were initiated. This implies that growth should be particularly labour intensive, and 
without the global recession we would have expected employment to rise significantly in 2009 
and 2010. The situation is, thus, markedly different from previous recessions in Germany that 
typically occured when wage pressure was already high. As a result, while there will be some 
further increase in unemployment, a massive setback on the labor market is unlikely, in our 
view.    112 
The outlook: Recovery but a modest one 
The German economy will pick up in the second half of 2009. Growth will be stimulated by 
rising demand from abroad as is documented by the latest increases in foreign orders and rising 
export expectations in manufacturing. Domestic demand will also grow, not least because of 
positive effects of the inventory cycle. In addition, public investment will accelerate. Business 
investment, in contrast, will remain sluggish as a result of the low capacity utilisation and 
higher costs of finance. 
Next year, the recovery will continue. Exports will continue to grow, but less forcefully than in 
previous cyclical recoveries. The larger contribution to growth is expected to come from 
domestic demand. Private consumption will continue to expand significantly despite some 
negative impact from the fact that the “scrappage premium” for old cars no longer applies and 
from the fall in employment as private consumption is stimulated by tax reductions. Business 
investment will start growing again, although rather moderately. Residential investment will be 
stimulated by low mortgage rates. 
Overall, we expect real GDP to grow by 1 percent in 2010, after a fall by 4.9 percent in 2009. 
Unemployment will average nearly 3.5 million persons in 2009 and climb to 3.9 million in 
2010. Consumer prices will be almost stable in both years.   113 
5.3.14  Germany  RWI 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  2495.8  − 5.0  1.2 
Private consumption  1409.7  0.5  − 0.5 
Public consumption  451.8  0.4  0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation  474.7  − 1.8  0.1 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings  137.3  − 1.5  − 1.1 
Change in stocks 
a
  3.9  − 0.8  − 0.2 
Total domestic demand  2340.1  − 1.7  − 0.3 
Exports of goods and services  1179.4  − 7.5  2.8 
Imports of goods and services  1023.7  − 4.2  1.4 
Net exports  
a
  155.7  − 3.3  1.5 
GDP deflator  1.5  1.4  1.9 
Consumer prices  2.6  0.4  1.3 
Private consumption deflator  2.1  − 0.3  1.1 
Output gap 
b
            
Unit labour costs 
c
   60.5  63.6  62.4 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate  2.8  2.2  1.8 
Employment (thousands)  40277.5  40154.0  39298.5 
Unemployment rate 
d
   7.2  7.7  9.5 
Real household disposable income  0.6  0.7  − 0.7 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   12.7  12.6  12.9 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    0.0  − 3.0  − 5.0 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    62.2  67.6  70.5 
Current account balance  
f
    6.6  4.6  5.8 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   4.6  1.5  1.5 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   4.3  3.9  3.7 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA  0.4  − 3.0  1.2 
    Japan  − 0.5  − 5.9  2.0 
    Euro Area  0.6  − 3.7  1.0 
World trade volume (goods)  3.9  − 13.5  6.0 
Oil price 
i
   97.0  60.0  70.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.470  1.380  1.450 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   114 
Germany  RWI 
The German economy is recovering only gradually. After having declined for four quarters in 
succession, GDP did, in fact, increase by 0.3% during the second quarter of 2009 relative to the 
previous quarter. Nevertheless, aggregate production is 7.1% lower than one year ago, so that 
the economy can only be seen to have stabilized at a low level. Private and public consumption 
have risen in particular. Indicators suggest a moderate revival during the second half of 2009. 
The main impetus will be provided by the global economy and the civic investment program, 
while private consumption is likely to decline. Inflation meanwhile is expected to increase, with 
consumer prices rising by 0.4% this year and 1.3% next year. 
 
In view of these developments, the RWI expects real GDP to drop by 5.0% in 2009. A halting 
recovery is to be expected for the entire forecast period. Economic growth will probably 
amount to an annual average of 1.2% in 2010.  
 
The situation in the German labor market should continue to worsen for some time to come. Up 
to now, by introducing shortened working hours and other adjustments at the company level, a 
reduction of employment levels in response to lower production levels has been surprisingly 
small. The measures have resulted in strong decreases in productivity and in employees’ 
working hours, while unit labor costs have risen. Yet businesses are expected to seek ways of 
curbing costs, so that unemployment will probably increase, affecting 3.7 million people by the 
end of this year and 4.4 million by the end of next year. The unemployment rate is consequently 
expected to increase from 8.3% to 9.8% on a yearly average. 
 
Public budgets are already facing a considerably worsened situation as a result of falling 
revenues, due to the economic slump, and of increased expenditures as well as on account of the 
steps taken to stabilize the economy. We expect this trend to continue, driving the total federal 
budget deficit up 3.0% of the GDP in this year and 5% in 2010. The debt/GDP ratio, i.e. the 
level of public debt relative to the nominal GDP, should therefore rise to more than 75% by the 
end of next year. 
 
Government economic policy faces tremendous challenges in view of the current situation. 
With the aim of ensuring a functioning money market, the ECB has drastically expanded the 
supply of liquidity and should now carefully tighten the reins on the money market. Financial 
policy faces the task of indicating ways to reduce the increased debt. A credible strategy would, 
in our judgment, limit the increase of expenditures and weight the budget in favor of growth-
stimulating expenditures that encourage growth.   115 
5.3.15  Greece       KEPE 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  239.1  − 1.4  0.0 
Private consumption  173.3  − 1.2  0.2 
Public consumption  40.3  3.9  0.5 
Gross fixed capital formation  46.3  − 12.8  − 0.8 
   Private excl. dwellings  26.4  − 16.2  − 1.4 
   Dwellings  12.7  − 14.5  − 1.5 
Change in stocks 
a
  1.4  − 0.2  − 0.1 
Total domestic demand  263.6  − 4.5  0.1 
Exports of goods and services  55.5  − 13.2  0.8 
Imports of goods and services  80.0  − 19.1  1.0 
Net exports  
a
  0.9  3.6  − 0.1 
GDP deflator  3.5  0.9  1.6 
Consumer prices  4.2  1.1  1.8 
Private consumption deflator  4.1  0.3  1.2 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     na  na 
Employment (thousands)  4707.0  − 1.9  − 0.6 
Unemployment rate 
d
   7.4  9.5  10.2 
Real household disposable income     na  na 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      na  na 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 5.0  − 9.5  − 4.9 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    97.4  102.7  107.2 
Current account balance  
f
    − 13.8  − 10.6  − 10.5 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months), end year
h
   4.87  2.6  2.5 
Long-term interest rate (10 years), end year  
h
   4.8  5.3  5.1 
United States Federal funds rate, end year      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.8  1.6 
    Japan     − 5.5  2.0 
    Euro Area     − 4.2  1.0 
World trade volume (goods)     − 18.0  3.1 
Oil price 
i
      60.8  73.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.470  1.380  1.430 
    Yen/Euro   na  na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   na  na  na 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   116 
Greece  KEPE 
In the second quarter of 2009 the Greek economy entered a phase of output decline. Greek GDP 
fell by 0.3 per cent compared to the same quarter last year. Recent evidence from monthly 
indicators points towards deepening of the recession in the remainder of the current year. 
Industrial production for the period January to August has dropped by 9.7% in comparison to 
the same period last year. The decline in private consumption has accelerated in the second 
quarter of 2009 to -1.9 per cent compared to the same quarter last year. Data on retail sales 
index volume show a continuation of the negative trend but at a slower pace. While private 
consumption is declining public consumption has risen to 3.6 per cent in the second quarter of 
2009 and is expected to rise by 4 per cent for the year providing, along with public investment, 
the main impetus for total spending. Meanwhile housing investment has been declining for a 
third consecutive year and is estimated to drop by more than 14 per cent in 2009. The decline of 
non housing private investment is expected to be higher. Consumer prices are expected to 
increase by somewhat less than 1% this year.  
 
In view of these developments, we expect real GDP to drop by 1.4% in 2009. A recovery is not 
expected before the second half of next year. Economic growth will probably remain very close 
to zero in 2010.  
 
The situation in the Greek labor market is worsening rapidly and it should continue to worsen 
for some time to come. The reduction of employment, in response to lower production levels, is 
expected to approach 2% on an annual basis. The unemployment rate is consequently expected 
to increase from 7.4% to 9.5% on a yearly average and exceed 10% in 2010. 
 
Greece’s exports are suffering due to the international economic situation.  We expect export 
volumes to decline by over 13 per cent this year. At the same time imports of goods and 
services are declining by even higher rates (-19%). As a result net exports have a significant 
positive contribution to GDP growth, while the current account deficit is exhibiting a noticeable 
reduction. 
  
The economic downturn has had severe repercussions on public finances. Tax revenues have 
collapsed and expenditures have increased substantially. The budgetary measures, designed to 
bring the deficit below the 3% threshold, have failed. The general government deficit is 
estimated close at 10% while  the debt/GDP ratio, should increase to more than 102% of GDP.  
 
The new government faces tremendous challenges in view of the current situation. A credible 
economic strategy would, in our judgment, limit the increase of government consumption and 
weight the budget in favor of growth-stimulating investment expenditures.   117 
5.3.16  Hungary    GKI 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  106.0  − 6.5  0.0 
Private consumption  69.5  − 6.7  0.0 
Public consumption  10.0  0.0  0.0 
Gross fixed capital formation  21.3  − 6.0  6.0 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings     na  na 
Change in stocks 
a
  2.0  − 1.2  − 1.4 
Total domestic demand  104.7  − 10.4  0.8 
Exports of goods and services  86.3  − 15.0  4.0 
Imports of goods and services  85.0  − 20.0  5.0 
Net exports  
a
  1.3  5.4  4.6 
GDP deflator  5.2  4.0  3.0 
Consumer prices  6.1  4.7  4.3 
Private consumption deflator     na  na 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate  7.5  2.0  1.0 
Employment (thousands)  3879.4  − 2.5  − 0.5 
Unemployment rate 
d
   477.0  9.8  9.8 
Real household disposable income  6.8  − 4.5  0.0 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   0.8  4.8  4.8 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 3.4  − 3.8  − 3.8 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    73.0  80.0  80.0 
Current account balance  
f
    − 8.4  − 2.7  − 3.4 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)   9.5  7.5  6.0 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   7.4  6.5  5.8 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   7.9  6.4  5.5 
United States Federal funds rate   0.5  0.5  0.8 
GDP          
    USA  1.1  − 2.6  0.8 
    Japan  − 0.7  − 6.0  1.7 
    Euro Area  0.8  − 4.8  − 0.3 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
   97.5  60.0  75.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.470  1.380  1.450 
    Yen/Euro   152.26  127.0  125.0 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   251.20  280.0  265.0 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   118 
Hungary  GKI 
The current situation 
Recession in Hungary was greater than the average: in the first half of 2009, compared to the 
same period of the previous year; the contraction of GDP was 4.8 per cent in the EU and 6.4 per 
cent in Hungary. In Autumn 2009 the Hungarian economy must have hit bottom (according to 
the national statistics GDP was down by 7.2 per cent in the first half of 2009). In the fourth 
quarter slight growth is forecast quarter-on-quarter, which still means a large, 4 per cent drop 
compared with the fourth quarter last year. The annual contraction is expected to total 6-7 per 
cent (6.5 per cent is the precise numerical forecast of GKI). Services alleviate the reduction of 
GDP and play a stabilising role. 
 
Employment, wages and consumption are gradually adjusting to recessionary times. The annual 
average rate of unemployment is expected to be at around 9.8 per cent, the year-end figure 10.3 
per cent. Real earnings of households are projected to drop by 2-3 per cent, real incomes more, 
by 4-5 per cent, because of an increase in unemployment, rigor in welfare transfers, and 
accelerating inflation due to the lift of some tax rates. With the decrease of credits, household 
consumption is likely to drop by 6.7 per cent, whereas households’ propensity to save increases 
markedly to almost 5 per cent of GDP. Consumption is anticipated to diminish even more 
sharply in the second half year than in the first one. The volume of investments decreases by 
about 5 per cent this year. The general decrease is neutralised to some extent by – mostly 
infrastructural – investments co-financed by the EU. In foreign trade an EUR 4.5 billion surplus 
is expected. This year Hungary will not need net external financing, because browning will be 
used either to lift foreign exchange reserves or to repay loans borrowed earlier! 
 
The rate of inflation is forecast to reach 4.4 per cent in the average of 2009 and about 6 per cent 
at the end of the year. The HUF is 7-8 per cent weaker than last year, which has an inflationary 
pressure on the yearly average, however, in the second half of 2009 a much stronger and less 
volatile HUF/EUR exchange rate is forecast with an annual average of HUF270 (compared with 
the first half year when it was HUF290). The reference rate of the central bank remained high 
(9.5 per cent) when unfavourable money market conditions prevailed. Only when the risk 
appetite improved in money markets sharply and the tax law for 2010 was passed the National 
Bank of Hungary could cut its official rate in two steps, by a total of 150 base points. Rate cuts 
can continue to 6.5-7 per cent by the end of the year. 
The outlook 
The development of the Hungarian economy in 2010 depends mostly on the evolution of the 
global crisis and the global consolidation and recovery trends. Certainly, the economy is and 
will be influenced by the (equilibrium-enforcing and credibility-building) economic policy of   119 
the current government as well as by the so far unknown economic policy of the new one to be 
inaugurated after the parliamentary elections of spring 2010. As money markets clearly 
signalled, foreign investors expect declining public foreign debt ratios and thus they are willing 
to finance limited deficits, there will not be much room for a different sustainable economic 
policy as far as the main macroeconomic trends are concerned, whereby the new government 
will have endless opportunities to change the details. 
 
In 2010 the tax centralisation (tax revenues relative to GDP) will be lower by about 1 
percentage point. Government revenues from taxes and contributions will be close to the level 
of last year. Government expenditures will also decline in nominal terms, mainly because taxes 
on employment were reduced and the 13th month compensation schemes were withdrawn. 
Although after the elections the new government can alter the internal structure of the 2010 
budget significantly– even by passing a supplementary budget – this will probably not affect the 
planned 3.8 per cent deficit target relative to GDP, which was agreed with the IMF. The gross 
public debt will rise to about 80 per cent of GDP by the end of 2009 from 73 per cent at the end 
of 2008; the 2010 year-end figure will be similar. The deterioration this year is related mostly to 
the contraction of GDP. If the debt is adjusted for the unused part of the IMF loan deposited 
with the National Bank of Hungary, the gross indebtedness figure was 67.4 per cent at the end 
of 2008 and it will climb to about 75 per cent in 2009, then by the end of 2010 the gap between 
the two figures may narrow. This will not be an outstanding indebtedness figure in Europe at 
all! 
 
The external balance remains favourable in 2010, similar to 2009. The foreign trade surplus 
decreases to EUR3 billion. Even if the domestic use of GDP grows only slightly since much of 
the inventories were sold off in 2009, import growth is expected to be at least one percentage 
point higher than export growth (4 and 5 per cent respectively). In addition there  will be some 
deterioration in the terms of trade. However, not much change is expected in other lines of the 
current account, because declining profits also limit the room for profit repatriation. 
Notwithstanding, net EU-transfers rise to EUR3.4 billion in 2010 from EUR2.5 billion in 2009. 
The overall external financing need will be similar to that of this year: rather small or around 
zero. Foreign investments too, gain momentum slowly, whereas capital outflows will stay 
limited. Overall, the net foreign debt of Hungary will substantially decrease in 2010. 
 
Similarly to the EU, the Hungarian economy will stagnate in 2010. However, there is higher 
probability for a “negative stagnation” in the case of Hungary. As compared with the 
corresponding period of 2008, some slight growth is possible from the second half of the year. 
After the peak in 2008 and the decline that followed in 2009, the growth index for agriculture is 
expected to stay at around 100 – provided that weather conditions are average. The construction 
industry will be the fastest expanding sector – with around 6 per cent output growth – as a result   120 
of infrastructure projects co-financed by the EU. Industry is expected to grow by 2-3 per cent 
because export markets slowly improve and domestic demand slightly expands.  Services also 
stay flat – with the exception of financial services and real estates, which still foresee some 
decline. 
 
The 6 per cent expansion of investments means that approximately the 2008 level will be 
reached again. Corporate investments are likely to increase moderately, investments co-
financed by the EU will surge. Household consumption will not change much. Gross earnings 
are expected to increase by 1 per cent – taking also into account the cut in personal income 
taxes. However, because of changes in personal income taxes, net earnings will grow by 7-7.5 
per cent resulting in an approximately 3 per cent increase of real earnings. Real incomes will 
stay flat more or less, because unemployment benefits decline as time passes by, family 
subsidies do not increase in nominal terms – a portion of it is to be reported on the tax return 
sheets as non-taxable income – and the real value of pensions contracts since the 13th month 
pension was abolished. Households will have easier access to credit but its behaviour will be 
more cautious. Net savings relative to GDP will stay at around 5 per cent. The rate of 
unemployment will be equal to the figure of this year: 9.8 per cent. The bottom of employment 
is expected in the first quarter of 2010. 
 
In 2009 Hungarian inflation trends differed from international ones. In the EU inflation virtually 
came to a halt, moreover, there is deflation in many countries. By contrast, inflation accelerates 
in Hungary partly because the delayed impact of earlier energy price increases and partly 
because of the rise of consumption tax rates. Towards the end of 2010, however, a global 
inflationary wave is to come due to the fiscal stimuli applied. The additional liquidity pumped 
into the world economy may induce demand-pull inflation and many countries can decide to 
raise VAT-rates to fill the gaps in their budgets. Hence, Hungarian inflation trends may again 
differ from the international ones, because the impact of tax rate increases will fade away in this 
period. In the first half of 2010 inflation will be around 5 per cent, then it drops to 3 per cent by 
the year-end, the annual average will be 4 per cent. 
 
In 2010 the indicators of economic equilibria will further improve in Hungary. The external 
financing need will be confined to the renewal of the existing debt, the deficit of the general 
government will not increase, the debt ratio will drop. As investor confidence gradually returns, 
the demand for Hungarian bonds increases, although in the first half of 2010 the political 
(election) risk premiums will be incorporated in the yields. In the second half of the year 
government bond yields will probably drop, the forint will strengthen. With an eye on keeping 
stability, the central bank will be able to decrease gradually the base rate from 6.5-7 per cent (at 
the end of 2009) to about 6 per cent by the end of 2010. Because of the uncertainties related to 
the elections, in the first half of 2010 the HUF/EUR exchange rate will stay at around HUF270   121 
(the level predicted in the second half of 2009), then – if the economic policy mix is supported 
by the financial markets and the international institutions – it will strengthen to HUF260 in the 
second half of the year, resulting in an annual average of HUF265. Hungarian inflation trends 
may differ from the international ones, because the impact of tax rate increases will fade away 
in this period. In the first half of 2010 inflation will be around 5 per cent, then it drops to 3 per 
cent by the year-end, the annual average will be 4 per cent. After recent years’ position towards 
the end of indicator-based rankings, Hungary will move up to the medium range of European 
countries in 2010 in terms of the improvement of economic imbalances. If this is maintained 
and further structural reforms are implemented, the country can be in a relatively favourable 
competitiveness and growth position after the crisis. Moreover, in Central Europe Hungary can 
be the only country which real options of joining the eurozone early – in 2013-2014. 
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5.3.17  Hungary       KOPINT 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  106.0  − 6.0  1.0 
Private consumption  69.5  − 5.0  0.5 
Public consumption  10.0  0.0  0.5 
Gross fixed capital formation  21.3  − 5.0  2.0 
   Private excl. dwellings  na  na  na 
   Dwellings  na  na  na 
Change in stocks 
a
  1.9  na  na 
Total domestic demand  104.7  − 8.4  0.5 
Exports of goods and services  86.3  − 13.5  6.0 
Imports of goods and services  85.0  − 17.0  6.0 
Net exports  
a
  1.8  na  na 
GDP deflator     3.8  3.8 
Consumer prices     4.5  4.5 
Private consumption deflator     na  na 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      − 4.0  2.9 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate  792.0  2.2  2.0 
Employment (thousands)  3849.0  − 2.2  0.8 
Unemployment rate 
d
      10.0  10.3 
Real household disposable income     − 3.5  0.7 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      4.0  4.0 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 3.9  − 3.8 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       79.0  79.0 
Current account balance  
f
       − 1.9  − 2.7 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      6.5  5.5 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      6.8  5.5 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      7.5  6.0 
United States Federal funds rate      0.3  0.5 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.7  2.0 
    Japan     − 5.9  1.1 
    Euro Area     − 3.9  0.9 
World trade volume (goods)     − 11.0  3.0 
Oil price 
i
      60.0  72.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.380  1.400 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries      280.0  270.0 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   123 
Hungary  KOPINT 
The current situation 
After the financial and economic turbulences in the period between October 2008 and April 
2009, the Hungarian economy started to consolidate. In summer, the foreign investors returned 
to the security market, the exchange rate of the domestic currency started to strengthen. The 
economic performance remained weak (minus 7.2 per cent in the first half of the year) but in the 
second and third quarter it seems to have reached the bottom. For the last quarter a slight 
recovery can be expected. 
The inflation rate is relatively high (3.9 per cent in January-September), mainly due to the raise 
of VAT rate from 20 to 25 per cent in July 2009. 
The export, the engine of the Hungarian economy before the crisis, has fallen dramatically since 
the autumn 2008, by almost 20 percent in the first 7 months of 2009. But, at the same time, 
import decreased more, by 25 per cent, so the trade balance improved significantly. 
Due to the falling exports and industrial production, unemployment rate increased to 10 per cent 
in August of 2009.  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
The major steps made by the government in order to stimulate the economy: 
•  To capitalize some domestic banks in order to make incentives to the credit market, 
•  To accelerate the development projects supported by the EU; 
•  Because of the very limited and fragile trust in the Hungarian economic and fiscal policy of 
the Hungarian government by the international investor’s community, the fiscal policy can 
not give any substantial financial stimulus to economic recovery. The fiscal policy focuses, 




The GDP will fall in 2009 by about 6-6.5 per cent. From the end of the year a slow recovery 
may start and in 2010 economic growth might be positive (plus 0.5-1 per cent). Nevertheless, 
economic outlook is very uncertain. It is strongly depending on the economic situation on the 
main foreign markets of the Hungarian exports in Western Europe and on the economic policy 
of the new government, expected after the election in spring 2010. 
Unemployment rate, however, remains over 10 per cent.  
Domestic demand remains weak but slightly growing in 2010. Both, household’s consumption 
and investments might be positive but significant impetus from these demand items can not be 
expected in medium term. 
Inflation rate will be similar to this year’s rate (about 4.3 per cent).    124 
5.3.18  Ireland        ESRI 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  181.8  − 7.2  − 1.1 
Private consumption  93.9  − 7.0  − 2.0 
Public consumption  28.9  − 2.0  − 2.0 
Gross fixed capital formation  39.5  − 30.5  − 15.5 
   Private excl. dwellings  24.4  − 26.0  − 18.4 
   Dwellings  15.1  − 45.7  − 18.8 
Change in stocks 
a
  0.2  − 0.8  0.2 
Total domestic demand  162.6  − 12.5  − 2.3 
Exports of goods and services  151.9  − 1.7  1.1 
Imports of goods and services  133.0  − 7.7  − 1.2 
Net exports  
a
  10.0  14.9  19.3 
GDP deflator  − 1.2  − 2.9  − 0.5 
Consumer prices  4.1  − 4.3  0.0 
Private consumption deflator  3.1  − 2.0  − 0.5 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     − 1.0  − 2.5 
Employment (thousands)  2099.7  1934.0  1853.9 
Unemployment rate 
d
   6.3  12.2  14.8 
Real household disposable income  102.5  − 5.2  − 2.8 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   8.4  11.9  11.6 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 7.3  − 12.9  − 12.8 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    44.2  61.9  75.7 
Current account balance  
f
    − 6.1  − 1.2  1.8 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      na  na 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.7  1.5 
    Japan     − 5.4  1.7 
    Euro Area     − 4.2  0.3 
World trade volume (goods)     − 11.9   2.5 
Oil price 
i
   97.0  61.5  76.5 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.471  1.37  1.40 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   125 
Ireland  ESRI 
The current situation 
We now expect GNP to fall by 8.7 percent in 2009 and by 1.7 percent in 2010. In GDP terms 
the corresponding figures are -7.2 percent for 2009 and -1.1 percent in 2010. Underlying these 
annual forecasts is a quarterly profile in which we expect growth to return in the latter part of 
2010, although at a very modest pace. The international context in which the forecasts were 
prepared is beginning to look somewhat more optimistic, relative to the earlier part of the year. 
Both Germany and France returned to growth in the second quarter, as did Japan. The IMF is 
now forecasting that the US will also return to growth in 2009. Given these trends and forecasts, 
we now expect to see exports growing next year at a rate of 1.1 percent. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
Over the medium-term, assuming appropriate policies are put in place to ensure a rapid fiscal 
consolidation of the public finances, the single biggest challenge facing the economy will be 
tackling the level of unemployment. The key challenge is to prevent short-term unemployment 
from turning into long-term unemployment. The single best manner to achieve this is a rapid 
return to growth. We would argue that to facilitate this there is a need more generally for pay 
cuts in the Irish economy. In the paper Recovery Scenarios for Ireland   analysis it was argued 
that if the 2009-2010 fiscal consolidation is successful, and assuming that there is a full world 
recovery by 2011, then Ireland will be well placed to participate in such a recovery and that the 
additional fiscal austerity measures planned for 2011 and 2012 may not need to be fully 
implemented. However this scenario is critically dependent on an adjustment in the average 
wage level of the economy of the order of 7 per cent. As members of a fixed currency regime 
such an adjustment can only come through adjustments in the domestic nominal wage. This is 
all the more imperative given the recent weakening of sterling which is putting further 
competitive pressures on the Irish exporting sector. As yet there is little evidence that such an 
adjustment is taking place in the official statistics.  
The outlook 
We expect the Irish economy to begin to recover by the second half of 2010 together with a 
levelling off of the unemployment rate. If anything, the relatively resilient performance of the 
external sector in Ireland, together with some tentative signs of an earlier than expected 
recovery in the international economy, are to be welcomed. To ensure Ireland is well placed to 
participate in a global recovery a number of factors must operate in Ireland’s favour. These 
include the successful implementation of the planned fiscal programme for 2010, the 
achievement of an improvement in competitiveness through downward adjustment of wage 
rates and a resolution of the problems in the banking sector. Successful implementation of these 
measures could result in a return to more robust rates of growth in the medium term.    126 
5.3.19  Italy  CONFINDUSTRIA 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  1572.2  − 4.8  0.8 
Private consumption  922.6  − 1.7  0.7 
Public consumption  324.2  0.4  0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation  328.4  − 13.1  1.5 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings     na  na 
Change in stocks 
a
  − 0.3  − 0.4  0.0 
Total domestic demand  1580.0  − 4.0  0.8 
Exports of goods and services  453.4  − 17.3  4.1 
Imports of goods and services  461.2  − 14.5  3.6 
Net exports  
a
  0.2  − 0.7  0.1 
GDP deflator  2.8  2.3  1.4 
Consumer prices  3.3  0.7  1.3 
Private consumption deflator  3.2  0.7  1.5 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
   4.2  3.4  − 0.5 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     na  na 
Employment (thousands)  24996.0  24297.0  23954.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
   6.7  8.3  9.5 
Real household disposable income     na  na 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      na  na 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 2.7  − 5.2  − 5.0 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    105.7  114.8  117.8 
Current account balance  
f
    − 3.4  − 3.1  − 2.9 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   4.6  1.3  1.2 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate   2.1  0.3  0.4 
GDP          
    USA  0.4  − 2.6  2.0 
    Japan     na  na 
    Euro Area  0.7  − 3.9  1.3 
World trade volume (goods)  4.1  − 14.4  9.1 
Oil price 
i
   97.3  60.5  70.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.470  1.380  1.420 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   127 
Italy  CONFINDUSTRIA 
The current situation 
The Italian economy is about to recover: we expect GDP to moderately pick up in this second 
half of the current year (+0.4%), after the -4% QoQ growth recorded during the first half. 
Exports will lead the way, pulled along by a fast-improving world demand. According to ours 
and other surveys on industrial output and new orders, we expect production to have increased 
by 3.9% QoQ in the third quarter. Other qualitative indicators are consistent with our growth 
expectations. Though remaining in recession territory, the activity PMI indices continue to rise 
and are now close to 50, the threshold that separates recession from expansion. ISAE business 
and consumer surveys are also showing clear signs of improvements in business and household 
confidence.  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
In 2009 the deficit is going to be around 5.2% of GDP while the debt will reach 114.8%. The 
government’s projections are very similar (the deficit at 5.3% and the debt at 115.1%). The 
primary balance is expected to settle at -0.2% of GDP, the same figure expected by the 
government. 
The estimates for 2009 are the result of revenues contracting due to the crisis (-1.3%) and an 
increase in total expenditures (+3.5%). Social and health spending and capital expenditures 
(due, for the most part, to transfers to State Railroads and disbursements  for unsold public 
buildings’ buyback. Interest payments will be lower as yields on government securities 
decrease. 
The main challenge in coming years will be the reduction of public debt. In the medium term, 
the debt reduction mostly depends on the level of growth. While, in fact, it’s simply not feasible 
to raise an already high tax burden, it’s also extremely difficult to cut expenditures, as the last 
10-year experience tells us. The government’s hope to reduce expenditures with the 
introduction of fiscal federalism may prove disappointing at least in the short run. These kind of  
fiscal reforms need time to become effective while may even lead to an increase in expenditures 
in the medium term. In the short and medium term, it would be more appropriate to adopt some 
important reforms regarding the pension system, market liberalizations, education, research and 
tax evasion. 
The outlook 
Italian GDP is expected to moderately rise during the second half of 2009 (+0.4% with respect 
to the first). On average, it will fall by 4.8% this year, a loss which is, indeed, already entirely 
accounted for by past developments.  
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In 2010, GDP is expected to increase by 0.8%. Exports will pull the Italian economy out of 
recession (+4.1%, -17.3% this year), thanks to a partial rebound in world trade volumes (+9.1%, 
after the 14.4% collapse recorded this year). Buoyancy in emerging countries will be 
accompanied by a recovery in advanced economies.  
 
Compared with the 15.7% cumulative decline recorded in the previous two years, there will be 
only a modest pick up in investment (+1.5%) and it will be partially achieved through 
government incentives. Consumption will increase by 0.7% (-1.7% this year). Sustained by 
greater confidence it will be, however, held down by shrinking household income: further 
progress in real per-capita wages (+0.4%) will be, in fact, more than offset by a new decrease in 
employment (-1.4% in terms of full-time equivalent workers, which follows a -2.8% expected 
in 2009). The unemployment rate is bound to increase from 8.3% in 2009 to 9.5% in 2010, the 
highest level since 2000. Consumer inflation will remain rather subdued: 1.3% (0.7% this year). 
The public deficit will settle at 5% of GDP while the public debt will rise to 117.8% from 
114.8% in 2009. 
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5.3.20  Italy  ISAE 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP     − 4.8  0.4 
Private consumption     − 1.8  0.4 
Public consumption     1.5  0.6 
Gross fixed capital formation     − 12.1  0.5 
   Private excl. dwellings     − 17.3  0.9 
   Dwellings     − 6.7  0.7 
Change in stocks 
a
     − 0.1  0.0 
Total domestic demand     na  na 
Exports of goods and services     − 20.2  1.7 
Imports of goods and services     − 15.3  1.6 
Net exports  
a
     na  na 
GDP deflator     2.4  1.3 
Consumer prices     0.8  1.7 
Private consumption deflator     na  na 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      4.0  0.4 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     1.6  1.8 
Employment (thousands)     na  na 
Unemployment rate 
d
      na  na 
Real household disposable income     0.1  0.2 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      na  na 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       5.3  5.1 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       114.9  117.3 
Current account balance  
f
       na  na 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      na  na 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.6  1.8 
    Japan     − 5.8  1.0 
    Euro Area     − 3.9  0.7 
World trade volume (goods)     − 14.5  4.9 
Oil price 
i
      60.6  75.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.395  1.494 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   130 
Italy  ISAE 
The current situation 
2nd-quarter GDP decrease (-0,5%) was less severe than the fall registered in previous quarters 
(-0,8% in q4-08 and -2,7% in q1-09). Exports (-3,7%) and investment (-2,9%) kept declining, 
although at lower rate than in former quarters; consumption, thanks to expenditure-hike in 
durable goods, was marginally positive; changes in stock contributed negatively to GDP 
formation for the second quarter in a row. 
 
Indications for the third quarter point to a likely return of the Italian economy on a positive 
growth path. Industrial production should have rebounded during summer; restocking and 
positive stimulus coming from some fiscal incentives (bonus for scrapping cars) would sustain 
the manufacturing pick-up. However, absent substantial increases of autonomous components 
of  demand, the production acceleration could be short-lived; according to Isae forecast, 
industrial production would stabilize in Q4 at the levels of the former quarter.  
 
As for surveys indications, consumers’ confidence has been improving quite surprisingly, 
probably driven by strong reduction of inflation. Industrial firms confidence indicator has been 
on the rise since the through touched in March, setting however at still historically low levels 
(with a partial setback in the September reading).  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
Labour market conditions keep deteriorating, although (up to now) less than expected. Fall of 
employment was refrained by massive recourse to schemes that allow firms to reduce per-capita 
working-hours (so called “wage supplementation fund”) rather than reducing number of 
employees. These schemes were reinforced and extended to cover more workers in the wake of 
the strong recession; however they are temporary. If a sufficiently strong recovery wouldn’t 
materialize in due time, negative repercussions on the number jobs would become more likely 
The outlook 
The outlook is for a weak recovery of the Italian economy (about +0.4% in 2010) along with 
the euro area (+0,7%). Recovery would be driven by world trade acceleration, particularly in 
the East-Asian region, and some improvement in domestic demand. Inflation would accelerate, 
in response to higher oil price and the some more sustained domestic cycle. Employment, in the 
full-time-equivalent measure, would still contract (about -1%, after the fall of -2,7% of 2009).  
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5.3.21  Italy  PROMETEIA 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP     − 4.9  0.5 
Private consumption     − 1.8  0.3 
Public consumption     1.1  0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation     − 12.4  0.2 
   Private excl. dwellings     − 18.5  1.8 
   Dwellings     − 7.0  − 1.1 
Change in stocks 
a
     − 0.2  0.1 
Total domestic demand     − 3.6  0.4 
Exports of goods and services     − 19.8  3.5 
Imports of goods and services     − 15.4  2.8 
Net exports  
a
     − 1.2  0.1 
GDP deflator     3.0  1.4 
Consumer prices     0.8  1.4 
Private consumption deflator     0.4  1.3 
Output gap 
b
       − 5.9  − 5.6 
Unit labour costs 
c
      3.6  0.2 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     0.8  0.9 
Employment (thousands)  23392  23134.0  22904.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
      7.5  8.7 
Real household disposable income     − 0.4  0.0 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   12.4  13.5  13.2 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 2.7  − 5.3  − 5.7 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    105.8  115.8  119.8 
Current account balance  
f
    − 3.4  − 3.0  − 3.3 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)           
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      1.2  1.1 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   4.7  4.3  4.4 
United States Federal funds rate           
GDP          
    USA     − 2.8  0.8 
    Japan     − 5.9  1.1 
    Euro Area     − 4.0  0.7 
World trade volume (goods)     − 12.5  5.4 
Oil price 
i
      60.5  67.6 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.39  1.42 
    Yen/Euro     130.4  131.9 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries        
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   132 
Italy  PROMETEIA 
The current situation 
The decline in industrial production came to an end in the summer, even if the strong rebound 
in August (partly due to statistical reasons) is expected to be reversed in September. Business 
and household opinion surveys are also improving, as Italy is benefiting from a recovery in 
exports and the need to rebuild stocks is providing an initial spur to production. By our 
estimates, the third quarter will register an increase on a quarterly basis of both industrial 
production and GDP. By contrast, figures on the labour force and on the number of hours of 
wage supplementation authorized (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) show a deterioration in the 
labour market.  
Reflecting above all the fall in raw material prices in the second half of 2008, consumer price 
inflation reached 0 per cent in July and was 0.2 per cent in September. It is likely to rise 
gradually from autumn onwards, as base effects, resulting from the movements in global 
commodity prices a year ago, are waning.  
As regards fiscal policies, the latest data confirm a substantial deterioration of fiscal position in 
2009 mainly due to cyclical reasons.  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
During the summer, three documents were approved by the Government: the DPEF (Economic 
and Financial Planning Document), the Financial Bill and the Update of the DPEF. Because of 
the already high public debt, the Italian Government choose to let the automatic stabilisers work 
and not to implement crisis-related discretionary measures. The exceptions being the “Against-
crisis Law” with some measures for firms (the temporary possibility for SMS firms not to 
reimburse bank loans, tax benefits to new investment) and for the labour market (the recourse to 
the Wage Supplementation Fund has been widen), but without any effect on the balance 
because they act through changes in the composition of the budget.  
These Government's recent measures should support the recovery, but just lowering the 
contractionary effects of the budget law for 2009: we estimate the fiscal stimulus to be 0.3 
percent of GDP in both 2009 and 2010 (0.7 percent the Government estimate). 
The outlook 
As long as the world economic upturn is getting slowly under way within the next quarters, 
economic activity in Italy should continue growing in 2010. Nevertheless, a sustained recovery 
in domestic demand is still far off, as capacity utilisation rates are still near rock-bottom and 
unemployment set to rise further. Taking this into account, gross domestic product is expected 
to grow slowly on average next year.  
Consumer price inflation is forecast to rise to 1.4 per cent in 2010, reflecting the improvement 
of the cyclical situation in a less favourable context for international row material prices.   133 
 
The risk remains that the adverse effects of the recession on the labour market could still have 
significant repercussions for household expenditure and that the supply of credit, still 
conditioned by programs to recapitalize banks, could keep the recovery of final domestic 
demand subdued. The risk of a double-dip at the turn of next year has not completely 
disappeared. 
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5.3.22  Italy  REF 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP    − 4.9  0.6 
Private consumption    − 1.8  0.3 
Public consumption    1.0  0.9 
Gross fixed capital formation    − 13.3  − 0.2 
   Private excl. dwellings    − 19.2  2.4 
   Dwellings    − 7.1  − 2.6 
Change in stocks 
a
    − 0.4  0.1 
Total domestic demand    − 4.1  0.5 
Exports of goods and services    − 18.6  1.9 
Imports of goods and services    − 15.5  1.3 
Net exports  
a
    − 0.6  0.1 
GDP deflator    2.2  1.3 
Consumer prices    0.7  1.4 
Private consumption deflator    0.0  1.8 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
     1.8  − 0.1 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate    1.2  1.7 
Employment (thousands)  23404.7  22987.3  22803.3 
Unemployment rate 
d
   6.7  7.9  8.6 
Real household disposable income    − 0.3  − 0.2 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
     13.8  13.5 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
      − 5.6  − 5.5 
Gross public debt 
f,g
      115.3  118.8 
Current account balance  
f
      − 2.9  − 2.8 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   4.0  1.4  1.5 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate   2.2  0.3  0.7 
GDP          
    USA    − 3.1  0.9 
    Japan    − 5.5  1.3 
    Euro Area    − 4.0  1.0 
World trade volume (goods)    − 11.8  5.6 
Oil price 
i
   98.3  61.4  74.6 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.471  1.387  1.493 
    Yen/Euro   152.0  131.1  138.3 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries        
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   135 
Italy  REF 
The Italian business cycle has followed the recent evolutions observed for the euro area 
economy. The minimum of the cycle was reached last spring; the fall of GDP became less 
severe in the second quarter of 2009. Private expenditure has reduced only slightly (if compared 
with the contraction of GDP), thanks to some factors that have softened the impact of crisis on 
households, i.e. automatic stabilisers, fall of inflation. Even the reduced deterioration of labour 
market has helped: employment has decreased in a reduced measure, thanks to the reduction in 
the worked hours and the use of Cassa Integrazione, a fund that pays the wages of workers laid 
off temporarily, or whose working hours have been reduced, while unemployment has risen to 
7.4% (from 6.7% recorded in the 2Q 2008). 
The contraction was severe for investments; firms have corrected their investment decisions 
given the deterioration of cycle, the growing uncertainty, and the fear of credit constraints. 
There is also some evidence that the credit supply has been reduced, in particular for SMEs.  
The indicators have shown an improvement since last spring; but even if the fall has finished, 
we are far from a rebound. The pace of the recovery is modest. Industrial activity has been 
moving not so over the minimum and in the period May-July the cumulate contraction (by 
respect to the maximum recorded in the first quarter of 2008) has been still large (-24%). Even 
if more recent indicators signal some improvement at the end of the summer, one could wonder 
if the recovery will be only partial. 
If the correction in the level of activity is permanent, that means that some productions have 
disappeared and there will be an excess of productive capacity, with negative effects on the 
investment decisions and the labour market. 
The outlook for the next year(s) is also affected by the need of a fiscal consolidation, in Italy as 
in other countries. After a cumulate loss of 6 p.p. in two years, the growth of GDP in 2010 will  
be only modest, given the lack of a strong recovery in GFCF and the weakness of private 
consumption: households will be affected by the deterioration of labour market (employment 
will continue to decrease, due to the delayed effects of cycle), and by the return of inflation, that 
will depress real wages.  
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5.3.23  Netherlands            CPB 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  595.9  − 4.7  0.1 
Private consumption  272.5  − 2.7  − 0.8 
Public consumption  151.8  2.2  0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation  121.7  − 10.6  − 6.6 
   Private excl. dwellings  65.3  − 13.3  − 8.9 
   Dwellings  37.9  − 12.2  − 8.1 
Change in stocks 
a
  0.2  − 0.5  0.3 
Total domestic demand  546.131  − 3.6  − 1.4 
Exports of goods and services  457.4  − 10.9  2.5 
Imports of goods and services  407.6  − 10.3  0.5 
Net exports  
a
  49.8  − 1.3  1.4 
GDP deflator     1.3  0.8 
Consumer prices     1.1  1.1 
Private consumption deflator     0.5  1.2 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      9.4  − 3.7 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     na  na 
Employment (thousands)  7668.4  − 0.8  − 2.9 
Unemployment rate 
d
   303.6  5.2  7.9 
Real household disposable income     0.4  − 1.0 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      10.6  10.6 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 4.6  − 6.2 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       59.9  65.8 
Current account balance  
f
       3.7  5.7 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      1.4  1.5 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      3.8  4.1 
United States Federal funds rate      0.3  0.5 
GDP          
    USA     − 3.25  1.25 
    Japan     − 6.00  1.00 
    Euro Area     − 4.50  0.00 
World trade volume (goods)     − 15.75  3.50 
Oil price 
i
      58.0  65.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.365  1.400 
    Yen/Euro      130.7  134.4 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   137 
Netherlands            CPB 
The credit crisis has thrown the world economy into a deep recession. The Dutch economy 
cannot escape from this and is expected to contract by 4¾% next year. For 2010, zero growth is 
foreseen. The country expressly experiences the consequences of the worldwide drop in 
demand. Re-exports are expected to decrease by 12½% this year. Domestically produced 
exports will also show a large fall, of 14¾%. According to today’s forecasts, Dutch re-exports 
will expand by 4½% next year, while the rise in ‘made in Holland’ exports will then be limited 
to 1½%.  
Households are expected to consume 2¾% less this year than last year, despite the forecast 3% 
increase in real disposable wage- and benefit income. Next to the decline in profit income of 
over 40% in 2009 (almost 7 billion euro), households see their housing wealth diminish as a 
result of slightly descending home prices. This moderate drop in home prices will probably last 
for some time, which harms consumer confidence. Next year, household consumption could 
drop by another ¾% compared to the already low level of 2009. 
Because of the plummeting demand, from both abroad and home, private enterprise is not in top 
gear this year. Capacity utilization is relatively low. As a result, firms have little reason to 
invest right now. What’s more, profitability is under pressure. That makes it more difficult to 
finance investments — all the more so in a period in which banks are sharpening credit 
conditions. The result is an expected decrease in private non-residential gross fixed investment 
of 14% in 2009 and another 9½% in 2010. 
 
Usually there is some delay in the reaction of unemployment to changes in production. This 
year, employment (measured in persons) is expected to decrease by ¾%; for 2010, a further 
decline of 2¾% is forecast. Under the influence of unfavourable circumstances at the labour 
market, the so-called cyclical labour supply diminishes: women postpone their return to the 
labour market, young people decide to study longer, and some of the elderly retire earlier. This 
exerts a restraining influence on unemployment. The introduction of a part-time unemployment 
scheme also lowers official unemployment figures: statistics do not count people in this scheme 
as unemployed, because they still have a job. Nevertheless, unemployment will rise to (on 
average) 5¼% this year and 8% next year — a twofold increase compared to 2008. 
As a consequence of the worldwide fall in demand and the lower oil price (and related to that, 
the lower prices for natural gas and electricity), inflation will go down from 2.5% in 2008 to an 
expected 1% in 2009. All the same, the rise in contractual wages will be 3% on average this 
year. This rise is relatively large, compared to inflation, because many collective labour 
agreements for this year were settled in 2008, when inflation was still high and unemployment 
low. As it is forecast now, inflation will also be 1% next year. The rise in contractual wages will 
drop to 1½% on average, as a result of quickly increasing unemployment and low inflation.   138 
Forecast uncertainties mainly concern the timing and strength of the economic recovery. The 
most recent figures of the economic indicators show some signs of improvement in the 
economic situation. It is hard to assess whether the economy will grow substantially from this 
point, will stay at the current lower level or even further decrease after a temporary recovery. In 
addition, swine flu increases uncertainty. In the projection, a mild world wide pandemic is 
assumed.  
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5.3.24  Norway  SN 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP (mainland)  223.2  − 1.2  2.1 
Private consumption  120.9  0.4  5.4 
Public consumption  59.8  5.7  3.5 
Gross fixed capital formation  64.6  − 5.9  − 0.2 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings  12.1  − 13.6  2.3 
Change in stocks 
a
     − 0.9  0.0 
Total domestic demand (mainland)  227.0  0.1  4.1 
Exports of goods and services, traditional goods  39.5  − 10.6  2.7 
Imports of goods and services  89.4  − 8.8  6.6 
Net exports, mainland, traditional goods 
a
     0.2  − 2.2 
GDP deflator (mainland)     3.2  2.5 
Consumer prices     1.9  0.9 
Private consumption deflator     2.3  0.5 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      − 0.3  0.7 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     4.0  3.7 
Employment (thousands)  2616.0  − 0.5  − 0.6 
Unemployment rate 
d
   2.6  3.3  3.9 
Real household disposable income     2.8  5.6 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   2.0  4.6  4.5 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    18.8  na  na 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       na  na 
Current account balance  
f
    19.5  13.4  11.1 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)   5.3  na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   6.2  2.5  2.7 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.9  1.0 
    Japan     na  na 
    Euro Area     − 4.1  0.3 
World trade volume (goods), Norways partners     − 10.0  1.6 
Oil price 
i
      59.9  64.5 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.370  1.370 
    Yen/Euro      130.5  130.4 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   8.20  8.75  8.24 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   140 
Norway  SN 
The current situation 
The current slowdown in Norway began as far back as early 2008, but worsened dramatically 
when the financial crisis hit the economy with full force at the end of the third quarter last year. 
According to the most recent seasonally-adjusted figures from the quarterly national accounts, 
the GDP for mainland Norway fell by 2.7 per cent from the third quarter last year to the first 
quarter this year. The GDP for mainland Norway increased by 0.3 per cent in the second quarter 
and growth is expected to gradually recover in the next few years. 
Despite the sharp cyclical downturn through the winter, unemployment has not increased much 
in Norway. Norway’s counter-cyclical policy is stronger than that in the euro area. Norwegian 
households probably do not expect a fiscal policy reversal in the form of tax increases in the 
near future. This may make fiscal policy more effective as a counter-cyclical measure in 
Norway. The petroleum sector now appears to having a stabilising effect on the Norwegian 
economy in the short term. Finally, the financial crisis caused a rapid weakening of the krone 
against the euro. This has eased the pressure on the internationally exposed business sector 
compared with euro area countries. The last upturn saw a sharp rise in labour migration into 
Norway. Many immigrants have been working on short-term contracts, and return to their home 
countries when the downturn comes. Unemployment therefore increases less than if they had 
been living permanently in Norway. The increased numbers opting for higher education, which 
is typical of a Norwegian downturn, also reduces the labour supply and hence unemployment in 
the short term. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
The economic slump is easing off after extensive policy interventions aimed both directly at the 
problems in the financial markets and in the form of more traditional demand stimulation. 
Interest rates are at record low levels and the fiscal policy is extremely expansive. 
 
With prospects of continued weak economic growth in Norway, an expansionary fiscal policy 
will be maintained in 2010, but far less fiscal stimulus is expected than in 2009. We assume that 
there will be a certain shift in the composition of public sector spending towards greater 
emphasis on investment and somewhat less on consumption. Interest rates will increase slowly, 
to prevent the krone from appreciating too much 
The outlook 
The strengthening of the NOK is expected to continue. Because the Norwegian economy as a 
whole is fairing much better than our trading partners, we should also expect a higher growth in 
wage costs in Norway than in our competitors’ countries. Impaired cost-related competitive 
power will therefore counteract the improvement in the international markets. Despite   141 
progressive growth in traditional exports of goods, the export volume in 2012 is expected to 
only just surpass the level of 2008. 
 
Economic policy is promoting consumption growth, and growth in the mainland economy will 
pick up somewhat through 2010. When the fall in housing investment comes to a halt next year, 
the slowdown in the building industry will level off . Mainland GDP growth is projected to rise 
gradually to trend or higher in 2011. Our projections therefore show the business cycle in 
Norway bottoming out at the end of 2010/beginning of 2011, but that GDP will remain below 




   142 
5.3.25  Poland        IBRKK 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  362.0  0.9  1.4 
Private consumption  223.3  1.9  1.0 
Public consumption  67.2  2.1  2.2 
Gross fixed capital formation  79.9  − 3.1  − 1.2 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings     na  na 
Change in stocks 
a
  6.0  − 1.8  0.8 
Total domestic demand  376.3  − 0.9  1.5 
Exports of goods and services  142.8  − 10.0  4.9 
Imports of goods and services  157.2  − 13.3  5.2 
Net exports  
a
  − 14.4  1.8  − 0.2 
GDP deflator     3.4  2.0 
Consumer prices     3.5  2.1 
Private consumption deflator    3.5  2.1 
Output gap 
b
       − 0.4  − 1.1 
Unit labour costs 
c
      3.0  1.2 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     4.7  2.1 
Employment (thousands)     − 0.7  − 0.9 
Unemployment rate 
d
      9.8  11.6 
Real household disposable income     0.5  − 0.9 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      5.5  3.7 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 5.8  − 7.2 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       49.0  53.5 
Current account balance  
f
       − 3.9  − 3.4 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      3.5  3.5 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      4.4  5.0 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      4.7  5.5 
United States Federal funds rate      0.3  0.3 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.6  1.5 
    Japan     − 5.4  1.7 
    Euro Area     − 4.1  0.5 
World trade volume (goods)     − 13.5  7.3 
Oil price 
i
   97.7  60.5  75.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.460  1.390  1.470 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   3.52  4.31  4.05 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   143 
Poland  IBRKK 
The current situation 
For 2009 as a whole, Poland’s GDP growth is expected to remain positive mainly due to a 
highly positive contribution of net exports (albeit in a declining trend) and still relatively 
vigorous consumption, both private and public. The latter and public investments are strongly 
supported by the EU structural funds. In result of the sustained depreciation of the Polish 
currency and a continued foreign goods de-stocking the import demand has collapsed more than 
exports. However, a deterioration of business climate and a growing unemployment have a 
negative impact on the investment demand and prospects for consumer demand.  
  With a moderate positive growth accompanied by a mitigating inflation and improving 
current account balance, Poland’s economic performance looks quite well in the world-wide 
crisis environment. Fiscal position has however worsened more than expected due to shrinking 
tax revenues.  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
Both monetary and fiscal policies are neutral. As disinflation is rather sluggish, interest rates 
have been cut only moderately though continuously. The central bank has also reduced 
obligatory reserve ratio by 0.5 p.p. to stimulate credit supply. At beginning of the crisis fiscal 
policy reaction was pro-cyclical as exemplified by the last February action to cut current 
expenditures. As it was not enough, the parliament had to revise the 2009 budget allowing for 
the 6% of GDP deficit motivated mainly by cyclical factors. Discretionary anti-crisis fiscal 
measures are of a very moderate size and are implemented quite slowly. The room for a more 
expansionary fiscal policy is limited with a high structural deficit and difficulties in budget 
deficit financing. 
The outlook 
De-stocking should terminate in the nearest future. With a sustained positive consumption 
growth, backed by decelerating inflation, pension indexation, lowering households savings and 
the EU funds, domestic demand should recover in 2010. The recovery will be followed by a 
growing import demand. Improving external environment will support Polish exports but net 
export contribution  to the GDP will become slightly negative. On the risk side there is the 
slower recovery or stagnation of  the GDP growth in Western Europe, higher than expected 
unemployment growth and a deeper deterioration of households financial position.   
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5.3.26  Serbia    FTRI 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  33.7  − 3.2  3.6 
Private consumption  14.5  1.7  1.1 
Public consumption  12.8  1.4  1.2 
Gross fixed capital formation  4.7  1.7  2.3 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings     na  na 
Change in stocks 
a
     na  na 
Total domestic demand  31.8  1.7  2.2 
Exports of goods and services  10.6  3.5  4.8 
Imports of goods and services  18.2  4.5  5.4 
Net exports  
a
  − 23.6  − 22.4  − 21.5 
GDP deflator     na  na 
Consumer prices  10.1  12.9  8.9 
Private consumption deflator     na  na 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     na  na 
Employment (thousands)  2001  − 3.8  − 3.1 
Unemployment rate 
d
   22.4  23.4  26.8 
Real household disposable income     na  na 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      na  na 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       na  na 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    25.4  na  na 
Current account balance  
f
    − 17.2  − 11.8  − 13.4 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      na  na 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     na  na 
    Japan     na  na 
    Euro Area     na  na 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
      na  na 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      na  na 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   96.00  97.00  105.00 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   145 
Serbia   FTRI 
The current situation 
Weak global and domestic demand and almost discontinued lending induced a further slump in 
Serbia’s economic activity– a fall in real GDP in Q2 2009 is estimated at 4.4% y-o-y. Recession 
was reflected mainly in employment cuts, a drop in wages and tighter credit terms for 
households. A sharp contraction in investment, both by the government and enterprises, 
continued into Q2. Despite increased dinar liquidity in Q2, banks did not step up their lending. 
The activity in the non-subsidized segment of the credit market was particularly slow and 
enterprises continued repaying their external debt. Demand for investment loans was weak even 
on the subsidized market. International economic flows contracted sharply on account of a 
drastic slump in economic activity both at home and in Serbia’s major trading partners. A 
record low current account deficit in Q2, coupled with a substantial surplus on the financial 
account (owing to the first tranche of the IMF loan proceeds) resulted in positive balance of 
payments and an increase in foreign exchange reserves, which largely contributed to 
stabilization of trends in the foreign exchange market. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
A fiscal expansion in 2009 would be carried over into 2010, which is what happened this year 
and the one before. In spite of the fact that the current account deficit reduced remarkably in Q2 
2009, it is possible to grow up in 2010, which would raise the probability of a balance of 
payments problems. Also, high public spending would continue pushing up inflation. If current 
spending cannot be curtailed sufficiently to reach the balanced budget target, the capital budget 
may need to be scaled back, or, as a last resort, indirect taxes be raised. General monetary 
condition was restrictive in the first part of the year. A more restrictive monetary policy has its 
impact on the real side of the economy. Anti-crisis packages started with support measures to 
increase the working capital of enterprises. Based on the latest projection and the underlying 
risk factors, the NBS Monetary Policy Committee judges that the key policy rate is more likely 
to be lowered in the next period than kept on hold (12%). Given the risks to the 2010 inflation 
target, the Monetary Policy Committee will decide on further cuts in the key policy rate once 
the key economic policy elements are defined. 
The outlook 
FTRI outlook predicts a week cycle in the second half of the year because of prolonged effects 
of credit restriction from the first part of year, and week external demand. The GDP decreases 
this year would be near 3.5%; the second half of the 2009 deceleration would give a negative 
stimulus to 2010 when expected growth would be about 3.6%.  
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Due to general condition of the economy, a year inflation rate with about 10% will still be high, 
going down to below 10 percent next year. If FDI inflow in second half of the year would 
accelerate, investment in 2010 would reinforce following better prospects.  
 
Economic crisis is increasingly weighing down on the labor market as reflected in a sharp fall in 
employment both in legal entities and by natural persons. The economic downturn impacted on 
the rising number of unemployed persons and the jobless rate. Growing indebtedness of the 
household has stimulated private consumption last year, but current recession impulse 
decreasing household expenditure. Notwithstanding high unemployment, wage settlements are 
excessive relative to targeted inflation and labour productivity growth, undermining firms' 
external cost competitiveness.  
 
Private external debt has soared, increasing the risk of a disorderly external adjustment, 
particularly in an environment of worsening global financial conditions. 
 
In the course of 2010 production is likely to rise. Momentum will, however, remain low. 
Investment will pick up as a result of expected growing export demand, primary in EU, and 
falling tensions on international financial markets. 
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5.3.27  Slovak Republic  SAS 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  67.3  − 4.5  1.3 
Private consumption  37.4  − 1.5  1.5 
Public consumption  11.6  3.0  5.5 
Gross fixed capital formation  17.5  − 7.1  3.0 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings     na  na 
Change in stocks 
a
     na  na 
Total domestic demand  69  na  na 
Exports of goods and services  55.6  − 14.0  − 0.4 
Imports of goods and services  57.2  − 10.1  − 1.3 
Net exports  
a
     na  na 
GDP deflator  2.9  na  na 
Consumer prices  3.9  1.9  2.3 
Private consumption deflator  4.4  na  na 
Output gap 
b
    3.9  na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     na  na 
Employment (thousands)  2434.0  − 2.6  1.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
   9.6  12.4  11.7 
Real household disposable income  40.1  na  na 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
           
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 2.2  − 6.3  − 5.5 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    27.6  36.0  41.0 
Current account balance  
f
    − 6.5  na  na 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)           
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      na  na 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      na  na 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     na  na 
    Japan     na  na 
    Euro Area     na  na 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
      na  na 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      na  na 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   31.29  na  na 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   148 
5.3.28  Slovenia    SKEP 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  37135.0  − 7.0  0.7 
Private consumption  19580.0  − 0.5  0.0 
Public consumption  6735.0  3.2  1.0 
Gross fixed capital formation  10742.0  − 20.0  1.8 
   Private excl. dwellings  8977.0  − 20.0  1.0 
   Dwellings  1723.0  − 8.0  − 8.0 
Change in stocks 
a
  1201.0  0.5  0.0 
Total domestic demand  38258.0  − 4.0  0.7 
Exports of goods and services  25134.0  − 19.0  2.6 
Imports of goods and services  26258.0  − 18.0  2.4 
Net exports  
a
  − 3.0  − 0.1  0.0 
GDP deflator     na  na 
Consumer prices     0.8  1.3 
Private consumption deflator     na  na 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     4.3  2.0 
Employment (thousands)  879.0  − 3.0  − 1.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
      5.8  7.0 
Real household disposable income     na  na 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      na  na 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 5.5  − 6.5 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       30.0  35.0 
Current account balance  
f
       − 0.5  0.0 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      1.2  1.3 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      4.5  4.7 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA  1.1  − 3.0  1.2 
    Japan  − 0.7  − 5.5  1.0 
    Euro Area  0.8  − 4.1  0.5 
World trade volume (goods)  3.3  − 15.0  5.0 
Oil price 
i
   98.0  60.0  72.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.47  1.39  1.42 
    Yen/Euro   152.0  130.0  130.0 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   149 
Slovenia  SKEP 
The current situation 
Slovenia is experiencing the deepest crisis since the country’s independency. Pointed economic 
decline have resulted in negative GDP growth in the last quarter 2008 and in the first quarter 
2009 - after two negative quarters GDP increased by 0.7% in the second quarter this year. 
Nevertheless, due to the negative effects of the economic and financial crisis still the year on 
year drop in activity remained high, -9.3%. The international crisis had a great negative effect 
on exports and also domestic demand, particularly on investments. In the first half 2009 exports 
were down by one fifth, even more declined imports. The contribution of net exports to GDP 
growth was positive. Industrial production slowed down during 2009, in manufacturing even by 
22%, second key factor in the GDP decline is lower fixed capital formation (-25%), as a result 
of lower capacity utilisation because of decline in orders and partly of tighter financing 
conditions and a slowing cycle in infrastructure investments. Public consumption increased by 
4% in the fist half of the year, private consumption fall by 1.2%. Labour market indicators 
deteriorated - the number of persons in employment diminished, the number of registered 
unemployed persons in first seven months grew by even 28% compared to 2008. It is expected 
to grow further in the months to come. Inflation melted in 2009, mainly due to low economic 
activity and lower oil and food prices. After deflation in July, inflation rate stood at zero in 
August and after a drop of consumer prices in September again minor deflation was observed.  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
Despite measures to stimulate financial sector by injecting liquidity, in anti-crisis packages 
credit activities remain moderate in majority of banks, interest rates and risk premium are 
relatively high in 2009. Wage subsidies, given manufacturing companies to keep jobs and 
subsiding full working time were effective and around 20.000 jobs were preserved. Along with 
sharp decline of GDP and decline in tax revenues, general government deficit deteriorated close 
to 6 percent of GDP in 2009. Budget expenditures are rising, particularly for transfers and 
public sector wages. Due to the process of eliminating wage disparities wage increases in the 
public sector are among the main risks for general government deficit. In autumn 2009 
discussions for medium- and long-term reforms are undergoing, such as modernisation of 
pension system, social expenditures, parts in health care system. Public deficit should narrow 
again in years after 2010. 
 
The outlook 
The prospects for the rest of this year and 2010 are still uncertain. Despite slight improvement 
reflected in business climate indicator, nevertheless industrial production, exports and some 
related services (transport, retail trade) are still on a low level. Investments are slowing down   150 
substantially. After sharp decline of GDP estimated on -7 percent, modest economic prospects 
are foreseen also for the first half of 2010. Slow recovery is to expect in the second part of the 
year 2010 and economic growth will be only slightly positive in 2010 (0.7%). Some 
improvement could arise from external markets (exports are foreseen to rise by 2.6% in real 
terms), and also domestic demand – public sector investments coupled with more efficient 
drawing on EU funds could give some impetus to investments and public consumption. Wages 
are foreseen to grow moderate, with an inflation rate of 1 percent in 2010. Unemployment is 
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5.3.29  Spain    CEPREDE 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  1088.5  − 3.6  − 0.3 
Private consumption  622.8  − 5.3  − 1.4 
Public consumption  211.1  5.2  4.0 
Gross fixed capital formation  314.0  − 15.4  − 3.2 
   Private excl. dwellings  226.2  − 8.9  − 2.2 
   Dwellings  87.8  − 23.3  − 3.5 
Change in stocks 
a
  1.1  − 15.8  − 8.4 
Total domestic demand  1152.5  − 6.2  − 0.7 
Exports of goods and services  289.0  − 12.1  1.6 
Imports of goods and services  353.0  − 18.8  − 0.3 
Net exports  
a
  − 5.9  − 71.3  − 28.7 
GDP deflator  135.4  0.8  1.5 
Consumer prices  130.3  0.0  2.1 
Private consumption deflator  130.3  0.0  2.1 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
   32.2  4.2  2.5 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate  32.2  4.2  2.5 
Employment (thousands)  18971.4  − 6.5  − 1.9 
Unemployment rate 
d
   11.3  18.2  20.3 
Real household disposable income  24.7  4.3  0.4 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   14.3  28.1  5.8 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    − 4.0  − 6.4  − 8.0 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    39.5  48.2  52.4 
Current account balance  
f
    − 0.2  − 60.4  − 4.2 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)   3.0  0.8  1.0 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   4.6  1.3  1.6 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   4.4  4.0  3.8 
United States Federal funds rate   2.97  0.8  1.0 
GDP          
    USA  0.5  − 2.9  2.2 
    Japan  − 0.7  − 5.6  1.3 
    Euro Area  0.6  − 3.5  0.6 
World trade volume (goods)     − 13.0  2.5 
Oil price 
i
   97.2  57.9  86.9 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.463  1.36  1.29 
    Yen/Euro   152.45  147.4  143.6 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   152 
Spain    CEPREDE 
The current situation 
Spain is living the current crisis in a harder way than the rest of the countries of the same area. 
The problems in the labour market are the result of the lack of capacity to create jobs in sectors 
different to the construction, which is producing the most of the unemployment. 
If we look at the recent developments in short term indicators we could advance than they have 
already passed the tough and someone have even showed some positive growth compared to 
previous period. 
It means that GDP growth rate would be very close to cero in the third quarter and slightly 
positive in last one. At the end GDP annual growth rate would be around 3,6% in 2009, half 
point over the Euro zone average. 
On the positive side we should remark the significant correction achieved in the current account 
deficit, which could be reduced form nearly 10% of GDP in 2008, to almost the half in current 
year. 
Unfortunately much of this disequilibrium has been passed trough the public sector that could 
increase its deficit in more than five GDP points. 
Although the most troubling news have come from labour markets where more than one and a 
half millions of jobs have been destroyed in one year and the unemployment rate has raising 
almost seven points in four quarters. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
Having in mind the weakness of the Spanish domestic demand some supportive policies will be 
still needed in coming year, both from monetary as well as fiscal sides. 
As it is not clear the ECB planned timing to normalize monetary policies, the Spanish 
authorities should keep some expansionary measures, at least in a short run,  but preventing 
additional deterioration of the fiscal deficit. As this equilibrium will be very difficult to achieve 
additional efforts should be needed, not only in quantitative dimension of expenditures but also 
in the qualitative one, trying to be very careful in the choice of spending policies. 
The outlook 
As we have mention above, we are forecasting a quarterly recovery path starting between the 
third and fourth quarter this year and showing year on year positive figures in the second half of 
2010. This quarterly profile still yields a slightly negative GDP growth rate in 2010. 
For coming years we are forecasting a GDP growth rates well below the potential because high 
employment rates will drag households incomes and consumption, while private investment 
will keep very moderated in a framework of low GDP growth expectations.   153 
Accumulated disequilibrium in fiscal balance and labour markets will be, therefore, very 
difficult to correct in the short term and only the external balance will show some improvement 
in the future with higher savings and lower investment rates. 
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5.3.30  Spain    SGEI 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  1088.5  − 3.6  − 0.3 
Private consumption  622.8  − 4.1  − 0.4 
Public consumption  211.1  2.9  1.8 
Gross fixed capital formation  314.0  − 14.2  − 4.7 
   Private excl. dwellings  226.3  na  na 
   Dwellings  87.7  − 12.5  − 7.5 
Change in stocks 
a
     na  na 
Total domestic demand  1152.5  − 5.6  − 1.0 
Exports of goods and services  288.9  − 16.2  2.1 
Imports of goods and services  353.0  − 20.5  − 0.6 
Net exports  
a
     2.3  0.7 
GDP deflator     0.4  0.1 
Consumer prices     na  na 
Private consumption deflator     na  na 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      0.4  0.0 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     na  na 
Employment (thousands)     − 1119.3  303.5 
Unemployment rate 
d
      17.9  18.9 
Real household disposable income     na  na 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      na  na 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 9.5  − 8.1 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       39.7  53.4 
Current account balance  
f
       − 5.2  − 5.2 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)      na  na 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
      1.5  1.2 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
      3.6  4.0 
United States Federal funds rate      na  na 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.5  2.5 
    Japan     − 5.5  1.7 
    Euro Area     − 4.0  1.0 
World trade volume (goods)     − 12.0  2.5 
Oil price 
i
      56.0  67.2 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro      1.340  1.370 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries           
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   155 
5.3.31  Sweden CSE 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  328.3  − 5.0  1.0 
Private consumption  147.4  − 1.8  1.7 
Public consumption  86.8  1.5  0.9 
Gross fixed capital formation  64.0  − 14.0  − 5.0 
   Private excl. dwellings  43.9  − 16.0  − 6.1 
   Dwellings  10.2  − 27.4  − 10.6 
Change in stocks 
a
  48.0  − 0.9  0.4 
Total domestic demand  303.9  − 3.4  0.2 
Exports of goods and services  178  − 12.8  3.0 
Imports of goods and services  153.6  − 12.7  2.5 
Net exports  
a
  24.4  − 1.0  0.4 
GDP deflator     na  na 
Consumer prices  3.4  − 0.3  1.3 
Private consumption deflator  2.8  2.1  0.5 
Output gap 
b
       na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
      na  na 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate  3.9  2.4  1.8 
Employment (thousands)  4594.0  − 2.4  − 2.3 
Unemployment rate 
d
   6.2  8.1  9.7 
Real household disposable income  162.0  1.6  − 0.5 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   12.1  14.5  12.3 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    2.5  na  na 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    38.0  na  na 
Current account balance  
f
    7.8  7.2  7.3 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)   4.1  0.7  0.4 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   3.9  0.4  0.6 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   3.9  3.2  3.9 
United States Federal funds rate   2.1  0.3  0.8 
GDP          
    USA  10331.5  − 2.8  1.8 
    Japan     − 5.7  0.7 
    Euro Area  9211.3  − 3.9  0.9 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
   97.3  60.0  80.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.47  1.38  1.38 
    Yen/Euro      na  na 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   9.6  10.5  9.5 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   156 
Sweden  CSE 
The current situation 
A fall in GDP by 6.8 percent (y/y) in the first quarter was followed by a fall by 6 percent in the 
second quarter. Although, the second quarter was the first quarter since Q1 2008 displaying 
growth in GDP (q/q). This indicates that the downturn has ended. During the second half of 
2009 the economy is expected to begin a gradual recovery. It is likely that there will be some 
negative surprises along the way.  
 
There may be a tendency to overestimate the pace of the recovery. One reason for that is that 
there will be some technical effects on GDP when stocks are running out. Companies have to 
start to produce to be able to manage the same level of delivery.  
 
One important sign of recovery is that household consumption seems to increase again. During 
the end of 2008, and up to now, households have sharply increased their savings. Since 
disposable income has increased rapidly and costs for loans have fallen, there is potential for 
strong growth in household consumption the upcoming years. Therefore, it is of great 
importance that household confidence returns. 
 
The Swedish export has gained from a weak exchange rate for the Swedish krona up to the third 
quarter of 2009. Since then, the krona has appreciated and reached levels last seen before the 
financial crisis occurred.  
 
A strong budget surplus prior to the crisis has been helpful during the past year. Fiscal stimulus 
has been implemented without, at the same time, jeopardizing the long-run outlook for the 
Swedish economy.  
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
A reestablishment of households confidence is fundamental for the recovery in the Swedish 
economy. One reason for this is that when global demand starts to increase again the Swedish 
industry will face tough competition and it will take some time before the increased demand 
will lead to an increased employment. 
 
Another factor of importance is that the government continues to implement reforms to increase 
competitiveness. 
The outlook 
In 2009, the growth rate will be -5 percent. Exports, investments and household consumption 
are all contributing negatively to growth. There will also be a significant reduction in stocks. In   157 
2010, both private consumption and exports will contribute positively to GDP growth. 
Investments will continue to fall as companies still are uncertain about future demand and have 
enough spare capacity to meet the relatively small increase in demand.  
 
In 2011, GDP growth will be close to, or reach, long term growth. Exports and consumption 
will be normalized, although, investments will continue to be weak.  
 
The labour market will be weak during the forecast period (2009 to 2011). Unemployment will 
reach over 10 percent and employment will fall with 5 to 6 percent. The labour market is not 
expected to improve before late 2011. 
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5.3.32  Sweden NIER 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP     − 5.0  1.5 
Private consumption     − 1.5  2.2 
Public consumption     1.0  1.0 
Gross fixed capital formation     − 16.2  − 4.0 
   Private excl. dwellings     na  na 
   Dwellings     na  na 
Change in stocks 
a
     − 0.8  0.4 
Total domestic demand     − 4.8  1.1 
Exports of goods and services     − 14.7  3.1 
Imports of goods and services     − 15.7  2.7 
Net exports  
a
     − 0.6  0.4 
GDP deflator     2.6  0.5 
Consumer prices     1.9  0.8 
Private consumption deflator     na  na 
Output gap 
b
       − 7.6  − 7.5 
Unit labour costs 
c
      4.0  − 1.9 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate     3.3  2.1 
Employment (thousands)  4484.0  − 2.6  − 3.1 
Unemployment rate 
d
   6.1  8.8  11.4 
Real household disposable income     0.2  0.1 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
      13.6  12.0 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
       − 2.3  − 3.5 
Gross public debt 
f,g
       44.9  47.1 
Current account balance  
f
       6.7  6.4 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)   4.1  0.7  0.3 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   3.9  0.6  0.5 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   3.9  3.4  3.9 
United States Federal funds rate, end year   0.25  0.25  0.75 
GDP          
    USA     − 2.8  1.7 
    Japan     − 6.3  1.3 
    Euro Area     − 4.2  0.5 
World trade volume (goods)     na  na 
Oil price 
i
   97.0  60.0  71.0 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.460  1.370  1.410 
    Yen/Euro   151.1  131.1  137.0 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   9.61  10.60  9.92 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   159 
Sweden  NIER 
The current situation 
The decline in Sweden’s GDP has come to a halt as seasonally adjusted GDP was more or less 
unchanged between the first and second quarters of this year. Household consumption rose. 
Moreover, consumers have become noticeably less pessimistic and in August, consumer 
sentiment about the economy improved for the fourth month in a row. Another positive signal is 
that the sharp drop in Sweden’s exports has ceased. Various business tendency surveys have 
also increased. The increases, however, are from extremely depressed levels. All factors 
considered, the assessment is that GDP growth will be zero in the third quarter 2009. In the 
fourth quarter 2009 there will be a temporary drop in GDP. After three quarters of positive 
growth, household consumption will decrease because of the new influenza. Another factor, 
which impacts trade in services, will be a decrease in tourism by Swedes abroad and by 
foreigners in Sweden. In a full-year overview of 2009 and 2010, however, the new influenza is 
expected to affect GDP only marginally. The overall assessment is that GDP will be down by 
5.0 percent in 2009. 
The outlook 
Early in 2010, output and demand will begin to pick up. The tendency in other countries will 
strengthen slightly, and demand for Swedish exports will rise. With an assumed expansionary 
fiscal policy and low interest rates, household consumption will continue increasing. The 
increase will be slow, however, as consumption will be curtailed by rising unemployment.  
At the outset of next year, capacity utilization will be very low. Consequently, investment in the 
business sector will not pick up until the fourth quarter of 2010. All factors taken into account, 
GDP growth will be 1.5 percent in 2010.  
In 2011 the international recovery will continue, and the demand for Swedish exports will 
increase further. Growth in demand, however, will still be modest, as Swedish industry 
produces and exports a relatively high proportion of investment goods, for which demand will 
come late in the recovery. 
Unemployment will stabilize during 2011. Consumer confidence is increasing, and saving to 
build a buffer is decreasing. As incomes will be rising relatively fast and interest rates will still 
be low, the pace of growth in household consumption will increase. 
In 2011 capacity utilization will have risen sufficiently for business sector investment to pick 
up. At the same time, inventories will be approaching desired levels, and firms can slow down 
on inventory depletion. All factors considered, GDP will increase by 2.9 percent in 2011, and 
resource utilization will then start rising. 
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5.3.33  Switzerland    KOF 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP  341.5  − 3.4  0.1 
Private consumption  194.5  0.7  0.3 
Public consumption  36.5  2.5  1.2 
Gross fixed capital formation  72.6  − 4.6  − 3.4 
   Private excl. dwellings  41.4  − 10.1  − 6.8 
   Dwellings  31.2  2.7  0.6 
Change in stocks 
a
  − 1.0  0.0  0.4 
Total domestic demand  302.7  − 0.5  0.4 
Exports of goods and services  186.5  − 11.6  0.1 
Imports of goods and services  147.7  − 7.8  0.9 
Net exports  
a
  38.8  − 3.0  − 0.3 
GDP deflator  104.7  0.8  − 0.1 
Consumer prices  108.8  − 0.4  0.5 
Private consumption deflator  103.6  − 0.8  0.3 
Output gap 
b
    − 1.8  3.1  3.3 
Unit labour costs 
c
   3.4  4.9  − 1.8 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate  2.4  1.6  0.1 
Employment (thousands)  3325.1  − 0.2  − 1.8 
Unemployment rate 
d
   2.6  3.8  5.1 
Real household disposable income  324.5  3.2  0.8 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
   8.2  10.3  10.8 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
    0.9  0.2  − 2.1 
Gross public debt 
f,g
    40.0  39.9  41.4 
Current account balance  
f
    1.9  8.3  7.8 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)   2.52  0.3  0.4 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
   2.6  0.4  0.5 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
   2.9  2.3  2.4 
United States Federal funds rate   2.9  0.7  0.7 
GDP          
    USA  118.6  − 2.8  1.4 
    Japan  110.6  − 5.6  0.8 
    Euro Area  114.5  − 3.6  0.5 
World trade volume (goods)  162.2  − 11.9  4.8 
Oil price 
i
   97.7  59.8  67.5 
Exchange rate          
    Dollar/Euro   1.470  1.380  1.410 
    Yen/Euro   152.26  129.96  132.56 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries   1.59  1.51  1.53 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   161 
Switzerland    KOF 
The current situation 
The negative trade balance for 2009 and the sharp economic decline at the turn of 2008/2009 
will lead to a growth rate of -3.4 per cent in comparison with the previous year. In spite of the 
deteriorating situation on the labour market, private consumption will still show a weak increase 
this year. The oil price collapse in the second half of 2008 will result in a negative inflation rate 
for this year. Without the sharp decline in the price of oil, 2009 would have seen a rise in prices. 
The low inflation, combined with the massive stimulus measures abroad, which are having a 
positive effect on the demand for Swiss exports, should improve economic conditions 
somewhat in the second half of this year. Nevertheless, the situation on the labour market will 
not be easing up. 
Economic policy and country’s key features relevant for the outlook 
The Swiss National Bank is expected to maintain low interest rates for a fairly long period. The 
expected low inflation rate is giving enough leeway here. Interest rates will only rise toward the 
middle of the forecast period. Growth in spending from the public budgets should be declining 
next year owing to the expiring stimulus packages. As growth in revenues is expected to decline 
even more there will nevertheless be a positive fiscal impulse. 
The outlook 
The current stagnation will begin giving way to a slow recovery in mid-2010. The result is that 
economic growth for 2010 will be a mere 0.1 per cent. Inflation in the coming year will hit 0.5 
per cent. Private consumption will only begin to recover during the second half of 2010. GDP is 
expected to grow by about 1.4 per cent in 2011. Unemployment will reach its zenith in 2011 at 
5.5 per cent. 
 
Salaries will stay stuck at the current level for the time being. Hence, consumer demand will 
only start to perk up around the middle of the coming year, with an inflation rate of 0.5 per cent.  
Construction investments will be developing moderately (0.6 per cent). Investments in 
machinery and equipment will continue declining sharply (- 6.8 per cent). The current phase of 
inventory reduction will come to an end in the coming year. 
 
Thus, considering all the influencing factors, Switzerland will face a sustained economic 
recovery only as of mid-2010. Compared with the previous year, output in 2010 will be 
practically at a standstill (0.1 per cent). In 2011, GDP growth will reach 1.4 per cent compared 
to the previous year, and the annualised growth rates will rise to nearly 2 per cent towards the 
end of the forecast period. 
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5.3.34  United Kingdom  NIESR 
Variables  Level, Euro bn, current prices  Volume, % change from previous year 
j
 
       
   2008  2009  2010 
       
GDP    − 4.3  1.0 
Private consumption    − 3.5  − 1.1 
Public consumption    4.7  1.1 
Gross fixed capital formation    − 13.9  − 2.9 
   Private excl. dwellings    − 12.0  − 2.5 
   Dwellings    − 28.8  − 8.5 
Change in stocks 
a
    1.2  1.0 
Total domestic demand    − 4.8  0.1 
Exports of goods and services    − 8.7  7.4 
Imports of goods and services    − 9.9  3.5 
Net exports  
a
    0.6  0.9 
GDP deflator    − 0.2  0.3 
Consumer prices    1.3  1.3 
Private consumption deflator    − 0.3  0.7 
Output gap 
b
      na  na 
Unit labour costs 
c
     2.6  0.8 
Nominal hourly gross wage rate    na  na 
Employment (thousands)    − 1.8  − 1.0 
Unemployment rate 
d
     7.6  8.8 
Real household disposable income    2.3  2.0 
Net saving ratio (households) 
e
     6.1  8.9 
Public sector fiscal balance 
f,g
      − 11.2  − 11.5 
Gross public debt 
f,g
      66.0  77.2 
Current account balance  
f
      − 1.7  − 1.5 
Central bank policy rate (non-EMU countries)     0.6  1.2 
Short-term interest rate (3 months) 
h
     1.5  1.8 
Long-term interest rate (10 years)  
h
     3.6  4.0 
United States Federal funds rate     0.3  1.2 
GDP         
    USA    − 3.2  0.6 
    Japan    − 7.0  0.7 
    Euro Area    − 4.7  0.3 
World trade volume (goods)    − 10.1  9.6 
Oil price 
i
     59.3  67.7 
Exchange rate         
    Dollar/Euro     1.370  1.400 
    Yen/Euro     130.9  135.1 
    Local currency/Euro for non-EMU countries     0.80  0.87 
        a
 Percent of GDP of previous period (contribution to growth). 
b
 Percent of potential GDP. 
c
 Compensation of employees per head divided by labour productivity per head. defined as GDP in volume divided by total employees. 
d
 Percent of total labour force (according to Eurostat). 
e
 Percent of net disposable income. 
f
 Percent of GDP. 
g
 EMU definition. 
h
 Percent, the benchmark yield of corresponding government securities. 
i
 Brent.,USD/barrel, annual average. 
j
 If otherwise not specified.   163 
United Kingdom  NIESR 
The current situation 
Following the huge 2.4 per cent quarterly decline in the first three months of the year, the 
biggest for 50 years, the economy will shrink a further 0.4 per cent in the second and stagnate in 
the third. A recovery will begin in the final quarter of 2009, helped by consumers bringing 
forward purchases to beat the reversion of VAT from 15 to 17.5 per cent in January. The 
upswing will be sluggish as GDP expands by 1 per cent in 2010 and 1.8 per cent in 2011. Slack 
demand will bear down on prices, with consumer-price inflation expected to average 1.3 per 
cent in 2009 and 2010 while home costs, measured by the GDP deflator, will fall by 0.2 per 
cent this year and rise by just 0.3 per cent in 2010.  
 
The recovery will be weak because consumer spending, housing investment and business 
capital spending will carry on falling in 2010, though by much less than this year. Private 
consumption will decline by 1.1 per cent despite rising disposable income as households save 
more; the saving ratio will rise from 1.7 per cent in 2008 to 6.1 this year and 8.9 in 2010. The 
further rise in saving next year occurs partly for precautionary reasons as unemployment 
continues to rise but it also reflects continued falls in housing wealth as house prices resume 
their decline. This in turn will also bear down on housing investment, which will fall by 8.5 per 
cent in 2010. Business investment will decline by 2.5 per cent in 2010. 
 
Despite these counter-forces, they will be overcome by a turnaround in the inventory cycle and 
greater support from net trade. A rundown in stocks has intensified the recession, contributing 
1.2 percentage points out of the total 4.3 per cent decline in GDP this year. But in 2010 the 
change in inventories will add 1 per cent to GDP. Net trade, which has already been bolstering 
the economy during the recession, will underpin the recovery, boosting GDP by 0.9 per cent 
next year and by 1.2 per cent in 2011. Domestic producers of tradable goods will be able to 
exploit the competitive advantage from the lower pound as world trade recovers.  
 
A feeble recovery will do little to improve the public sector finances. The general government 
financial balance is expected to breach 11 per cent of GDP this year, before only gradually 
falling back to 7½ per cent of GDP in 2013. Gross debt is expected to have reached 95 per cent 
of GDP by then (from 44.2 per cent of GDP in 2007). Making matters worse in the longer term, 
trend growth is now estimated to be 2.3–2.4 per cent a year. That makes all the more essential a 
plan for sterner fiscal retrenchment than the one currently envisaged by the UK’s finance 
ministry. 
 
        